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DAY ONE
JOSEPH KEARNEY: Good morning. Stanley Fish told me just now that
when he was dean, he loved opening remarks. This, of course, is why I support
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conferences such as this. I would deny it, but it will so obviously be true by the
end of the next few minutes that it would not be a plausible denial.
I do want to welcome all of you. My name is Joseph Kearney, and it’s a
great privilege for me as dean of Marquette University Law School to welcome
you here. To be sure, I appreciate that I welcome you to your own conference.
That won’t stop me. I know that most, perhaps indeed all, of you have been
engaged on this matter, together with my colleague, Chad Oldfather, and one
another. I understand this to be a working conference, and you may be sure
that my welcoming remarks will not keep you long from your work.
Certainly, this is the sort of gathering that we at Marquette University Law
School really consider it a privilege to host, especially since we opened this
building, Eckstein Hall, in 2010. But even for some time before that, we at
Marquette Law School have been known as Milwaukee’s public square. That’s
an appellation that the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, which we think to be a
disinterested entity, gave us. We have been about the business of welcoming
the community, engaging it in substantive ways on important and difficult
topics, long and often. The Marquette Law School Poll, which we launched in
2012 and of which you may have heard, and our new endowed Lubar Center
for Public Policy Research and Civic Education are only recent examples of
this outreach.
But it is no hyperbole to say that we are especially glad for this conference.
That’s not only because Chad gave me a pass on all aspects of organizing it or
planning it. Admittedly, he did that in part because he knows that with me it’s
all or nothing, and so to have me organize part of it would have been probably
not a happy collaboration for us. But really the reason that we’re happy to host
this conference is that the topic is truly important. And for us to be able to
gather here, at Marquette University Law School, substantial scholars from
around the country is really a privilege for us. We are somewhat by ourselves
here at Marquette University Law School, with Milwaukee’s being unusual
among cities of its size in the sense that there is only one law school. I’m not
lamenting that as a general matter, but, for gatherings such as this, it does mean
that we have to persuade people to come and join us. It is true that Madison is
only 75 miles away and Chicago is not much farther, but we are really quite
glad to have you here today in our home, rolling up your sleeves.
I also admit or claim a certain particular affinity for your topic. I have my
own views about professional ethics within the law professoriate. No doubt
they are less well developed than (and thus easily displaceable in favor of)
whatever principles you collectively arrive at here. Yet I will indulge myself
by making one specific point—an observation of a phenomenon that I find
distasteful at best. This is the phenomenon of law professors’ participating in
amicus curiae briefs—or sometimes even representing parties—in litigation
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outside of officially recognized law school contexts (such as clinics) and yet
nonetheless associating themselves with their law schools in the matter. While
it happens all the time, I think this inappropriate, even apart from the immodest
self-denomination by some of these professors as “scholars” when they file
these briefs. This is not to suggest that I myself act against this phenomenon
any more than other deans seem to do, at least on the amicus front (you may be
sure that I would take action if a colleague purported, in a capacity associated
with the law school, to represent parties in litigation, as one did before I became
dean). None of this is to disdain the legal practice. In fact, considering myself
professionally, most fundamentally, to be a lawyer, I keep a hand in litigation,
and I myself on one occasion even filed a brief for myself as an officious
intermeddler—that’s a loose translation of amicus curiae, I know from my
study of Latin. But I do none of that cloaked in Marquette Law School garb.
There we have a principle that I would commend for your consideration in your
work this weekend.
So that is my welcome to you, which I mean to be warm and sincere, as
well as my short specific rant, which is perhaps self-indulgent but germane.
The last time Chad organized a conference and allowed me to introduce it (this
was on law clerks), I unburdened myself at somewhat greater length of my
views of the growing phenomenon of career law clerks. I liked my remarks so
well that I republished them in the Marquette Lawyer magazine, our semiannual
publication (I expect that the legal academics in the room are familiar with it),
where they attracted some attention. I do want you to know that I included in
the magazine not only my own remarks but various of the remarks of the
conference participants on their own pet peeves—I mean, their own deeply
supported views. Perhaps we will get to the point of doing the same again. I
said that I considered myself professionally most fundamentally to be a lawyer,
and I do, but as dean I also consider myself to be a magazine editor. So we’re
always on the lookout for good content, and we do hope that in conjunction
with the Marquette Law Review, which unlike us will include footnotes
qualifying your various views, we can get to a point where, when your work is
done, we can ensure that it receives adequate publicity in the legal academy.
But between now and then no doubt you have a lot of work to do, and, as
I’ve already mentioned to Chad and Paul, I, with apologies, have to run. I have
to meet with someone who at least on the phone a few minutes ago represented
himself as a donor. Now, that’s an old trick, of course. It could be a
disappointed applicant to the law school, but I’m reasonably confident in this
case. Best wishes for a great conference.
CHAD OLDFATHER: A few words on how this conference came to be. It
is, in an important sense, a child of social media because it has roots in mutually
sympathetic commentary on Facebook that led at one point Paul to say, “You
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know, I’ve had this idea for a conference and I think Carissa might be interested
as well.” And I was interested, and she was interested, and now here we are.
So thanks, Facebook, for this.
Our format here is a little bit unusual. It’s kind of a hybrid of a roundtable.
Not round obviously, but tables. And freeform discussion rather than a series
of presentations, which I think is enjoyable and hopefully productive, and we
want it ideally to be productive in the sense that we make some progress
towards the production of some sort of document that purports to set forth some
shared conceptions of ethical principles that relate to legal scholarship.
We are recording this, and I have to give credit here to the good folks from
the Marquette Law Review for coming up with this idea. That’s what accounts
for all of the microphones. The video camera is up there in the corner. Their
suggestion was that we might transcribe some portion of the discussion here
and potentially something could appear in the Law Review based on our
conversations. So, speak in complete sentences that cohere into nicely formed
paragraphs and we’ll be good to go. And we will obviously give everybody the
opportunity to edit anything that were to come out of it in that format.
A. Participant Introductions
NEIL HAMILTON: Well, just very briefly, I was teaching legal ethics for
ten years and then in the early ‘90s got interested in academic ethics broadly
across the university, not just in the law school. So, I spent 12 years with
scholarly focus on academic ethics. But, you know, there is no field of
academic ethics essentially across the university. I got very involved with
AAUP, got very involved with American Association of Colleges and
Universities, some other organizations.
So, my main goal was, could I encourage some sort of mandatory
acculturation into the—what we did have in terms of academic duty—academic
ethics. And it didn’t go anywhere. I couldn’t get any national organization to
really buy in, so I finally threw in the towel about 2006. Done that. But I still
am very much devoted to legal ethics and a lot into medical ethics now, so two
of the main professions are very much engaged in this, but the academic
professions so far in my view are not so very interested in this simply because
you’re in a new initiative trying to think through how to do better.
STANLEY FISH: Good morning. Unlike many of you or perhaps not, since
I don’t know your biographies, but I’ve had another life in another part of the
academy in humanities departments and also as an administrator. And
especially as an administrator I became interested in specifying the limits of
scholarly activity and the relationship with scholarly activity, two part of
saying, political activity. And that interest now extends or encompasses rather
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both my history in the humanities and my tenure in law schools. And I continue
to be alarmed, as many of you know, at the politicization of academic work,
which takes somewhat different forms in the humanities and in the law schools,
but is, in my view, equally pernicious.
LESLIE FRANCIS: I’m Leslie Francis and I’m a professor of law and a
professor of philosophy at the University of Utah. Probably the way I got roped
into this is I’m a former colleague of Carissa’s but I work in ethics. My original
field was philosophy of law. I’ve taught legal ethics over the years. I’ve taught
all kinds of applied ethics over the years. I publish and review pretty regularly
in medical journals because I do a lot of work in bioethics. I’ve also taught
research ethics all over the place, mostly for scientists who are on various kinds
of post-docs, so questions like “how you might make your Photoshop pictures
that are in your articles of your autorads look better? What’s fraud and what
isn’t?” are the kinds of things I’ve taught to scientists over the years.
I’ve also been involved in a lot of discussions in philosophy of academic
ethics. I’ve been on the board of officers of the APA a couple of times, once
as chair of the committee for the Defense of the Professional Rights of
Philosophers where there were a lot of academic ethics questions that came to
our committee, and another time, more recently as president of the Pacific
Division of the APA and in that capacity, I was involved in drafting the main
document on the APA’s website now about good practices in philosophy.
So, I hope I’m going to bring a kind of comparative sense because I live in
the law world, but I live in other worlds, too. And there’s been a lot more
discussion I think of academic ethics in some of those other worlds. I think
Professor Fish is probably aware of that, too.
RYAN SCOVILLE: So I think I’m interested in this as a relatively junior
scholar, someone who came into academia directly from practice, and thus as
someone who initially approached scholarship as an advocate. I’ve since come
to view advocacy work as problematic, but it took a while to get there. And so,
I come to this conference as someone who has probably breached some of the
principles that we’re going to be talking about. All of which is to say that I
sense from personal experience that there’s a real need for something like this,
perhaps particularly for junior academics who are coming directly from law
practice and have not already internalized what it means to approach a topic in
a scholarly manner rather than as someone who is trying to win an argument or
prevail for a client.
PAUL HORWITZ: Well, good morning. I’m Paul Horwitz and I’m very
happy to be here from the University of Alabama. I will be slightly too long as
usual. I’ve always been, and increasingly so, interested in the history and
sociology more or less of the legal academy, the kinds of culture we have, the
ways that we live it. It seems to me that law professors have never been fully
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acculturated into the academy in the way that others in the academy are. They
don’t have the same process of graduate study leading to developing a canon
and a set of norms. This is, I think, changing the growth of fellowships and the
fact that so much hiring is done from those fellowships. It’s kind of serving the
proxy graduate study period. But I think it’s not necessarily as fully thought
out as I would like it to be. Although I think more of those people are
developing a sense of a canon of legal academic literature, my outside
perspective, and I think Robin was very informative about how this can differ
from school to school, is so much of that practice is about getting a job and the
strategies it takes to get a job and not about what the norms should be in the
first place, that they’re not always being properly acculturated. So, I worry
about that.
Like many of us, I have long been interested in practices in legal
scholarship, generally from a critical perspective but as my paper suggests, not
without some ambivalence or inconsistency or what have you. And I often post
about these issues on PrawfsBlawg and I also have often found that the private
conversations that law professors have about the ethics of legal scholarship are
more revealing and more cynical than their public statements, which obviously
I find unfortunate.
A last thing, which is self-serving, but connected, is, in theory, I’m working
on a book that’s under contract whose sub-title is “Social Class and the
American Legal Academy.” Chad and I have often talked about this, and his
thesis, is that law professors’ social class in kind of a I guess more of a voir dire
than a socio-economic sense but their position and what people have called the
professional managerial class affects what they write in ways that are not
always evident, affects their agenda and the issues that they think of as the most
salient.
Whether or not those are the issues that are most in need of legal reform, I
say this because it seems like a relevant background topic in thinking about how
law professors write and what they write, how they frame it, but also because
the book is long enough past deadline that it’s not quite approaching its bar
mitzvah but it’s kind of past the toddler stage, I mean, of lateness, not of
existence.
So, when I meet a new room of people I’m happy to say—especially people
who have kind of relevant expertise and interest, happy to learn from you or
chat about it.
OLDFATHER: So, I’ll piggyback off some of what has been said and end up
being kind of autobiographical. I don’t have specific expertise in the sense that
I have previously written directly about any of these topics. I have certainly, as
I think we all have, noticed certain things and had conversations about those
things, including some of the phenomena that other people have already
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mentioned. Like Ryan, I came to legal academia directly from practice and,
indeed, from an extraordinarily long time in practice by the standards of these
things, which is, it was basically eight years in practice. And in that sense, I’m
fortunate to be here at all.
I’m also piggybacking off of the social class aspect of it. I’m a firstgeneration college student, lawyer, the whole works who grew up in a tiny town
in southern Minnesota not knowing any professionals at all. And it is both a
feature and a bug of my personality that, as a result, I have always tended to be
somebody who is inclined to try to figure things out for myself rather than ask
for help, which has meant that as a scholar, I’ve tended to pursue things in
whatever direction my interests took me rather than necessarily trying to
conform to, some mentor’s program or something along those lines. Certainly,
I think it’s something that comes out in the piece that I wrote.
With that said, I will not claim at all to have been immune from many of
the concerns that we’re going to be addressing. I am in my second teaching
job, and getting here involved a certain amount of strategic behavior on my
part. When I was submitting those first articles I said to myself, I’m not going
to place these except in a journal that is going to get the attention of
appointments committees elsewhere because I have this personal interest in
attempting to relocate. And I was able to do that and I’m quite sure it had an
impact on my ability to move.
I don’t feel great about that, but it is something that I did, and that in order
to achieve that goal I had to do it and it worked out. But I think it also speaks
to something that is off with the system. I think it’s also been true for me that
the articles I’ve written since have been more sophisticated, better, and have
also not placed as well. And I think there is something going on there that’s
worth talking about as well that may point to an aspect of the production of our
scholarship that could perhaps be fixed.
So, I’ll stop there. I’ll ramble more later, but I’ll let Carissa talk for a while.
CARISSA HESSICK: Thanks. So, I was really struck by what Ryan said
about how people who are junior should think about the ethics of legal
scholarship because I have to say when I was junior I thought about them not
at all, right? I thought about scholarship as a way to get tenure and promotion
and a way to try to get other people to think well of me in the academy. And,
you know, maybe because I’m a criminal law person I think to myself, “well,
maybe that’s what this is about.” This is about trying to get the profession to
explain what we think people need to do in order to be thought highly of. It
isn’t just where they place their articles but it’s other things as well.
I will say, I didn’t stop to think about the ethics of legal scholarship until
just a couple of years ago when I was at a workshop for non-senior scholars
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where people would bring very early projects and get feedback on the project.
And I was struck by someone who I like quite a lot and I think of as very
intelligent who had a project and everyone in the room was pushing this person
telling him that the obvious path to take this article was down this certain line
of thought. And his response was, “I can’t do that because there are obvious
doctrinal problems with that.” And we’re like, “well, who cares? This is a law
review article.” And he responded, “I’m working with a group that’s litigating
this and we’re going to be filing a brief in whatever circuit and I don’t want
something to be out there that makes clear how weak that argument is under
existing law.” And I was appalled, to put it mildly.
And it had a really, really big impact on me such that a couple of months
later when I went to WALS, the section on scholarship had a panel. Dick
Fallon, among other people, was speaking on that panel and I was really caught
up in it. And I happened to have been sitting next to Paul and I harassed him
quite a bit about all of this and I think he, through that, got an invitation to help
out with this conference in part to just leave him alone.
But since then I’ve been struck, especially after reading Fallon’s article1 on
scholars’ briefs, about what it is that we’re trying to do as law professors
because I did a short stint as associate dean and was constantly telling my
colleagues, “It’s wonderful that you’re working on this project. Is there some
way that we can get the word out there about what you’re doing?” And we
spent a lot of time talking about how we could get publicity for them, which
meant publicity for the school.
But in more recent years—or I should say more recent months—especially
since the most recent election I’ve been concerned by what I see law professors
doing in the public sphere when talking about legal issues and how they bear
on political issues of the day. I don’t know that I think that that is scholarship.
You know, certainly when I talk to my colleagues about what we get to put
down on our end-of-year form for what we’ve accomplished and what you
would get to put in the scholarship section, I don’t think that you should put opeds. I don’t think that you should put blog posts. I know different people can
disagree about these sorts of things, but nonetheless, I do feel as though maybe
we need to have a conversation as a profession about what’s expected of us
when we make those very public statements because that’s, after all, sort of the
face that we present to the outside world.
So anyways, I’m very interested to speak with you about all of this stuff as
a relative newcomer to thinking about these things. I actually think that these
questions are very difficult and, in some ways, they bump up against what we
1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Scholar’s Briefs and the Vocation of a Law Professor, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 223 (2012).
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have been told are in our careers about what it is that we’re doing and what it
is that we’re supposed to do and the impact that we’re supposed to have.
ROBIN WEST: Thank you so much for inviting me. I’m Robin West. I’ve
been a Georgetown faculty member for 26 years and I, too, am an ex-associate
research dean. I’ve been involved in appointments process, and therefore, in
the evaluation of legal scholarship for 35 years. I’m presently chair of the board
of editors at the Journal of Legal Education. I also, as we discussed last night,
do run a fellowship program at Georgetown for folks who want to join the legal
academy where we talk about these issues constantly.
I did write a book about law teaching and legal scholarship that addresses
many of these issues. It came out a few years ago. I focus in the book on the
history of the legal academy’s relationship to both the university and to the Bar.
It helps to know where we came from to understand why we are where we are
today.
What prompts my interest in this topic is a set of concerns that became clear
to me as I was writing that book that the legal academy is in a very severe sort
of “identity crisis” with respect to what legal scholarship is and what the point
of it is.
To just give a flavor of the split, when I was writing one of the chapters on
legal scholarship, the nature of legal scholarship, I started asking people
unscientifically, randomly, “what do you think of normative legal scholarship?”
That’s the phrase that’s often used to describe legal scholarship that more or
less takes the form “the law is X and it ought to be Y.”
And I noticed right away one afternoon, in the same ten-minute period,
colleagues telling me, “normative legal scholarship is just not legal scholarship”
and “it’s not legal scholarship because it’s not scholarship. If it’s normative,
it’s not scholarship. So, it’s not legal scholarship if you’re saying the law ought
to be this. That’s something else. It’s advocacy or it’s adversarialism or its oped writing in the guise of the Law Review, but anything that takes the form of
the law is X, it ought to be Y isn’t legal scholarship because it is not
scholarship.” This was stated most definitively and most emphatically by
colleagues who are empiricists of various stripes, social scientists, and
economists.
At the same time, there were others telling me, including some extremely
distinguished law faculty, that “legal scholarship that is not normative is not
legal scholarship because it’s not legal. If it’s not normative, it’s not legal.
Legal scholarship has to be normative.” This comes out in tenure debates. You
will have colleagues saying, “we can’t credit this as scholarship. This is
normative.” And then you’ll have others saying, “we can’t credit that as
scholarship because it’s not normative.”
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So, the depth of that difference and how, to restate it, how deeply that
difference cuts, I think, makes it very difficult to think about the ethics of legal
scholarship as a defined understood entity. It’s not like there’s this thing there
and we have to decide how to do it ethically and do it well. We have very
fundamental differences about the nature of the thing. And I mean, one could
go on. There are other deep divisions about what legal scholarship is, what it
should be, et cetera.
I think some of these issues are pretty easy. It seems to me people should
not be listing these things under scholarship. If you want to list them under
service, that raises a host of other problems. I do think there’s a role of legal
academics as public intellectuals where there’s a commitment to the rule of law
at stake. That’s the sort of lens that I use to think that through.
So, I concur with what Paul said in his statement that preliminarily to a
discussion about ethics, it seems to me there has to be some sort of statement
of at least the difficulty of specifying what legal scholarship is. In my view, I
have this very pollyannaish, pluralistic view of all of this and think that there’s
room for all sorts of forms of legal scholarship. And I don’t care what you call
it actually, but there’s much value to be had in normative legal writing and
there’s much value to be had in non-normative legal writing, but I do think that
the efforts that follow from these different types of legal writing including
critical and including anti-disciplinary are sometimes quite different.
ELI WALD: Good morning, everybody. I’m Eli Wald. For the past 15
years I’ve been teaching and researching about lawyers and lawyers’ ethics. In
particular, I’ve been interested in what it is that lawyers do, rules of professional
conduct, professional identity, and professionalism. One way to introduce my
interest in this conference is this: because I’m interested in what lawyers do I’m
interested in what academic lawyers, that is, law professors, do. It continues to
be true that most law professors are lawyers. Perhaps no longer practicing
lawyers, but at least the vast majority of law professors hold a J.D. degree and
passed a bar exam. And yet, we know relatively little about what academic
lawyers do. It’s as if by virtue of having gone to law school and having attended
a few lectures over three years and having read a few excerpted law review
articles, one is supposed to know when one becomes a law professor what to
do, how to teach, how to write, what is scholarship, what is teaching, and what
is service. There’s a significant gap there, so the opportunity to participate in a
conference that in some way–thinking about legal scholarship–might narrow
that gap was interesting to me.
One other introductory remark. Lawyers’ rules of “ethics” are not rules of
ethics at all. Rather, the rules of professional conduct are rules of law, as
promulgated by states’ supreme courts. As rules of law, the “ethics” rules
reflect political and statutory compromises that are not quite about the ethics of
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the matter. Similarly, the required “legal ethics” course at law schools is
primarily not about ethics but about law—the rules of professional conduct.
Some leading commentators argue that often the ethics gets lost in rules of
“ethics” and in “legal ethics.”2 If we are to come up with some set of rules for
ethical legal scholarship, I hope that we remember the ethics and that it does
get lost in some legal formulation in our proposed rules.
AMANDA SELIGMAN: Good morning. My name is Amanda Seligman.
Chad said at the outset that we all know each other but I think none of you know
me, except for maybe Chad. So, I’m just going to take a minute or two and talk
about how I happen to be here which is very much by happenstance. I’m a
historian. In my real life I’m the chair of the history department across town at
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and I come to the law school once a
week as a Visiting Fellow in Law and Public Policy at the invitation of the dean.
A colleague did call me yesterday, a “semi-law prof,” which I think was a
compliment, but I really don’t know much about law or legal ethics and this is,
for me, an opportunity to do some learning in thinking about what I do as a
historian and perhaps to have a little bit of effect on what you do, but I really
am a free rider in the sense that I’m not writing for the symposium. I am very
interested in what you all have to say.
Just to tell you very briefly about my scholarship, which is very different
from what you do, I work on the history of ordinary people and how they
intersect with public policy—mostly in Chicago. Another goal that I have as
an urban historian is to help people who read my stuff a little bit more on the
public history side, see when they walk around an urban environment what the
history of that place is and to be aware that what’s on the site now isn’t what
was there before.
I’ve learned a lot over the years by working more closely with social
scientists. I teach and have previously directed the Urban Studies Programs at
UWM. Especially in working with sociologists, I’ve learned a lot about talking
about methods and I’m impressed with how social scientists make discussion
of methods an explicit part of what they do—which is not something that
historians by and large do. Historians love narrative. We hide our methods.
Even in the footnotes our methods are hidden, so that as a reader you do not
know what choices we made and what research we did and did not do. And I
was so impressed with the notion of research methods I actually put a

2. William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 66 (1991)
(discussing “legal ethics without the ethics”).
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methodological appendix in my last book as a guide to future researchers on
that topic.3
One of the favorite classes that I teach—and this brings me a little closer
here—is the undergraduate history methods class. When I was sitting and
chatting with Chad about this conference last month, on a whim said, “Why
don’t you come along?” I started thinking about how I put ethics into the
methods class. I actually came up with a list of about a half a dozen points that
I bring into the class, at least implicitly including ethics. At the start of the class
I share with the students a historian’s code and at the end of the class the last
assignment is to write a historian’s code. But I really don’t think that historians
think very much about ethics and it might be good for us to do so.
I also didn’t know until I was sitting in Chad’s office last month that
historians have a set of professional standards. I saw them on his desk and read
them last night for the first time. They looked pretty good, but I also found a
hole in them right away, so that I immediately wrote to the executive director
of the American Historical Association and said, “Here’s something you need
to put in.” He wrote back and said, “Oh, yes?” So, this conference has already
had an effect on historians and I’m looking forward to finding out how it’s
going to affect the teaching I do going forward, if not the scholarship that I
conduct as well.
NICOLA BOOTHE-PERRY: Good morning, everyone. I’m Nicky. I have a
similar background to Chad and Ryan, in that I practiced for ten years before I
went into academia and I did not purposefully pursue a career in academia. I
kind of fell into it and it was probably the best fall I’ve ever had in my life and
so I’ve been there now for 14 years. But when I got into academia I approached
it as I had in practice. I was a litigator for ten years. I was very aware of the
rules of professional responsibility and so I approached my academia the same
way. And once I got on the tenure track and I had to write scholarship, I
approached my scholarship the same way and I started realizing that not
everybody has the same approach to even think about why I write, what I write,
how I write, for whom I write, and what impact it’s not just having on myself,
but on the legal community.
And so, my scholarship for many years was on professionalism and ethics,
a lot about professional identity, very heavily influenced by Professor
Hamilton’s work, and in writing about professional identity and the importance
of law students having professional identity so that they can be these amazing
lawyers. The last article I wrote started focusing on the law professors

3. AMANDA I. SELIGMAN, CHICAGO’S BLOCK CLUBS: HOW NEIGHBORS SHAPE THE CITY
(2016).
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themselves. If we are asking our law students to have these certain standards
and ethics and professional identity, what about our own professional identity?
So, the last article I wrote discussed the obligations of law professors to the
law profession, to academia, to our students, with this new normal that we have.
And so, it has the obligations of law professors and as I was writing the article,
I found it to be really aspirational. Even though I’m using the word
“obligation,” it was very aspirational. And so, when maybe Paul or Chad read
the article and contacted me about the conference, I hadn’t really thought
specifically about specific duties and a restatement of duties of law professors,
but I had certainly thought about the culture that we have as law professors and
what was lacking in that, not just for our students but for ourselves. And so, I
was really excited when I got the invitation to participate in the conference to
actually come out of this with some actual duties and obligations, even though
they may be good practices but definitely a restatement. So, I’m really excited
to be here and to participate in this, so thank you again for inviting me.
B. Session One: What Counts as Legal Scholarship and What is the
Obligation of Neutrality?
HESSICK: So, our first discussion session has two questions: “What should
count as legal scholarship?” and “What is the obligation of neutrality?” What
I thought it might make sense to do is spend a little bit of time talking about
different types of scholarship, both in terms of scholarship that isn’t a book or
an article, but also, when you’re talking about books and articles, the different
types of books and articles that people write because I think that as we’ll talk
about a little bit later, it might be helpful to be precise about those different
types because we might think that there are different norms that apply to
different types of scholarship. And then I want us to take up the very easy
question of “What makes for good scholarship?” because a number of people
mentioned this at least in passing in the writing that they did for this conference.
And then I wanted to tackle some more concrete topics, how topic selection
plays into these issues, then get to the idea of different norms for different
scholarship and then sort of more specifically, “What’s our obligation or norm
with respect to neutrality?”
HORWITZ: I want to say I know you have raised an invaluable email. I
think it was your email last, right? The question, “What is the role of the
publishing process itself?” And I would say, that’s not necessarily off the table
I think. At least it’s a possibility that that seemed important to say it early rather
than late so that it’s not forgotten.
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FRANCIS: Yeah. Thank you for pointing that out because one of the things
that I just think is really hard is how we think about all of this in the context in
which we are. And I come pretty close to holding the position that we’re in
such a world of hurt about how law reviews operate that it may be very difficult
without tackling that to think carefully about how scholars ought to operate.
And maybe just a quick observation related to that, something that was kind of
a theme around here was a lot of people think about lawyers’ ethics and I just
want to put out at the table that I’m not sure lawyers’ ethics are at all relevant
to law professor ethics or that at least we ought to have it be an open question
whether anything that is a principle of lawyers’ ethics ought to be applied to
law professor publication ethics. I’ve been thinking about confidentiality, for
example; lawyers have presumptive duties of confidentiality to their clients but
law professors in publishing may have presumptive duties to reveal their
sources (with possible exceptions, as well as of course obligations to protect the
confidentiality of human subjects in research). I’ve been thinking about—you
don’t have a duty as a lawyer to cite to the court authority from another
jurisdiction that’s antithetical to the position you were maintaining, in a way
the problem that Carissa raised and how that would even play into scholarly
stuff. You don’t have an obligation to give the court your methodology to go
to Amanda’s point.
HESSICK: No. I think that those are really good points and I think it’s
something that we should keep in mind and I’ve actually flagged this idea in
light of the publication norms that we have. Does that actually mean different
things for different types of scholarship as I think Leslie suggested in the
submission that she made for this conference?
I do hope that at various points we might be able to come to agreement
about certain things that we think are uncontroversial and then, of course, I
think that there will be things that will be more controversial. But I really liked
Eli’s point that doing nothing isn’t enough. That scholarship isn’t simply
something that we do because it might inform us to read more or we might feel
good by sort of putting some things down on the page, but that we literally have
an obligation to engage in scholarship and for that to be part of our habit as
scholars, even if we can’t quantify what that obligation is.
I thought Nicky actually made a point, too, though, that’s—although I agree
with it, I’ve sometimes seen push-back from some colleagues and that’s the
idea that we have an obligation to increase the reach and impact of our legal
scholarship. That it’s not enough for us to simply write legal scholarship, but
that as the authors of legal scholarship we should also take affirmative steps to
ensure that what we’ve written, I suppose, reaches the audiences that ought to
have it and can then actually change things.
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I suppose who that audience is and what it might change might be
controversial but I was wondering if people agree with Nicky that we have an
obligation as the authors of legal scholarship to also help ensure that it has an
impact.
WEST: I disagree. I don’t know. I don’t quite understand the impulse
behind it but I think you have an impulse. I think you do have an obligation to
get your views out there, to get the scholarship out there. I don’t think that
there’s an obligation to maximize its impact and I think that the worry is that
that will quickly shade into a kind of, at least unpleasant, self-promotion that is
antithetical to the academic spirit. I think that what trumps it, really, is an
obligation of humility and of openness to contest and contestation. And when
you’re advocating on your own behalf for the impact of your work, it can cut
the other way.
I know that tenure committees increasingly look at this, look at not only
citations from other scholars, but citations by courts. I think that’s a pernicious
practice and does not necessarily correlate with quality. We should be
concerned, I think, less with impact and more with quality and I think those two
things can cut in opposing directions.
FRANCIS: I think it also risks confusing scholarship with advocacy. It’s like
the difference between pure science and applied science.
BOOTHE-PERRY: And just to comment, I don’t think that we actually
disagree, Robin. I think we’re saying the same thing. When I’m saying
“impact” it’s not necessarily a narrow impact. The idea is that you don’t just
write as a legal scholar just to write. If you just want to write, then go journal.
But your writing should have some purpose and some meaning and not just,
“oh, I write and so I publish and it’s in a law review, but nobody reads it.” It
doesn’t change anything, or it doesn’t have any kind of impact, not necessarily
a large impact that would be influenced by political or other ideas.
WEST: Yeah, I just worry that much of the scholarship that we do highly
value and should highly value is not aimed at changing anything. It’s aimed at
understanding.
BOOTHE-PERRY: But there’s an impact, so—
WEST: Okay. Then “impact” has become quite broad. I do have a
colleague who says that he writes just for self-enlightenment, to sort of work it
out for himself and that strikes me as a little odd. It is a bit like journal writing,
but I would just hesitate. I mean, I don’t want to sign on to what I view as an
increasing and pernicious practice of the citation counts and particularly the
citation counts by courts or even by legislative committees. That, I think, is a
worrisome trend.
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FISH: Long ago I became enamored with a statement, and of course, have
forgotten its author. It went this way: “Our thoughts are ours; their ends, none
of our own.”4 And I take that to mean, as I’m sure you immediately understand,
that as we work things out, we are responsible for the product of that activity.
What then happens, when and if the fruits of our labors are put out into the
world, they are not something that we can control, although there are, of course,
many ways in which you try desperately to control them.
So, the question of impact is something that is so contingent. It doesn’t
mean that there aren’t ways that we could increase the likelihood that
contingency will swing in your favor, but nevertheless something can always
happen in either direction that will completely surprise you, that is, something
that you wrote and you didn’t think that anyone would listen to it, and is
suddenly picked up in ways that you couldn’t predict. More frequently, it is
something that you wrote that you were convinced the world needed to hear
immediately and was heeded by no one.
One other remark. This goes back to a general question of, “What is
scholarship and what are scholarly activities?” In general, when I’m doing
scholarship, and I think most of you would say the same, I’m trying to get it
right. I don’t know what “it” is and it varies and the complexities of it certainly,
but I’m trying to get it right. And I’m trying to get it right because a puzzle or
a problem has attracted my attention and I just can’t quite figure out how
something works or what’s wrong with this answer or what’s missing. So,
there’s a satisfaction, almost a satisfaction of engaging in athletic performance,
when you can at least think that you’ve figured it out and then you can tell other
people about it and sometimes you’re figuring it out in the company of other
people.
But when I’m at a conference like this one, I have absolutely no doubt what
legal scholarship is. It’s what we’re doing here. That is, the feel of a
conversation like this one. And I’ve been struck by this many times, but most
especially when I go to conferences and, I must now confess something which
many of you will know, I am a card-carrying originalist, that curious group
whose mothership is the University of San Diego where we originalists
congregate once or twice a year.
Now, it just so happens that many of those who espouse this faith are
politically conservative although I myself am not. Many are. But I’ve been to
many of the conferences, originalist conferences, and never has there been a
second in which the spirit of advocacy has supplanted the spirit of trying to get
it right. And I’ve also often come out of those conferences, as I’m sure I’ll

4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.
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come out of this one feeling, “yes, that’s what the scholarly life is about and
that’s the excitement of it, that’s the pleasure of it.”
Now, then that leaves the key—a key question, not the key question—
always be suspicious of anyone who says “the key question”—that leaves a key
question, “What is the value of it?” And to that question I don’t myself have
an answer, although I must confess that I don’t very much care.
WEST: It’s just an add-on to what Stanley said. I do remember Paul Brest
telling me when I was a fellow out at Stanford, he was dean. He said, “Look,
your published articles are like your grown children. You just can’t control
them and so they’re on their own. They have to defend themselves. Let it be.”
WALD: Three points about the impact of scholarship. First, scholars have
a duty to write and publish, not to actively promote the impact of their
scholarship. When we talk about impact it would be odd if we were to find or
impose a duty to promote one’s scholarship or advertise one’s work, although
there is nothing wrong with some forms of advertisement, for example, it used
to be common to mail a reprint of one’s recently published article to colleagues
in the field. Hopefully, impact is achieved through the quality of the work,
without active promotion. But, while there is no duty to promote scholarship,
one can certainly promote work unethically by manipulating citation counts,
increasingly a common way of measuring impact.
Second, impact matters. Certain types of citation counts, by courts and by
peers, are relevant and important because they tend to reflect the level of
engagement that one’s scholarship generates.
Finally, some scholarship, like highly specialized work, will tend not to
generate mass referencing and that’s, of course, okay. But in general I would
really be quite concerned—or at least mindful of—if there was a work of
scholarship that over time had no citations or references to by scholars in the
field. Unfortunately, it is not at all uncommon to have scholarly works that
never get cited or engaged with, but at least one should be curious about why it
is that a scholarly work is not gaining some recognition and engagement from
some people in the field.
HAMILTON: The conversation—because the first topic you talked about
was just what are we going to include definitionally, which I think is
fundamental. We’re on impact. Just as somebody who has been associate dean
and an interim dean, one of the puzzles goes to Leslie’s comment. Without a
peer review process, you’re trying to figure out, “Does this thing make a
contribution to some scholarly conversation somewhere?” And you know, I
just have never believed in placement given that the apprentices are making the
decision as to whether that’s a quality screen of some sort and also the fact we
don’t have a peer review. We’re the only discipline in the world, I believe,
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without a peer review construct in the scholarship process that would itself have
some acculturation into what it is that’s quality.
But anyway, so then you get stuck as a dean into a citation count and
downloads or some surrogate that indicates that someone is involved in a
scholarly conversation, which I think is a fallback position.
HESSICK: Amanda.
SELIGMAN: I’ve translated that sort of self-defensive idea into a way of
thinking about the role of the academy as a cultivator of creativity in a broad
sense, so that one of the social functions of at least the humanities academy in
which I exist is to allow all sorts of interesting ideas, some of which are
productive and some of which are not productive, to bubble around and see
what happens to them.
And I think about the long conversation in which a work of scholarship
might exist even if it has no particular currency at the moment. This is an
answer to your question. But to plant a seed that will be picked up later on.
And I think it’s particularly important to think about the academy and the way
the academy cultivates creativity in society in comparison to business, in which
the ends are so much more particular, to make a profit, to create a different kind
of product. Our social function has to do with starting conversations even if we
can’t see where they’re going.
HESSICK: I want to give Robin a chance to respond but before she does I
want to jump in. And I understand that Leslie and Chad also want to talk and I
want to make sure we can do other things. Who knew moderator would be so
difficult?
I wanted to touch on the idea of humility as scholars and I’m entirely
sympathetic to Robin’s concern that impact can devolve into these crude and, I
would say, misleading, if not imperfect, measures of impact with citation
counts.
But I’d add that I’m not sure that humility is a virtue for a scholar, especially
someone who’s trying to get at truth, because it’s a collaborative process. And
if we’re trying to get at truth and we’re trying to build off the work of others
and have them build off our work as well, I think that the norm of humility that
was engrained in me as a child, as a young adult, can get in the way of that, that
we ought to try to reach out to people who are doing the things that we’re doing
or doing the things we think are relevant to what we’re doing and try to engage
with them and to try to get them to read our things. And we shouldn’t see that
as a lack of humility, but rather that humility is subservient to these other goals
of the pursuit of knowledge.
WEST: Excessive humility is no virtue. You have an obligation to engage.
I would put it that way. I was objecting to the idea that you have an actual
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obligation to self-promote, to maximize your impact and so on. I understand
the spirit. I think that it can slide into something that really can be pernicious.
On impact and how you measure it as a dean and so on, I would distinguish
between measuring impact in terms of scholarly citations and measuring impact
in terms of judicial citations. And so, it depends on what your project is, it
depends on what your point is, but I think that measuring impact in terms of
scholarly citations, if you don’t have any other way to go about it, it can
certainly play a legitimate role.
What’s dangerous is this slide toward having it be the thing, that “this is
what we’re doing; we’re trying to maximize our citation count.” We talked
about the value of work before there were little computer mechanisms for doing
these citation counts at the drop of a hat. What I see as most alarming is the
absence of evaluators, whether it’s the faculty as a whole, the tenure committee,
or the deans. Reading the work and then reading thoughtful evaluations by
peers and coming to a judgment about the quality of the work rather than a
judgment about the numbers.
I’m just raising that as something to worry about. I don’t mean to say we
need to codify some rule that you’re not allowed to look at impact.
FRANCIS: So I’m kind of getting back to the question of what’s scholarship
and I really liked what Amanda said a minute ago. One of the problems we
have is we sort of sit at an intersection between humanities and the social
sciences. And law is, at least some aspects of law, and for purposes of the
National Endowment for the Humanities, is considered a humanity. We sit at
the intersection between that and social science. Some of what we do is thought
of as social science scholarship. That’s more the empirical. Maybe even some
science as people are bringing neuro-science, for example, into law and looking
at those sorts of things.
Something that might be a resource for us to think about is the way those
disciplines broadly make the distinction between scholarship and advocacy.
So, if you look at what you can submit to NEH as law, you can submit a certain
kind of normative legal scholarship but you can’t submit what you’d be writing
for an amicus brief. For example, there’s been really interesting controversy
about the social sciences aspect of the National Science Foundation. But there’s
a place to look at how we might think about what’s social science law and
what’s social advocacy. And the same kinds of questions have come up in
science.
HESSICK: And I’m going to give this to Chad, but I actually think that’s a
good thing to try to focus on. I like Robin’s definition of normative scholarship,
“the law is X and it should be Y.” But I think sometimes when we talk about
advocacy scholarship we’re—
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WEST: That’s different.
HESSICK: It’s different. Right, there might even be sort of a Venn diagram
there.
OLDFATHER: I wonder if a way to approach that distinction between
normative scholarship that is scholarship and that which is not is that some of
it is a product of a process that starts with a question and some of it is a product
of a process that starts with an answer. The sort of thing that leads to an amicus
brief starts with the answer and builds toward it.
The sort of thing that I think is appropriate, potentially, as normative
scholarship starts with a question and works in good faith towards whatever
answer the scholar ends up determining is the appropriate answer. So, it may
be a question of orientation. I think it’s at least a helpful distinction to think
about.
Another thing that occurs to me as we’re having this discussion is—and this
is related—that this is in some ways parallel to the question of ideology in
judging in the sense that you’ve got the political scientist’s view that takes this
very reductionist approach to the appearance of ideology, finds a correlation
between some indication of ideology of a judge and the judge’s decisions. Part
of the response to that has been to point out that there are some senses in which
law is inherently ideological and builds in space for ideology to work within
limits, which is not the same as saying, I’m a Democrat, therefore I come out
this way or I’m a Republican, therefore I come out that way. That is, there’s a
distinction between the proper influence of ideology and the improper influence
of ideology. And a lot of what I struggle with in the scholarship I do relating
to judicial processes is trying to figure out how to channel judicial behavior
towards the proper and away from the improper.
And I think some of what we’re struggling with here relates to those sorts
of questions in that there’s room for normativity, but it’s not always proper.
And maybe this “starting with a question versus starting with an answer” is an
approach to it because I think the real risk here is when we are looking at impact
and looking at other-directedness and building a name for ourselves, it’s the
risk that Leslie identified of falling into advocacy. There are no bright lines.
It’s a matter of degree, but we can all recognize that at some point I’m becoming
too much of an advocate, whether it’s for a cause, whether it’s for myself and
my own personal or professional interests.
Actually, I would love to meet your colleague who writes only to work
things out for him or herself.
WEST: You probably have.
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OLDFATHER: As what I wrote suggests I have a great deal of affinity for
that sort of position. I don’t think in extreme form it’s right but, I find it very
attractive.
HORWITZ: I guess I’ll segue and say, provided that it is occurring within
the domain of one’s expertise and according to the kind of academic norms and
practices of one’s discipline writing because you just want to write, because
you just want to figure out interesting things or a question occurs to you, that
seems to be totally legitimate. More than legitimate. For me it’s almost a
default.
Often what interests you is going to be, especially in law, related to ongoing
events. I mean, you have an impetus given by court decisions and so on. Here’s
a problem that seems to me totally valid.
So, I wanted to do this. I wanted to talk about again—and as I think a
couple of people have gone back to the question—what is scholarship and part
of that is, as a co-organizer, I’m kind of thinking about the work product, the
thing we have in mind at the end. And I want to say this about that.
So, part of my answer here, or comment, is going to be kind of schematic
because I’m thinking about what the product might look like. And the other
thing I’ll say is I’m a big advocate, within the structure of the conference, of
the idea that whatever one comes up with as a consensus document or statement
of ethics is not only not immune from the possibility of somebody writing a
concurrence or a dissent or kind of a statement that’s like, “This is a pretty good
document but, in fact, it’s not possible to have a code of ethics of legal
scholarship.” I actually think those kinds of contributions would be very
interesting and valuable. In talking about what a code of ethics of legal
scholarship would look like, I am, personally, not at all opposed to the idea that
people can also then come at that document from the outside, critique it, attack
it, add to it, et cetera.
So, it seems to me, determining what is scholarship or legal scholarship
would be something like the practice of applying one’s relevant scholarly
expertise and, I guess, armature, the relevant skills and tools as a scholar in that
discipline to explore issues relevant to, in our case, the law. Nothing more or
less.
I don’t think it’s quite a tautological description. It does beg a number of—
or leave open a number of questions, but that I think is the essence of it. If I’m
thinking in terms of a document, and a kind of a restatement like document,
that’s where I’d start.
And then I imagine in the caveats or sub-questions, one of which would be,
What is legal scholarship by clinicians? By clinical legal scholars? We handle
these things differently in different places. Some places clinicians are tenured,
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in others they have kind of a security of employment. But whatever the
promotion process is, anybody who’s been through it knows that there are
debates both within the clinical community and then sometimes between the
clinical and doctrinal community about what counts as scholarship by clinicians
both in terms of what they write about and what they submit for purposes of
evaluation. And I’m happy, as it were, to bracket that question, but I think it
should be noted. One of the responses to what I wrote on Twitter the other day
about some of these kind of political issues was, “Well, the responder’s
definition would count out what clinical scholars do.” And that wasn’t my
intention and so I’m happy to kind of bracket that question while noting it so
that people don’t misunderstand from the get-go or have a hostile reaction from
the get-go.
Some of the questions we’ve addressed seem to me to be super structural,
so I’m very sympathetic to the idea that self-promotion can be distorting, can
have its negative effect, but that seems to me to be a “figure out the definition
of scholarship and then what one does with the scholarship might be subject to
separate considerations or norms.” Do you send it out to people, do you send
it to the newspapers? And so on. But if the thing itself is done properly as a
piece of legal scholarship, that’s kind of your first desideratum.
And maybe a third question here that seems to be raised has to do with the
motive for scholarship and that, given the definition of legal scholarship that
I’ve provided, I haven’t really talked about why you’re exploring it, what your
motives are for writing a piece. Could be for fame, advancement, could be to
intervene in a legal issue for partisan or ideological reasons, why the law has
nothing to say about email servers or why it does or whatever. And so, there’s
some question of whether scholarship should be disinterested and what it means
for scholarship to be disinterested, whether it should be kind of academic.
I guess that to me is the real distinction. I mean, scholarships should have
an academic motive. I don’t know that you have to call that disinterested. It
might be passionate. I think Stanley would say where the passion comes from
is the academic question. For me, the question would be, “Is your passion,
whatever the source, properly filtered through the brain, body, blood barrier,
whether it’s filtered through that academic barrier so that the output is correct,
whatever the input is, whatever the motive?” There’s some question there about
why you’re doing it.
HESSICK: I want to hear from Stanley because I know that he indicated he
had something to say about the advocacy/normative line. And then I’m going
to turn to Eli. But before I do that I know we’ve started touching quite a bit on
what makes for good legal scholarship and I collected some of the statements
that people had in their submissions. I thought there was quite a lot of overlap
so I just wanted to sort of report on that.
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FISH: I’ve adopted it as one of my missions here, one that I assume will
fail, to wean Paul from his pluralism, so—
HORWITZ: You’re not the only one, Stanley.
FISH: So I’m quite happy to produce a definition that would exclude much
of what clinical scholars do. That’s just a side comment. Another side
comment on impact. Often impact will occur because your work is picked up
in fields to which it was not originally directed and there’s no way that you
could predict or design that.
And then there are, of course, literary examples that talk about the
contingency of impact. As many of you will know, Melville’s Moby Dick was
entirely unrecognized and unappreciated while he was alive and only came to
be thought of as a prime candidate for the great American novel in the early
part of the 20th Century. A woman named Louise Rosenblatt in 1938 wrote a
book on the relationship between literature and the reader which had to wait
until the early ‘70s, when reader-oriented criticism became something people
were talking about. There are so many variables here.
The main issue I wanted to address was, yes, the question of normative
scholarship and advocacy. And in reading Robin’s piece, I realized something
that I wanted to share with you and test with you. Whereas I had been dividing
scholarship into legal scholarship and other forms of scholarships and genuine
scholarship, the real thing in advocacy, I think that my taxonomy has to be
increased and made more sophisticated, at least by the addition of one new
category.
So, here’s my new category entirely influenced by what Robin wrote in her
piece. First, I would think of scholarship as an extension of the liberal arts
enterprise and, therefore, permitted to accurate true accounts of whatever.
And second, scholarship is—which is specific in some way to the
discipline, and this is where Robin’s essay comes in because she points out
some scholarship is committed to following out justice’s imperative—to make
the law more just, to make it better. And there is a parallel, interestingly
enough, in the history of literary criticism, although most of us think of literary
criticism as the act of producing interpretations of text. That’s quite a new
phenomenon, late 19th century to the present. Before that, literary criticism
was philological, entirely descriptive. As you notice things, you pointed out
allusions to rivers in Scotland or you talked about certain kinds of constructions
and how they could also be seen in poetry of the 14th Century and stuff like
that. But you never thought about putting this all together (a) into an
interpretation of a poem and even (b) even more rare, into the evaluation of the
poem.
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So, in literary studies, interpretation and evaluation, which are now
considered absolutely commonplace, are new. So, this second category, that is
responding to the discipline’s specific commitments and, therefore, being
committed to following out justice’s imperative.
And then, the third, which I think Robin and I both agree, which is just,
frankly, partisan and then to pick up on what Chad said, which begins with the
answer rather than the question, which has as its aim, the securing of victory
for some political or ideological or some political or—
WEST: Opaque reason client.
FISH: Oh, yeah, sure. Ideological position. And that’s a much more, for
me at least, a more capacious definition than the one that I had before I began
to read these essays. Thank you all very much for that, and Paul, try not to be
so ecumenically generous.
HESSICK: A few quick words on what people said about good scholarship
or what I gleaned from what people wrote that they were saying about good
scholarship. So, a few people emphasized the importance of critical analysis
and careful analysis. I saw that in both what Nicky and what Leslie wrote. I
also saw it on some of the reading by Quinn. I thought the idea there that the
conclusions of scholarship have to be based on reliable inference and evidence.
This idea that analysis and the quality of analysis matters for whether
scholarship is good or not.
I also saw, in a few of the different submissions, people talking about the
importance of scholarly norms or community norms and saying what is good
scholarship, that that’s not a question that we answer in the vacuum, that we
have to look at what our colleagues in our profession have set up. I saw this in
what Eli wrote, that this isn’t something that we all get to choose on our own.
I saw this in what Chad wrote about talking that, it’s impossible to determine if
something is good scholarship without making reference to the norms. And I
even saw it in Paul’s comment that academics take a variety of approaches to
scholarship, but not an endless variety, that these norms matter, and that the
idea that what’s good or not is, at the end of the day, sort of a communal
decision.
I also was very interested to see both Nicky and Robin talking about the
idea that scholarship is laborious, that there’s a process and a labor that’s not
simple that has to be involved in it in order for it to be scholarship. That really
resonated with me and made me feel better about myself.
And then I also saw the idea that maybe what makes good scholarship
different from less good scholarship is the idea of novelty, of breaking new
ground. I saw this both in what Nicky wrote but also in the Jarvis reading.
That’s not to say that it necessarily has to break new ground but that it advances
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the ball, that it advances legal knowledge. I know that that can be controversial
for us because people’s over claims on novelty, so I will let Paul, I am going to
assume, complain about the role.
HORWITZ: No, not much complaint. Philosophers have written about, you
know, standard works by contra Aristotle for centuries. So, when you talk
about novelty I would say, contribute usefully to the discussion as opposed to—
I mean, everything doesn’t have to be a point that’s never been raised before.
It might be a question of depth, application and so on.
FISH: A moment of self-promotion. In my last book, Winning Arguments,
I explained how academic work is impelled by the obligation to originality.
And that extends even to people who are busily and actively arguing against the
possibility of there being anything like originality. They still want to get that
original argument against originality out there.
WALD: Not to exaggerate the scope of Stanley and Robin’s agreement, I’m
sympathetic to trying to define scholarship and its boundaries in the direction
that they are advancing. What’s legal scholarship? Seeking the truth and
pursuing specific commitments unique to the discipline of law, for example,
justice’s imperative. What’s not scholarship? Partisan advocacy. What are we
not sure about? Forms of normative scholarship, because some (like Stanley
and Robin) disagree as to whether certain forms of normative scholarship
constitute the pursuit of justice or are mere advocacy.
So far so good. Unfortunately, resolving disagreements about normative
scholarship cannot be done by reference to legal expertise. I wish it was that
simple to say that legal scholarship is about the deployment of expertise to
explore the law. The problem with this definition is that it’s not entirely clear
what the expertise of law professors is. Some think of law professors’ expertise
from a historical-jurisprudential perspective. During the era of Formalism the
expertise used to be narrow and self-contained, it was about the “law.” Then
came Legal Process. Next came the “law and . . .” interdisciplinary schools of
thought, like Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies and Law and
Sociology, and legal expertise expanded to include economics, political
science, cultural studies, sociology, literature etc. That is one concrete way to
talk about the evolving expertise of law professors.
I fear, however, that when we talk about the expertise of law professors
what others might mean really is some broad and ill-defined “engagement with
the law.” And if expertise was to be defined in such an open-ended manner,
then we really haven’t advanced the definition of what legal scholarship is at
all by saying that it is the deployment of expertise to explore the law.
The framing by Robin and Stanley–on the one hand truth and justice (both
scholarship) and on the other hand advocacy (not scholarship)–allows us to hold
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onto something concrete and build on it, whereas the expertise of law professors
is somewhat dubious to me. What we need to do next is explain in much greater
detail what is unique and specific to legal scholarship. If it is to be justice, what
exactly is the relationship between legal scholarship and justice?
FRANCIS: I would add to your list an explicit and defensible methodology
picking up on what Amanda said. And also, the discussion in—I don’t
remember the article, but the one where a string cite without an explanation for
how you picked the cases is bogus.
SCOVILLE: This picks up on Eli’s comment. On the issue of expertise, it’s
a little bit unclear to me what expertise requires, and I think that’s an issue
because even in my own work I find myself sometimes using radically different
methods. Sometimes I might want to pursue an empirical answer to a question,
but other times I might want a theory-based or a historical answer. So, I think
there may be a tendency for legal academics to adopt a pretty wide range of
methods, if my own experience is indicative. Sometimes someone might be an
originalist and sometimes they might do a statistical analysis. Is it okay to do
that? If expertise is necessary the answer seems like it might be no, but the cost
of that is you have limited range—there will be fewer possibilities for creativity
and less freedom to follow whatever your interests might be.
WEST: Another distinction that I’ve heard made often and that is helpful to
some people is distinguishing between scholarship that originates from inside
law and scholarship that originates from some point outside law, which is the
reference to the inter-disciplinary voice. I do talk a lot to fellows and students
about the difficulties that people have coming into the academy from a legal
practice and locating a scholarly voice within them. And having their lawyerly
identity evolve into that of a scholar, it’s a real struggle.
And it seems to me that there’s an ethics that does follow from a normative
legal scholarship, if we can all agree that that’s not oxymoronic, and that what’s
distinctive about it is the degree to which that scholarship cannot be interestdictated. And so, I appreciated Chad’s note about having the question dictate
rather than the answer. But I think it’s also that the interest can’t dictate and,
in other words, there’s a difference between writing toward the end of better
protecting victims of domestic violence—which I’m all for with passion—and
writing up a piece of scholarship about DV law, I think, and it’s that the interest
can’t dictate. And so there’s an ethic of disinterestedness that I think needs
exploration because I don’t think we have a very good grip on it in the legal
academy, which is why we have so much trouble distinguishing normative legal
scholarship and what’s good about it, if anything, from advocacy scholarship
and why that sounds to many people, including me, like something that’s
oxymoronic that just isn’t possible and it seems to me the difference does have
to do with this disinterestedness. I don’t think it’s the case of clinical faculty
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are not capable of achieving that kind of disinterestedness, but it’s work. It’s
work to achieve it. It doesn’t mean that you don’t care, it doesn’t mean that
you’re not passionate, it doesn’t mean that you’re cold and calculating. You
better care or you’re not going to be able to finish the work. And passion helps
but there’s a difference in the scholarly voice and the advocate’s voice when
dealing even with scholarship that has to do with these issues and at its root, I
think the difference is this disinterestedness.
HESSICK: So, I want to hand this over to Amanda. But before I do, I just
want to point out that I think here what we’re talking about—the
disinterestedness point—is an important one. And I also think that it raises
questions the extent to which that norm affects different types of scholarship or
different situations. I think people feel pretty comfortable saying that the
funding source needs to be disclosed or perhaps people ought not write research
that had been funded.
But I do think that there are other questions about when people have a point
of view or activities that aren’t directly motivating it. Paul suggested that
people should be transparent about all these things and that disclosure can solve
these problems. I’m less confident that that’s true. I do wonder whether—
WALD: Tell us what you find dubious about the effectiveness of disclosure.
HESSICK: Oh, because I often think that those disclosures sometimes are
seen as a mark of expertise rather than a mark of “don’t take me seriously.”
Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe that’s just how I read them and I also think that
maybe it might let people off the hook, that they feel as though if they make
this disclosure, that’s enough for them to have filtered what their views were.
I guess what I’m trying to say is I think that the disclosure can both set the
wrong signal and also not accomplish its goal.
But I wonder how much more we need to worry about when we have to
worry about disinterestedness. When clinical faculty choose to write
pedagogical scholarship as opposed to non-pedagogical scholarship and if that
pedagogical scholarship is to talk about a method that they’re using at their own
institution, would we expect that to be a disinterestedness piece of scholarship?
I’ve personally never seen one that has said, “And the program that we use is
actually really terrible and we should have done something else,” for example.
What about getting invited to a conference? You get invited to a conference
to write on a phenomenon or something that happened and if you happen to
write something that’s negative it’s quite shocking. Everyone talks about Judge
Posner’s contribution on the death of Justice Brennan. “How could you
possibly write something that was critical of Justice Brennan?” That raises
perhaps other questions, but I don’t think that it goes away.
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I want to raise these questions but not necessarily answer them and then
also say, we have this norm of methodological disclosure, I think, for empirical
papers and I think Baude makes a good argument that maybe we need a similar
methodological approach to doctrinal scholarship and do people have to be
especially worried. There was something in one of the readings talking about
how if you are writing normative scholarship it’s less important to disclose the
interests that you have than if you are writing descriptive scholarship, because
if you are writing normative scholarship people would be on guard for the idea
or that you might have a point of view, but that’s not the case if you’re writing
a treatise. This is actually one of Eisenberg’s points.
SELIGMAN: So, I want to make a kind of observation about the kinds of
questions that I’m hearing here to help move the goal forward a little bit. I’m
hearing four different kinds of questions and I want to know about what they
matter for. So, one question is, “What is scholarship?” The only thing that I
really heard that matters in answer to that question is tenure and promotion.
I also have been hearing questions about what is good and bad scholarship.
I’ve been hearing questions about why do we create scholarship, what are the
motives or goals. And then implicit in what I’m hearing as an outsider is kind
of taxonomy about kinds of scholarship assuming that you count things like
tweets as scholarship—which is not necessarily the case—but there’s a whole
bunch of things that you as legal scholars do, not all of which are narrow. Some
of which are broad.
So that it might be worth in the final document to enumerate different types
of things whether or not they count as scholarship. The question I want to throw
back with that observation is, “Which of those are questions that matter for the
ethics of legal scholarship and which of them are just sort of interesting?”
FRANCIS: So, I want to go back to how people get into the legal academy
a little bit to reflect back on methodology and scholarly quality. The
methodology that lawyers have been trained in, who move into the academy, is
advocacy. For example, how do you write a good brief, how do you construct
a good oral argument, do you stand up?
It’s not just that people who are in graduate programs in disciplines
typically have lengthy discussions about the ethics of their discipline as part of
graduate training programs. It’s also that they learn a scholarly methodology.
When a historian is trained as a historian, there are things you learn about how
to be a historian, how to find documents, what kinds of documents you find,
how to analyze documents, and so on. Same thing in literary theory.
I see a lot of normative scholarship where people are not trying to be
advocates but it’s really terrible normative scholarship because they don’t know
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a thing about how to do moral analysis and they’re trying to do moral analysis.
They need a good ethics course.
WEST: Right.
FRANCIS: They come out with some piece of junk about utilitarianism or
whatever and I just cringe when I read this stuff.
Now, I put a little a plug here about the expertise point. Frankly, there’s
nothing wrong with co-authoring and there’s something to be said, I think, for
if you want to do statistics don’t go to two minutes or half-a-day workshops at
the ALS and think you’re done. Associate with a good statistical methodologist
and so on.
BOOTHE-PERRY: In the same vein with Amanda to try to get a document
out of this and to answer some of these questions and kind of piggybacking on
what Leslie said about how those of us who move from practice into academia
and we don’t have any instructions on how to do this, I think what’s important
for our discussion as we talk about an ethical obligation of a scholar and, in
thinking about what is legal scholarship, the question of expertise, I think we
would need to be very careful about what that is because if we’re talking about
what is good scholarship, certainly your scholarship, if we’re going to classify
it as being good, will not be good if you don’t have a background in the subject
matter.
Certainly, if you come from practice into academia—I didn’t know how to
write a law review article, I didn’t know how to do scholarship, so I had to start
somewhere that either I was drawing from my experience in practice or maybe
it was a new topic for me. And actually, it was a new topic for me. So, I
certainly wasn’t an expert in the sense that I had spoken at a number of
conferences or published widely on the issue, but through research, it’s parallel
to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 says that you have to be a
competent lawyer. And it says you can develop that competence through
appropriate study or with associating with someone who has the expertise,
which would be like a co-authoring piece, so certainly the expertise is
necessary, whether it comes from your years of experience in writing this type
of scholarship or speaking on it or in your research, but I think expertise would
be part of the obligation of a scholar to determine what something is that’s legal
scholarship, going with Paul’s definition that he has, that expertise is important
in that sense, though. I don’t want us to dismiss it that easily.
WALD: While a common misconception, it is not true that the dominant
methodology of law practice is advocacy. It’s false. It has always been false.
Certainly, zealous advocacy has historically been a preoccupation of codes of
conduct and is the cornerstone of the adversarial system and the dominant
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ideology of the legal profession.5 At the same time, most practicing lawyers
are not trial attorneys or litigators and will never see the inside of a courtroom
unless they are defendants. Of course, corporate lawyers and many other
attorneys sometimes engage in advocacy when negotiating transactions, but it’s
not what we think of as advocacy when we have a litigator in mind because
negotiation is often not a zero-sum game of winning, losing, and slicing up the
pie, but rather about getting to a yes and increasing the size of the pie. So, we
should probably shy away from simplistic assumptions about advocacy as the
central methodology of law practice with an image of a litigator, Atticus Finch
style, in mind.
By the way, even if advocacy was the methodology of practicing lawyers,
it would not necessarily help us define or identify the methodology of legal
scholarship for academic lawyers. In fact, as we have already discussed, we all
seem to agree that zealous advocacy pieces are not scholarship.
WEST: I also want to pick up on the really interesting point. I think the
problem is bigger. I agree with what was just said, but I think the problem is
bigger. The academy, and the bar and the bench do not have a history of
developing an understanding of justice. And this is perverse and it is shocking
to realize but there’s a history to it. Langdell thought that justice equals law
and so the expertise in law is all you need. He said this quite explicitly over
and over and over again in after-dinner talks. If you want to know what justice
is, go read the law.
So, to be able to accurately state the law for Langdell meant that you were
doing justice. So, if the law scholar who is not advocating a client’s interest is
writing within a legal method that assumes that law equals justice, then expertly
and accurately explicating the law is doing this moral project, is doing this
normative thing, but there’s no jurisprudence, there’s no philosophy behind it
that celebrates what that justice is.
Now, on the other hand, at the same time Langdell was writing, Holmes,
who disagreed with Langdell on everything, agreed that justice is [nonsense].
He said it explicitly over and over and over again. He said, “I hate justice.” He
wrote that in a number of letters. What did he think we ought to be doing with
law? Promoting utility. That’s why you get all the normative scholarship that
carries on about utility. And so, between those two poles you don’t have the
developed philosophy that would give this method of the legal scholar actual
content and moral depth.
FRANCIS: And where did Law Reviews originate? They originated with
Langdellian legal education.
5. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
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WEST: And with the restatement projects, just the straight explication of
law.
HESSICK: So, we are out of time, but because I moderated I will take 30
seconds to add two things. One, I was very struck with Leslie’s point about the
training that we get, but I actually thought many of us got a particular type of
training that does teach us how to be disinterested, or at least we tell ourselves
that it does, and that was a judicial clerkship. I actually think that that
experience could be a model that we could try to reference and ask people to
try to think back on.
And then the last thing that I’d say is I love the idea of a norm of
disinterestedness and I think that probably many, if not all of us in the room,
could agree on it. But I’m thinking about my colleagues in criminal law who
are often hired precisely because of their experience as a defense attorney or as
a prosecutor and I wonder how easy it would be to sell them on
disinterestedness as a norm.
FISH: Is there a literature devoted to studying people who transition from
practice to the academy?
HORWITZ: There are guides, but I don’t know that they are often guides
that involve the kind of, let’s say, ethics or norms of practice. More like “how
to get a job.”
FISH: In other words, the experiences that some of you are reporting could,
I think, be made analytically interesting. And I wasn’t aware that anyone had
written on this phenomenon, what happened.
C. Session Two: The Obligations of Sincerity, Candor, and Exhaustiveness
HORWITZ: The official title of this session is “The Obligations of Sincerity,
Candor, and Exhaustiveness,” and I don’t think this is a sign of creeping
pluralism, but I acknowledge upfront treating it as a topic does not mean that
one can’t dissent from it, but here’s how I’m going to proceed just the same.
We have the three terms. I’ll start at the broad level of definition. I will then
ask—and I think I’ll do it early rather than at the very end—whether people
think that there should be other values, whether we’re missing anything that
might be productively added at this point by way of kind of broad “umbrella”
values that ought to be mentioned at this point, and then we can perhaps talk
about caveats, applications, and so on. So, let me start kind of with the big
picture. So, sincerity, candor, exhaustiveness.
So, let me start with sincerity. If people were coming up with a definition
of sincerity, or again, if they don’t have a complete definition, if they have, as
I’ve said, key words or basic concepts that they think would help us illuminate
what sincerity is, where would you start?
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HAMILTON: I thought it was an ambiguous term, but could the author tell
me up front what’s the motive? It goes back to I think what Chad was talking
about here, “What is the motive behind this piece?” And then I can decide
whether they are what I would call traditional scholarly ethics or whether they
are advocacy ethics. I have up front what am I looking at here in terms of the
piece.
HORWITZ: And I can see or anticipate that we might have some question
about when something belongs under the category or rubric of sincerity and
when it belongs under candor, but we can kind of take each as they come. Are
there other suggestions? Again, key words or ideas. What constitutes sincerity
in the context of the ethics of legal scholarship? Stanley?
FISH: I just don’t think that the sincerity requirement or bar should be made
too high, so that it begins to approach something like transparency, which is
both psychologically and existentially impossible.
FRANCIS: Could I ask you why you’ve got that as a separate category? I
guess the reason I’m asking it is I haven’t ever seen that proposed as a scholarly
norm in other disciplines. I’ve seen other disciplines have enormously difficult
conversations about why you select the research problems that you do, whether
there are things you should never do, which is something we don’t have up
there.
HORWITZ: Right. Well, so I think I can take the co-organizer’s privilege
and say it is not clear that there is any perfect answer to that. That’s to say it’s
not that we had a long debate and decided sincerity has got to be on the list, and
if it’s productive, we can move pretty quickly. What I’ll do is ask, whether
anybody has anything more to say about sincerity and then we can move pretty
quickly to candor, which I suspect will capture some of the things. But I’m not,
in my moderator’s capacity, counting out—people may say yes, it belongs
there.
BOOTHE-PERRY: When I think about sincerity, I think about one of the
pieces I wrote, the author was writing about intellectual honesty. So maybe
that could be something we have in there, being honest about the evidence that
you’re presenting, and then it kind of goes back to what we were talking about,
about what constitutes legal scholarship and problem of promotion, but also
being honest with what your purpose is in doing it. Is it for financial gain or
something else, those disclosures, so some form of intellectual honesty.
SCOVILLE: Two points. One, it seems like everything we’ve talked about
so far is actually candor. Second, I’m not sure sincerity should require
consistency. I think sincerity was in a couple of the draft codes that we read.
To me, it seems fine for someone to argue X in one piece and then not X in
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another, just to test out ideas. I don’t see why you should have to have some
sort of logically consistent end-game that ties all of your scholarship together.
WALD: What about the opposite of X? You said not X, what about the
opposite of X? Can you argue X and the opposite of X?
SCOVILLE: Yes.
HORWITZ: And that may end up applying to candor or transparency or
whatever one argues for. I want to explore the possibility of not X seems valid.
I have argued a lot for what I call an institutionalist approach to religious liberty
and religious autonomy, but it also seemed to me at some point, for a particular
conference I was doing, I was interested in the economics of religion and I
wanted to come at the question that I had advocated for, from a contrary
position and take a kind of poke at it, and sometimes I think a scholar might
say, “I’ve argued for X and now it’s also time for me to ask some of the negative
questions that have occurred to me along the way,” and that seems to me valid.
But again, I’m not categorizing here, it may end up being a question of some
other category.
OLDFATHER: So, this isn’t directly responsive to any of the things on the
board, but is just tossing out some related ideas from codes of ethics from
history and political science. The historian’s piece speaks about—under the
heading Shared Values of Historians, Integrity, so “historians cannot
successfully do this work without mutual trust and respect. By practicing their
craft with integrity, historians acquire a reputation for trustworthiness that is
arguably their single most precious professional asset.”6 Political scientists do
use the word transparency and in two senses, there’s production transparency,
which is with respect to data generated or collected. I think more pertinent for
our purposes, there’s analytic transparency, where “[r]esearchers making
evidence-based knowledge claims should provide a full account of how they
draw their analytic conclusions from the data.”7 That is, clearly explicate the
links connecting data to conclusions.
FISH: Why do we call that transparency? Why not just making a good
argument? I hate transparency. I wish I’d never heard the word.
HORWITZ: Well, if “Against Transparency” hasn’t yet been taken as a book
title, I’m looking forward to your next book.
6. AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (rev.
2018)
(1987),
https://www.historians.org/jobs-and-professionaldevelopment/statements-standards-and-guidelines-of-the-discipline/statement-on-standards-ofprofessional-conduct [https://perma.cc/B5ZM-PJAT].
7. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, A GUIDE TO PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN
POLITICAL
SCIENCE 10
(2d
ed.
2012),
http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Publications/APSAEthicsGuide2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DR35-3GF4].
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[LAUGHTER]
FISH: I’m trying to think of moments when the question of sincerity might
arise and I’ve only been able to think of one; someone who gives a presentation
or even hands someone a piece of work and then the response is “Well, do you
really mean that?” Which I take it to be a question like, “Are you just trying to
get a rise out of us, are you just trying to be provocative or contrarian?”
HORWITZ: You’ve heard that question?
FISH: Yeah. I always mean everything. So, is that what you have in mind?
Do you really mean that and are there good reasons, even in scholarship for
sometimes, not saying what you mean, but just following out a line of reasoning
because it might provoke helpful responses, or is that a form of meta-sincerity?
These things get me.
SELIGMAN: I have a naïve, non-lawyer question: is sincerity an issue here?
Lawyers, as opposed to legal scholars, sometimes represent people or entities
that they do not like, that they think are bad, but don’t particularly really want
to have them win, because they think—believe—that people deserve access to
the court process, that they need due process?
FISH: Well, sincerity’s a test sometimes, in some parts of the world.
HORWITZ: As people have noted, there’s been some suggestion that it is
not clear that sincerity is necessary as compared to candor. It seems a good
time to move on. So, candor, people may have more positive views on that.
Again, I think the question is—leaving aside, and I think we can do this at the
end, whether one or more of these values should be stricken from the list,
assuming it is a value and one that counts for the ethics of legal scholarship,
What do we mean when we say candor?
HESSICK: I just want to repeat what I said at the end of the last session,
which is I’m not a big fan of the idea of disclosures. Both, because I think that
they can send the wrong signal, they can actually send a signal of expertise.
But also, because I think that to the extent that we expect them to do work,
that’s problematic. If we have some sort of tie to an issue that might require a
disclosure, I think we can sort of take one of two approaches. We can either
try to guard very much against whatever those interests or biases or prior
commitments might be, or we should not engage in the process. And I’d extend
this to—maybe it’s a little bit different when we talk about funded research. I’d
be quite comfortable with law schools not doing funded research, although I
understand that it’s quite common at some institutions and for some types of
work. But if I’m writing this book review because this person’s my friend and
I want to get them good publicity, and so I’m going to put a little footnote, “This
person’s my friend and that’s why I was asked to write this review,” then you
shouldn’t be writing the review, if you can’t write an honest, straightforward
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review, and if you feel as though people need that information in order for—
but I understand that not everyone’s going to agree with me.
SELIGMAN: I’d just like to offer a different way of thinking about what
candor might mean other than simply disclosure, although I appreciated that
point very much and I’m going to be thinking about it for a while. But let’s
think about what anthropologists (particularly those who do ethnographic
research) do. In their scholarship, they write about how they are situated, which
affects exactly what they were able to see and not see. That’s something that’s
very well worked out in anthropology.
FRANCIS: I just wanted to point out that I think we need to ask the question,
“Candor about what?” Because I think candor about methodology matters a
lot. Candor about—so, that’s part of the anthropologist. I mean, if you’re doing
qualitative work, you describe your methodology and that includes, if it’s
participant-observer research or whatever, what your connection is. I also think
that there’s pretty well worked out norms about candor about what would be
called a direct conflict of interest. That’s usually defined in monetary terms.
And also might be spousal terms. There are also, in other disciplines, and I
thought a bunch of the articles were great on this point—there’s a lot worked
out about disclosure of authorship and the law profession. Law scholarship has
been pretty bad about that and—
HORWITZ: Can I ask you what you mean by that?
FRANCIS: I mean, you’ll actually see in science journals where there’s a
laundry list of folks who might or might not be authors, an exact description of
what each person contributed. “So, so and so brought patients to the table; so
and so did the primary drafting; so and so did the this.” In the footnote, at the
beginning. Now, there are a lot of allegations that law professors use their
students’ work in a way that would actually count as authorship in other fields,
and that was actually the point that I had in mind. Or don’t even disclose their
research assistants. But the development of norms about what you need to say
about who was an author or the contributions that people made. So, those are
three areas where we might start—methods, direct conflicts of interest of
whether your relative is different from your good friend, and authorship.
HORWITZ: So, let me offer a comment or two. Regarding authorship, there
are the big, kind of the scandal issues, the ones that occasionally pop up. I don’t
know whether it’s an endemic problem in the legal academy, in part because
I’m really bad at using research assistants, but others might have a different
empirical or other take on this. Yeah, I would say there seems to be an
increasing norm toward listing co-authorship with law students, that that has
become, I think, more frequent. I’m not sure exactly why, it might just be that
some leading people, like Marty Redish, made a habit of doing it and so others
felt more comfortable doing it, or it might be because authorship counts
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increasingly in the job market, there’s more of an incentive if you’re pushing
your student forward to want to do it. But clearly, that’s fair as a concern. The
other thing I’d note, and this goes a little bit to Carissa’s point, with which
you’re right, I don’t completely agree. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct for lawyers might be relevant here in thinking about conflicts of
interest in that there are—and it’s a nebulous standard—but there are cases of
conflict where you’re completely conflicted out. It’s what I tell the students is
a consent plus regime—consent alone is not enough, disclosure alone is not
enough. In some cases, you are incapable of serving your client or may be
incapable of serving your client and the consent can’t be worked around, so you
have to withdraw. There are other cases where you may have an interest, but
the interest is not sufficiently strong that you believe, in good faith, that you
can perform a diligent and competent job of client representation. So, there
may be cases where I could not write that book review or should not. I have in
mind a review that appeared pretty recently, within the last three or four years,
where two friends and colleagues at an institution reviewed the book of a third
colleague who was at the same institution. One of them might have moved on,
but at some point, they’d all been colleagues and co-authors and so on together.
And without any disclosures, that seemed to me a pretty obvious problematic
case. On the other hand, I just criticized Nelson Tabby’s book in a book review
and I kind of said “I’ve worked with him on this and that.” The review was
pretty critical. I think one can quarrel with it, with my choice, which I did run
by the editor of that magazine, but there may be cases where you have a
potential conflict, and this is where candor may be relevant. So, we can
imagine—this is a little different from exhaustiveness, but we can imagine
candor as being some kind of requirement to give information in a piece of
scholarship, relevant to evaluating that scholarship, which can include a variety
of things including funding, personal interests, even ideological interests so that
the reader-critic has the tools needed to evaluate it.
FRANCIS: Could I just throw in, it’s not just “candor about what”—we
might also want to think about “candor to whom?”
SELIGMAN: The flip side of writing positive or negative reviews of one’s
colleagues is holding back the full weight of your negative evaluation of a work
out of politeness.
WEST: I just want to push back a little. First, against the idea that one needs
to expose one’s ideological priors. That strikes me as indulgence, not candor.
There’s no need and let the work speak for itself, so to speak. And then second,
perhaps there’s a worry about not letting loose with the full fusillade, but there
are also other ethical constraints on one as a human being and so, I don’t know
how to deal with that, but there’s ethics of politeness, of friendship. Someone
who’s being asked to vote negatively on a tenure decision involving of someone
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who’s become a friend shouldn’t make the vote on the basis of friendship, but
let’s not deny that this is an ethical conflict. And so, I just don’t want these
rules to become sort of trump-like. “Trump” meaning in the cards sense of the
word.
BOOTHE-PERRY: While you’re writing, just a quick comment on the other
norms that we are concerned with when we’re talking about our scholarship, as
Robin just pointed out. In the ethics of friendship and the ethnics of politeness,
maybe it might be wise for us, in this document, to maybe put a distinction
between ethics as being more like the Rules of Professional Conduct and some
specific obligations and a moral compass or a societal separation from the
actual restatement that we’re doing. There was some differentiation there.
HORWITZ: One thing I’ve done, just in response to Robin, to the way I put
it is kind of note other ethical issues, so to speak, external to scholarship, which
is to say we obviously have certain role ethical obligations, but that does not
exhaust our ethical obligations as human beings, and so candor is, in that sense,
not a trump. I guess I’d say one of the answers is there are times when the
answer is to abstain, don’t write the article and so on, because you might be
able to do this, but you can’t then properly follow other obligations.
WALD: The distinction between common morality and role morality is a
well-known one in legal ethics.8 The basic idea is that acting as lawyers,
members of the legal profession may follow a specific role-differentiated
morality that may at times conflict with common morality, if their role is
justified and legitimate. The distinction between common and role morality
gives rise to interesting ethical questions such as, “Can a good lawyer be a bad
person?”
It is not, however, clear to me that we can import the idea of role morality
to the realm of legal scholarship and law professors. The problem, or challenge
in doing so, and part of what we came together today to discuss, is that we do
not have an agreed upon understanding of the role and ethics of law professors.
Remember that role morality is only justified and one is only permitted to
deviate from common morality, if one’s role is justified and legitimate. If we
do not know exactly what law professors do and should do and if we do not
have a well-reasoned definition of their role, it makes little sense to talk about
law professors’ role morality.
It follows—and this may sound surprising coming from someone who
makes a living teaching the Rules of Professional Conduct—that it may make
little sense to borrow from lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct when
thinking about rules of professional conduct for legal scholars. The Rules of
Professional Conduct give life and operationalize, if you will, lawyers’ role
8. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).

CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

6/12/18 9:24 AM

CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

1121

morality. To the extent that law professors have a role morality different than
the one lawyers follow, then I’m not sure that the Rules of Professional Conduct
are generally helpful here in delineating specific rules for academic lawyers.
But the Rules may be helpful in some limited circumstances. Rule 8.4, for
example, deals with lawyers’ trustworthiness and honesty9—
HORWITZ: That’s the catch-all chapter.
WALD: Right. Borrowing from 8.4(c) makes sense in thinking about law
professors’ duty of trustworthiness and honesty. But more generally using the
Rules to help think about law professors’ duties may make less sense. Think
about the rules pertaining to conflicts of interests. The conflict rules are so
embedded in the notion of lawyers’ role-morality as representatives of clients,
such that borrowing from them, out of context, in thinking about law
professors’ duty of loyalty may be confusing. For example, one basic notion in
the conflicts rules is that there’s something called a conflict, and if it exists,
then it may be cured when a client gives her informed consent. That’s Rule 1.7.
How might this notion apply to legal scholarship? Suppose a law professor
writing a law review article has a conflict of interest. Who is the “client?” The
readers? The law professors’ home institution? And even if we can identify
the “clients,” in what meaningful way can we empower them to give something
akin to informed consent and what would that mean? Borrowing from the
conflict rules of lawyers, as you can see, might be quite difficult to do.
Or think about the notion of giving clients notice in the Rules as an
alternative means of, in some circumstances, curing a conflict of interest—and
this is going back to Carissa’s point about whether disclosing a conflict is
sufficient to cure a law professor’s conflict. When I read scholarship,
sometimes disclosures are helpful to me, because but for them, I’ll read an
article with an eye toward deferring to the author’s subject matter expertise. I’ll
assume that the author has the expertise and that the article reflects it. In
contrast, if I know, for example, that some work has been funded by an
interested party, an institution with a particular agenda, it’s not that I won’t read
the paper, but I might read it with a more critical disposition, not deferring to
the author’s expertise to the same degree given the disclosed conflict.
The same thinking applies to the conflict that arises when academics review
or engage with the work of colleagues in their own institution. I don’t think
there ought to be a ban on such practices, that strikes me as ridiculous, because
colleagues in an institution that work in the same area and have complimentary
expertise should be permitted and perhaps encouraged to review and engage
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”).
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with each other’s work. But, to the extent that some people are unaware of
those relationships that might in some way color or influence how we read or
how we ought to read the review or scholarly engagement, these relationships
ought to be disclosed.
Can we or should we then borrow from the notice and disclosure
requirements in the conflict rules when we think about the disclosures law
professors should make? I doubt it. The Rules’ notice requirements are so
grounded in the particulars of representing clients that they make little sense
outside of that context.
HORWITZ: I’m going to offer two quick responses. I guess I get to be both,
kind of manager and occasional participant. So, I agree with—Eli makes the
valuable point, that the lawyers’ ethical rules involving conflicts are there in
part because you are an agent for a principal and so you’re worried about, kind
of, agency slippage and so on, and you actually have a client to represent.
That’s not true for scholarship. One might rightly or pompously or somewhere
in-between, kind of say “Well, I’m serving the muse,” or “I kind of represent
the truth” or something of the sort, but it’s not quite the same thing. Again, it
may be that the response to this is more disclosure and less disqualification.
It’s not necessarily the response, but if you have a wide audience and the
concern is how the audience will receive or evaluate it, then it might be that
that’s one of the ways to address it rather than kind of the lawyerly
disqualification model. Whatever my second point was can’t have been that
important, so I’ll leave it.
OLDFATHER: All right. Just a couple points. This, I think, goes back to
Neil’s point with respect to sincerity, but I think candor, as well, is tied to
motivation and I like the “no other ethical issues external to scholarship”
because it seems to me as well that what we’re talking about here really
concerns at what point does something imperil the status of the project as
scholarship and that disclosure is tied to things that might lead one to question
whether the person, the author, is engaged in something that we want to call
scholarship as opposed to something we want to call advocacy, what he or she
is actually motivated by. And I think in some instances, the disclosure strikes
me as fine. It’s the author saying “I am aware of these facts, I have accounted
for these facts that might make my analysis seem to be not disinterested, but
I’m attempting to set them to the side as I conduct this.” I think at some point
though, they become too extreme. It starts to remind me now of the
“appearance of impropriety type standard,” with respect to judicial recusal.
There—we expect and we allow for judges to bring all sorts of priors to their
analysis of cases, but at some point, it becomes too extreme and we say you
can’t do it, you can’t be a judge under that circumstance. I think we will draw
the lines very differently, but there comes a point at which we should be willing
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to say you’re not a scholar at that point, you’re doing something else, you
shouldn’t be doing it.
HORWITZ: So, let me first of all, steal the opportunity to mention the point
that I had forgotten about Robin’s comment about ideology. I’m not
unsympathetic. I think that cannot always be useful or relevant, or terribly
important, and sometimes it’s clear. My concern, I guess the reason I bring it
up, is maybe, particularly in constitutional law, it’s often the case that is what
is doing a great deal of the work is—I won’t call them priors, but the premises
that go unstated about relevant values. So, I don’t care if somebody’s goal, for
instance—to kind of paraphrase Mark Tuffin is, “What’s going to serve the goal
of socialism in the United States?” But it helps me sometimes to evaluate an
article if a premise that’s not clearly stated or a baseline that’s animating the
piece and it’s really underwriting a lot of the work is stated—and maybe that’s
just the question of what constitutes well done versus not well-done
scholarship, so—
WEST: I agree with where you wound up. That’s a bad argument, if there’s
also a premise in a constitutional argument that is a statement of general
political moral theory and so sure, if it’s not explicit, then it’s a poor argument.
I don’t think you need to add an additional obligation of candor with respect to
one’s ideology.
HORWITZ: Yeah. And I certainly don’t want to confuse questions about
the quality of scholarship with questions about the ethics of scholarship, at least
not in every case.
FISH: Two points. One is I’m uncomfortable with sincerity as belonging
here at all. I’m not sure that it’s available to the kind of standards or even quasiformalization that you might desire, and I’m remembering in the conscientious
objector cases, Seeger10 and Welsh11, how unsatisfactory the sincerity standard,
which was the only one the Court left itself, was at the end of that process. My
second comment had to do with the question of tone in relation to candor and
goes back to someone who talked about reviewers—all people responding to
essays pulling their punches, being less than “candid.” Well, this might be a
matter of disciplinary difference. When I taught some years ago at Columbia
University, a young woman who was visiting from Oxford was writing her
dissertation and wanted to sit in on my classes, because she told me my work
would be part of her thesis. Of course, no one can resist that request and I
simply did not. And then after a certain amount of time, she asked me if I would
look at some of her work, and of course, I did. So then I met with her and had
this following conversation. I said, “Have I ever, in any way, harmed you?”
10. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
11. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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She said, “No.” “Have I ever, in any way, harmed anyone that you loved or
cared about?” And she said, “No.” And so, I said, “Why are speaking, then,
so viciously about me?” Not in terms of disagreeing with one’s arguments, but
in terms of something that grows to the level occasionally of name-calling,
almost name-calling. And she replied, I’m not sure about whether this is
accurate or not, and I’ll ask Leslie. She replied that that was the decorum in
philosophical debate. That’s what she said.
FRANCIS: That’s Oxford philosophical debate.
FISH: Perhaps it was only the decorum that her mentor had delivered to her.
But I know, again, in literary studies, one usually tries fairly hard to be polite
and to have ready locutions, like “I think the point that was raised is an
important one and I’m grateful to Professor X for directing us to this line of
inquiry, but I don’t think that his way of pursuing it will lead us to the best
result,” or something like that. As opposed to “Man, this is stupid, how did this
person ever get a position in a university?” And so forth. So, is this a matter
of what we might call a general requirement of collegiality even in the midst of
fierce difference of opinion or does it vary across disciplines? I don’t know.
HORWITZ: Neil? And then let me say, since everybody’s at least had one
round, and I know there are hands up, I’m going to move to exhaustiveness,
which I suspect is a briefer topic, not necessarily. Okay, we’ll try to keep them
short and let’s move to it as quickly as we can, in part, because I suspect the
others are relevant questions and I’m keeping an eye on the clock, but go ahead,
please.
HAMILTON: Well, two points. I’m agreeing that on the sincerity piece, at
least to my experience, I’m not seeing it in other disciplines, it’s a bit of an
outlier to me, and on that point, since our target audience ultimately is the legal
professorate and they’re going to be most influenced by whatever we can point
to in other—particularly the medical profession, the social sciences, the liberal
arts tradition—I mean, to where we see it well-developed these concepts,
whatever their title is in these other disciplines, would be well served,
especially, I think the medical, but in terms of what influences the legal
professorate. Just back to if we had agreement on the various major categories
of scholarship, which goes back to Stanley and Robin’s comments, the
discussion earlier, let’s say, the scholarship of the liberal arts tradition, the
normative scholarship, the frankly partisan, that’s what I meant. If I knew
which tradition they’re in or which context, then it helps me with
exhaustiveness, because then I know. Because if it’s the first type, I think I’m
reading a piece where they’ve done their best to explore all the counter
arguments and all the counter evidence, whereas if it’s in the last group, I’m
quite confident I’m not looking at that.
HORWITZ: So, Amanda, is it a short order or is it—
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SELIGMAN: Yeah. I just wanted to speak briefly about pedagogy since
Stanley raised this question as well. It’s very good that your discussion is
limited to legal scholarship, as opposed to legal teaching, because I think that
there are situations in pedagogy which call for us not to be candid with our
students and certainly not to disclose things. So, I think that part of what we
need to think about in this process is the code switching that you as faculty do
between your roles as scholars and your roles as teachers.
WALD: Well, if you’re moving on, would you just mind adding to the other
list Stanley’s point about—I’m going to loosely call it decorum, so we might
get to talk about it later.
HORWITZ: All right. And I’ll say, by the way, that question about code
switching is, I won’t say newly controversialized, but again, controversialized
in part because of the accessibility of social media, op-eds and so on. But I’m
thinking of debates about whether Amy Wax at Penn should be allowed to teach
first year students, in part on the basis of extra academic writings, maybe
academic writings, but not specifically classroom statements, so those code
switching debates are a matter of controversy right now. They don’t need to be
addressed here, but I do think there is a connection between candor and
exhaustiveness or a potential one because, there may be a duty to exhaust
relevant research sources but sometimes there’s also a duty to explain the scope
of your research or the scope of your investigation, and so that maybe segues
us into exhaustiveness. So, let me, at least in the interest of time, push us in
that direction. So, what does exhaustiveness mean? And maybe part of the
question here is, Are there different kinds of exhaustiveness that are relevant,
ethical scholarly duties? Anybody want to lead off on that?
FRANCIS: Well, my “to whom” comment—the reason I wanted to just sort
of expand on it, is often conflicts are disclosed to expert bodies, which then
make a judgment about whether or not they rise to the level of more general
disclosure, so there are conflict of interest committees at universities and
frequently, people will be expected to make disclosures to editors, and that’s
another place where—and the editor can make a judgment—but where student
edited journals could be a real problem for us because students are just in a very
difficult position, not only not having the expertise, but not having the authority,
so I just wanted to raise that. About exhaustiveness, we use footnotes in law
publishing very differently from the way footnotes are used in other disciplines,
and it might be worth reflecting on that. Just two little quickies. Often in
philosophy writing, the thing that you’re setting aside, that’s not the topic of
this article or that somebody might want to think much more about, but you’re
not doing it here, that’s what footnotes do a lot of the time. And footnotes for
us tend to be some sort of bizarre notion of authority and either it’s everything
like, “See generally Locke.” Anyway, I’ll stop there.
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HORWITZ: Yeah, and just to raise Eli’s blood temperature, add that there
are cases in legal ethics where one cannot split off a particular portion of a case
or particular piece of legal work, that is to say sometimes you can limit what
you’re going to do for a client and sometimes it’s not ethically permissible to
say, “I’m going to do X but not Y,” which is intimately connected to—and it
seems to me that although we often make scope statements, and that’s part of
the exhaustiveness question in a sense, there may be cases where it is not proper
to —at least it seems to me, to say, “I’m setting aside this question that is clearly
relevant and determinative on the issue I’m writing about,” particularly if
you’re doing so for strategic reasons. “I know I can sell the ultimate outcome
I want by kind of presenting it as a sheep and I’ll leave out the wolf that I know
is kind of really hiding in the weeds on this argument.” You know, “This
argument has the following implication, I know that if I know that there’s an
intimately connected issue that has bigger implications, that are going to make
people disagree with me, I’m setting it to one side.” I think there are cases
where that’s unproblematic and others where it might be problematic, but,
Robin, you had a comment, I think, on exhaustiveness.
WEST: A few, yeah. So, first, I think it’s worth remembering that the older
idea of legal scholarship was really neither normative nor inter-disciplinary, it
was descriptive. The point was to describe accurately the content of the law,
and I think our fixation with footnoting and with citation to authority comes
from that tradition. If the point is to say what the law is and if we understand
as lawyers that to say accurately what the law is, means to be completely
steeped in authority, you are not supposed to be original here. You’re saying
something that has been authoritatively laid down in the past and so you’ve got
to get the past right, so there’s this compulsion about having authority for every
proposition that’s stated. And then as we’ve moved away from that, as sort of
the normative—in the other sense of the word, normative, form of what legal
scholarship is towards other things to do, we haven’t dropped the habit of,
perhaps, excessive footnoting. But, even in normative legal scholarship, and I
would say also—and we haven’t talked about this at all—but in critical legal
scholarship and theoretical legal scholarship, which are just forms that I talk
about when I do my whole taxonomy, it still is a distinctive feature of legal
scholarship, to be embedded in authority and that counts against originality, it
counts against a lot of things that are valued in these other disciplines. It’s all
about being embedded in—working one’s position in—interweaving it with
authority so, there’s just going to be more citation of authority. I think the sad
thing with law review editing is that the students are habituated to that and so
push for the citation, the unnecessary citation, the citation that says, “See
Locke” for everything, et cetera, when it just isn’t appropriate. I want to say
that this is an example of what underscores Leslie’s very first, very well-taken
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point, that it’s hard to talk about this apart from what should be the ethics of
law review publication, so much of this is generated by habits of law review
editing. Oh, and I also wanted to add, under other, if we could just add
disinterestedness. I don’t mean to keep hammering away on this, but I would
just like to have a focused point where we can address that.
OLDFATHER: I really liked Robin’s point about that there’s this origin story
for why we have so many footnotes and there’s the reality of what they’ve come
to be. I’m reminded of when I was working on the very first article I wrote as
an academic and was still transitioning from being a practicing lawyer to being
an academic. I thought that—and I think I thought correctly—that one of my
jobs was to survey all of the past history of legal scholarship to see who had
talked about the thing that I was talking about and what had they said and how
could I situate what I’m saying within that. And I tried to do that and
fortunately, I identified a pretty good topic and it turns out that there was almost
nobody who had said anything about it, so that was a win for me. Later, doing
a different article, I had the following experience. I was doing some research
and I found this very well-done, I thought, piece on an issue that was written
by—I won’t name any names, but somebody at a law school of no great renown,
published in a pretty good, but not exactly great journal, and I thought, “Oh,
that’s really well-done, it’s too bad that didn’t place better.” And then I’m
continuing along, and I find a piece written by somebody whose name you
would all know and it took up the very same question, analyzed it in roughly
the same way, and did not in any way acknowledge that anybody had spoken
at all about the particular point ever in the past. It seems to me there’s a decent
amount of that, that goes on, and I find that troublesome, and that seems to me
to violate a norm of exhaustiveness.
FRANCIS: Or perhaps plagiarism?
OLDFATHER: Well, I don’t even know that it was plagiarism. I don’t think
that there was any direct lift. Now, it may well be that there were research
assistants involved in the process, who might have impacted this. But it wasn’t
that there were words lifted or that the analytical path was necessarily identical.
But the topic, and the general track of the analysis were such that there ought
to have been acknowledgment.
HORWITZ: So, I’ll make a short two-part intermission. One is, obviously
again, this is related to peer review. Obviously, peer reviewers are imperfect,
particularly in a profession in which it’s not clear that we’ve been steeped in a
canon, but that’s one way to ferret out these problems. And the second is, it
may be related to the pressure, both in terms of placement and so on, to be
novel. So, I like to joke that every—almost every law review article these days,
certainly many well-placed ones, have the paragraph that says, “This is the first
article to ever,” and then at the footnote, soon after, that says, “Of course there
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are honorable exceptions,” and then lists a bunch of articles, which ought to
make you question the first article proposition. So, exhaustiveness may be
damaged by the incentive to appear novel. It doesn’t mean not reading them.
OLDFATHER: I certainly agree with that point, and I have another story that
I’ve shared with you, that relates to that specific problem. I think, given the
identity of the person who wrote the article that completely ignored the second
one, novelty claims, worries about placement were completely non-existent.
This really seemed to be a situation where the author thought, “I’ve got
something interesting to say and because I have this thing to say, and it’s
interesting to me, I assume the rest of the world will find it interesting, too.”
The idea that someone else might have thought of it before might not have even
occurred to the author.
WALD: When we talk about exhaustiveness, we might mean at least two
things, both of which are important. The first is subject matter exhaustiveness,
and I find Robin’s departure point fantastic in thinking about this notion. It
used to be that the law was primarily about case law and statutory provisions,
so subject matter exhaustiveness had to do with getting the law right, citing and
discussing all the relevant cases and statutory provisions, and if one missed
some of these references, that was poor scholarship, in terms of exhaustiveness.
And then, Robin points out correctly, things have changed. Today subject
matter exhaustiveness includes not just case law and statutory materials, what
we refer to as primary sources, but secondary sources as well, such as law
review articles. If someone has written about one’s topic before, if there’s a
law review article on point and one fails to spot, acknowledge, and discuss it,
that’s a problem of subject matter exhaustiveness. Robin even pushes us further
to acknowledge that these days, it’s not just primary and secondary sources,
there are also non-law materials that come in, so not knowing what you don’t
know could trigger an exhaustiveness concern. But we’re not experts in
everything, so one might miss a few non-law sources, and do we still call it
failure of subject matter exhaustiveness?
Another issue of exhaustiveness is strategic exhaustiveness. For example,
can a scholar ethically follow this line of thinking: “I’m going to leave out from
the argument certain components that are going to be more provocative and
more problematic because I have an agenda or because I want to drive home in
this article a particular part of the argument and leave more challenging
questions to another day?”
If a scholar engages in such strategic
exhaustiveness, must she disclose it to her readers? And note that subject
matter and strategic exhaustiveness can intersect in a Venn diagram, when one
identifies a relevant and important line of inquiry related to her subject matter
but decides not to engage it in detail because she does not know the issues well
and the discussion is likely to be complex and distracting to her agenda.
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We can then talk about the ethical qualities of strategic exhaustiveness. It
seems to me that perhaps all we might require is good faith, if only because it
will be quite hard, I think, to scrutinize strategic exhaustiveness in a meaningful
way other than to insist on good faith. And to that end, let me give an example
of what we might mean by good faith. Unrelated to this conference, I have
written an article for the Marquette Law Review, in which I wanted to explore
social and cultural capital.12 As many of you know, when one talks about the
use of social and cultural capital, often these issues are mired in debates about
gender and racial inequality and discrimination, and I didn’t want to go into this
usual rabbit hole not because gender and racial equality are not exceedingly
important—they are—but because I wanted to explore the use of social and
cultural capital and its relationship with merit and success not in the context of
gender and racial inequality. In other words, I engaged in strategic
exhaustiveness, deciding not to explore in this article phenomena—gender and
racial inequality and discrimination—clearly relevant to my subject matter—
social and cultural capital. So, I picked as an example for my subject matter, a
novel about academic life that some of you have read, called Stoner. It was in
the news quite a few years ago and I picked it exactly because the protagonist
in the book, one William Stoner, was a white male who lived and worked in a
time and an era that for better or worse featured predominantly white males in
academia. The choice allowed me to explore Stoner’s experiences and
highlight social and cultural capital without getting into gender and racial
discrimination because women and minority professors were not featured in the
novel. Now, is there a problem of strategic exhaustiveness here? Is it legitimate
to examine social and cultural capital without discussing gender and racial
inequality? I acted, I hope, in good faith, intending to advance the scholarship,
not to hide the ball. My article explicitly states, “I’m sidestepping these issues
because I want to focus on aspects that sometimes get bogged down in other
issues.”13 But what if I had not provided an explicit disclaimer? Would not
disclosing constitute a failure of strategic exhaustiveness?
HORWITZ: Let me do this, with the time available. I know people have
particularly wanted to at least put on the board, so to speak, disinterestedness
and integrity, so I’ll certainly eat a little bit of our lunch time, so to speak, but
not too much. Do people have comments about these or things they want to
add, think should be on this list?
FRANCIS: So, I’ve been wracking my brain to try to think of one, but I think
we ought to have on the table the question of whether there are some areas of
scholarship that people should think twice before they ever enter into or at least
12. Eli Wald, Success, Merit, and Capital in America, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2017).
13. Id. at 3–4.
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open up the question about that. So, the examples from the sciences might
involve how human embryos are used past so many days or stem cell research,
cloning research. There have been environmental issues about things like GM
products and there have been various moratoria, there have been public bodies
that think about those questions, and I don’t know whether there are areas like
that in law, but there might be, and whether we ought to at least attend to that
possibility.
HORWITZ: So, I’ll put this down, I’ll say probably to the extent that law is
part of the humanities, the answer would be maybe not to the extent that it is—
legal scholarship to the extent that it’s part of the professions. I think you would
at least find some people who would make that argument. I would not be one
of them, but it’s possible that someone—
FRANCIS: “No go” areas.
HORWITZ: Yeah, I was going to call it “problems areas.”
FRANCIS: Or areas that should be thought about publicly before they’re
“go” areas. Cyber security, certain forms of cyber terrorism are coming to
mind.
HORWITZ: So, one can imagine, for instance, an article about “here is the
perfect strategy for concealing all your investments off-shore, here’s a law
review article saying there’s a terrific gap in the law that would enable people
to get away with just straight out theft.” That would be maybe a good or bad
illustration of the kind of thing you’re talking about.
HESSICK: So, I just wanted to say something briefly about the decorum
point and about whether there’s too much politeness, I think, as Amanda put it,
“a culture of politeness.” And I want to say that I’m pro-politeness, because I
actually think that at least at some schools—some faculties are known—you
give a talk there and it’s going to be all about ripping you down and blah, blah,
blah, blah, and they pride themselves on it. I actually think that the problem
with the politeness norm is that sometimes it leads people not to engage because
people fear that engagement is inherently impolite, and I actually think that
what the politeness norm ought to be is all about figuring out how to engage
politely. That is—and maybe politely is the wrong way to think about it—how
to engage on the substance in a way that is productive, that isn’t mistaken for
an attack on the author and that isn’t seen as anything other than engaging with
the author’s idea in good faith in order to further sort of the joint enterprise. So,
I think that those sorts of conventions that Stanley mentioned, I don’t think that
those are a bad thing, I think that we should engage with people’s ideas, we
should reframe their ideas in a way that presents them in their strongest light,
and then say the extent to which we think that those ideas are valuable in what
they add, and then talk about the extent to which they fall short. I think that’s
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more likely to get the author to engage with your criticism, but I also think that
if we can see engagement as having both sort of the “pat on the back” aspect to
it that’s a genuine, “here’s what was done well,” and then the “here’s what left
me wanting more or dissatisfied,” that’s something that could really help the
community. But I think that maybe the idea is it needs to be framed as
constructive engagement so that the idea of being polite isn’t then failing to
engage, because I think that’s a real error.
HORWITZ: And I don’t want to—and I could do it wrongly, ventriloquize
Stanley, but it seems to me if an issue was academicized, it’s easier to have
strong disagreement, the danger in our discipline with its debates about how
normative the work is—and I’m not saying that’s a good or bad thing, but it’s
not fixed, and the fact that we write about current events is people often kind of
assume an article is a stalking horse for a political position and that makes it
sometimes a more fiery engagement. If we agreed, we were fighting over the
article might be a different situation.
WEST: Okay. I’ll be quick. I just remember teaching an article in my
fellow seminar about whether or not Roe v. Wade14 led to the plunging of the
crime rate 20 years later, and a couple students opined that this research should
not have been done and the article should not have been written and we
shouldn’t be reading—it smacks of eugenics—even though the authors of that
piece were very careful to say this is not an argument for Roe v. Wade, so it’s
an example. I’m not sure that anything about that can or should be codified.
BOOTHE-PERRY: Actually, to piggyback on what Robin just said. I have
some discomfort in accepting the idea that there are areas that legal scholars
should avoid. I think we have an opportunity to push the envelope in many
cases, and as legal scholars, that might be something that we should be doing
in some instances. Again, if we know what the end goal is of our scholarship,
if we are not trying to write the manual for the thieves to get the off-shore
accounts, but to maybe instruct or persuade the legislators to change the laws
or the statutes, then if we academicize how we write it, we should be able to
attack any area, really, even the taboo areas that people don’t want to talk about
as legal scholars, that’s part of what we do, we talk about these areas for some
better good, some end goal.
HORWITZ: Stanley?
FISH: Yeah, going back to the candor and decorum questions and the tone
question. My thinking about these matters, is dictated by three events. One,
the first talk I ever gave at a law school was at Columbia Law School at a
workshop, presided over by Bruce Ackerman. Here was his introduction to me.

14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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“Here’s Stanley Fish; go get him.” And then I received, much earlier, when I
was an assistant professor at the University of California–Berkeley, and had not
yet given any talks on anything, when I began to give talks or, I got a couple
invitations, I got two pieces of advice from senior scholars. One was from the
philosopher, John Searle, a friend of mine, who said, “Watch out for the head
hunters,” by which he meant that any time you give a talk, there’s someone in
the audience who believes that he or she should be up there on the podium and
not you, and wants to take your head home as a trophy. And the second thing
that was said to me was by a historian, by the name of Hayden White, who said
to me about going out to give a talk, he said, “You’ll know you’re in trouble
when the second question is about the Holocaust.” These were really good
pieces of advice and have proven true time and time again.
HORWITZ: I don’t want to take too much from lunch, so consider it kind of
a miscellanea—miscellany, or concluding comments or what have you, for this
section. Anyone?
SELIGMAN: So, I’m going to take advantage of the opportunity to say
something I wanted to say about exhaustiveness, which is that I really actually
wanted to speak against exhaustiveness. As a historian, everything is related;
you could get to the point where you can’t actually publish anything because
you have to continue to research and you have to continue to write and your
footnotes will take up the entire universe. So, in my discomfort with the word
exhaustiveness, I wondered if thoroughness might be a better word.
HORWITZ: That’s right. Yeah, and I think some of it, hopefully is reflected
in the regarding scope so that you’re not trying to do the history of the world,
you’re trying to do what happened on a street in Chicago, but—
SELIGMAN: But I have to say, I mean, as somebody who writes about what
happens on a street in Chicago, I don’t look at all the primary sources. The
litmus test that I get myself to is when do I have enough to say something that’s
new, that no one’s said before?
HORWITZ: Fair enough. Yeah.
WALD: At the risk of sounding like a lawyer, maybe Amanda will take the
following as a friendly amendment. I don’t know that renaming exhaustiveness
“thoroughness” will do the trick. Perhaps what she means is reasonable
exhaustiveness? One doesn’t have to cite and substantively engage with
everything that has ever been written on one’s subject matter because that might
be redundant. Instead, one has to be reasonably exhaustive when it comes to
subject matter, exercising reasonable professional judgment as to what to cite
and what to engage with.
HORWITZ: In a restatement, reasonable papers over all matter of
differences, right? Other kind of concluding remarks or things people want to
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sneak in on this topic before we have lunch? All right. Appreciate it. Let’s
eat.
D. Session Three: The Mechanisms of Legal Scholarship, Especially Law
Reviews and the Issues They Create
OLDFATHER: Moving now into the section where we’re talking about the
mechanisms, and particularly law reviews and the various issues that those
might create. During the break, Stanley pointed out, I think, quite appropriately
that we might broaden the focus a little bit—whether it’s at this stage or looking
back on what we did this morning—to potentially include case books as
scholarship. I think at least some of them might fall into that basket. Certainly,
one can think of something like “The Legal Process” as a set of teaching
materials, that became extraordinarily influential both as teaching materials and
as scholarship. So that certainly those might be accounted for somewhere along
the line. With respect to the mechanisms, and focusing on law reviews
especially, I think we’ve got several sets of questions to consider. There’s the
question that Leslie raises most directly, which is whether this approach to the
production of scholarship is appropriate at all, and whether we ought, instead,
to move to some sort of peer review model. My instinct with respect to that is
yes, ideally, we would, but also, I don’t think that’s likely to happen anytime
soon, and so I wonder whether it makes sense for us to spend too much time on
that topic because I think, to some degree, we just have to take the world as it
is and comment on that. Then there are questions with respect to our obligations
on the author side of things. And I think that is probably our primary focus.
The ethics on the journal side of things we might touch on a bit, but they were
the subject of the last model code related to these general topics, published in
the Marquette Law Review twenty-six years ago.15 I think as well that Scott
Dodson’s model code does a fairly nice job of covering a lot of these issues as
well. So, we may want to consider to what extent we want to leave them largely
to the side.
I don’t have a particular framework for our discussion in mind. Looking at
it from the author side of things is probably the most logical place to start given
that our focus has been on scholars and scholars’ obligations. We can consider
things like puffery. We can think about things like the phenomenon of, as it’s
often referred to, “walking a piece down the hall” on behalf of a friend or a
colleague at another institution and recommending it to the law review editors
within one’s own institution. And I’ll stop talking, but only after raising that I
15. Michael L. Closen & Robert M. Jarvis, The National Conference of Law Reviews Model
Code of Ethics: Final Text and Comments, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 509 (1992).
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saw in the ethical standards for the political scientists a requirement on the part
of peer reviewers to “disqualify themselves if they have a reasonable doubt
about whether they can exercise the responsibility with scholarly
detachment.”16 So, there’s a discipline that is asking of reviewers that they be
able to review things in a scholarly detached manner and, boy, our process does
not seem to be one that includes such a norm to any real degree, at all. That’s
what I’ve got by way of an introduction. I’ll open it up to comments.
HORWITZ: I guess I’ll make three comments. One, and I know Carissa
wrote about this specifically, it’s not clear where in the schedule the question
of work by legal scholars not in law reviews or book form falls. It might fall
here if we widen the scope to case books, it might make sense to at least briefly
discuss that question. I do think some of that work is subject to standards or
that people should leave off the institutional letterhead if they’re unwilling to
abide by certain standards. And that will be good for democracy if more people
wrote as citizens rather than writing as ostensible experts. But that’s one
question. How do we do with non-scholarship or when do we deal with it?
Tomorrow morning there is a “what have we missed” session so it could very
well be placed there if we had to. The second is, particularly in an age of
increasing empirical work, some question about data, access to data seems
relevant here or kind of what obligations you have to make your work replicable
or falsifiable where it relies on data. And I think the third was the—I think this
can be formalized, but while I would, on the whole, prefer peer review, and I
will say not unaware of all the controversies over the peer review, so it’s not
that it’s ideal. It’s like democracy. It’s better than the alternative. So, while I
might prefer peer review, in its absence I would probably, or I could imagine a
kind of restatement section that says peer review is kind of the gold standard to
the extent we don’t have it, law reviews should move toward having anonymous
professional evaluation of articles. And faculty, when reviewing scholarship,
are obliged to review the scholarship, not review the placement. So,
particularly when you’re reading, read the article, judge it for itself as you’ve
said earlier don’t be overwhelmed by the fact that it appears in a fancy school
that does not necessarily have peer review or where something’s been walked
down the hall.
OLDFATHER: And I’ve taken the point about data disclosure here and I use
the word “transparency” because that’s what the American Political Science
Association uses in order to do that. So, sorry Stanley. I felt I had to. But
there’s one where another discipline certainly has a provision speaking exactly
to that.

16. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, supra note 7, at 14.
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WALD: At the risk of being somewhat of a devil’s advocate, I most
certainly don’t think of peer review as a gold standard. It’s anything but. It’s
complicated, it’s messy, and it has its own downfalls. Peer reviews take forever
to complete. Although anonymous in theory, in practice they are often not blind
because the pool of experts in a specialized field is small such that reviewers
realize who the author is and the author often knows who the reviewers are.
And the process is often tainted by academic politics.
Accordingly, I was wondering if we can talk a little bit about some of the
reasons for the background assumption that law reviews are second best to peer
review. One place to start this conversation is to talk about the ongoing shift at
elite law reviews to a hybrid peer review model. The so-called elite law reviews
have recently introduced a quasi-peer review process. One gets a call and is
advised that, “Your article is going for a vote before the entire board. In
conjunction with that vote, we are soliciting outside reviews of your article.”
This hybrid model, initial selection by article editors and a vote by the studentseditors, informed by outside peer reviewers’ input, strikes me as a problematic
process, even if one generally favors a move toward peer review. This evolving
hybrid model, in which there are no clear standards for soliciting peer
reviews—sometimes an author will be asked to identify the peer reviewers and
sometimes the peer reviewers will get three days to respond substantively
before the vote with the incredible pressure of trying to give a meaningful
assessment without costing a colleague the opportunity to publish in an elite
law review—is quite troubling.
I’d like to suggest that although the current law review process is far from
ideal, it is not clearly inferior to either traditional peer review or to the emerging
hybrid model adopted by some law reviews. Moreover, the idea that we law
professors are subject to the review of the best and brightest editors who are
second and third year law students, such that we have to write articles that make
sense to smart and well-intending student editors, does not offend me. It’s far
from ideal, to be clear, but I’m not at all sure that it’s inferior to the peer review.
OLDFATHER: I kind of like this moderating thing because you get the
microphone whenever you want it. I think that, and this may be the point that
Robin is about to make, but that the historical point she made with respect to
footnoting may have some applicability here as well, in the sense that,
traditionally, law reviews were about the doctrinal work that had as its audience
not specialists, but generalists, practicing lawyers, and judges. And that it
would serve then the very useful function of making sure that legal scholarship
was pitched at a level to be understandable by and useful to those folks. As we
have moved to a world in which there is more specialization and more
scholarship that is more academic in nature, that may have fallen away. There
may still be value to an approach that has this gatekeeper that forces us to use
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language in a certain way that appeals to those young in the discipline. So,
there is something to build off your point.
WEST: Thanks, not what I was going to say but I’ll sign onto it. So, at
Georgetown at any rate, the students increasingly use faculty as outside
reviewers and it leads to its own problems which are, I think, quite severe. The
main one being that calls from a faculty member at one school to a faculty
member at Georgetown or at the receiving school asking for that faculty
member’s assistance in getting one’s own article published or the article of a
junior colleague or the article of a friend. And that has to stop. And so, it seems
like this is a solvable problem that law reviews from each of us, our own law
reviews could be encouraged to seek out outside reviews, but to do it
anonymously and to resist all pressure from their faculty. And pressure from
the faculty should be regarded as an ethical problem. I mean, not a fireable
offense, but as something that should be discouraged.
FRANCIS: So, I agree very much with what Robin just said. And to expand
on it a little bit, we’re not going to be able to change the current structure of
law reviews directly, but we could indirectly make recommendations to law
faculties about best practices for the law reviews which, after all, they sponsor.
WEST: And give credit for it.
FRANCIS: That’s right, yeah. And then give student credit for. And it
seems to me that maybe a way to go about it is to look at what are the worst
problems, as we see it, with current law reviews that, and I’ll go to what you
were saying because you’re right, the hybrid doesn’t solve the problems at all.
And it seems to me that there are two problems, one of which, what Robin just
mentioned—favoritism. So, that’s a real problem, with who gets published
where. And we need to work to end that. And on masked reviewing and getting
comments. But the only way you can start to tamp out favoritism is to mask
the identity of authors.
The other thing that I think is a very serious problem, and it came up in the
puffery discussion, is that no matter how smart students are, they don’t have the
whole sweep of the field. And so, there’s really a lack of expertise in making
decisions about what gets published or not. And a start on that is using people
in the field in your own—if it can be masked at your own law school. But
another way to do that is to have an identified pool of people around the country
or at other law schools that, and now what journals in other fields do, they
protect very carefully the anonymity of the peer reviewer, but they’ll publish at
the end of say every two-year period or something like that, a list of the folks
who have reviewed for them, with a thank you. And the advantage of that is
you can tell the quality of the folks who review. You could also figure out
whether everybody who reviews for a journal is from the Federalist Society,
just to take one example. You know, you could figure out whether there are
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systematic biases that go into that. So, maybe what I think we ought to do is
make a set of recommendations for law faculty as supervisors of journals about
some of what we think are the worst abuses.
HAMILTON: Well, let me build off what Robin and Leslie just said. I might
have pushback on Eli here because I just published an article on Professional
Lawyer on the faculty’s ethical failure with respect to law review. The basic
theme is in all the professions, I think without exception, except ours, the
properly qualified credentialed and licensed people are responsible for
supervising the unlicensed, uncredentialed people, reasonable supervision in all
professions, except ours, on this, because we don’t, although we have examples
around the country as you suggest and others, of faculties who are stepping
forward more and, obviously, we have increasing number of peer review
journals, but, even among the student-edited, we do see examples of more
faculty involvement. I just think it’s absolutely fundamental that there be some
kind of reasonable faculty supervision that the apprentices are doing this
competently. But I don’t want the perfect to get in the way of the good in this
whole project. And on this particular one, I’m agreeing with Chad. I mean,
we’re not going to change this culture. This has gone on for decades and
decades. So, maybe it is just some suggestions about good practices and this
would be one where we observe some of the key problems of the current
system. Frankly, as we have discussed this today, I think this drives a lot.
Because without peer review, you don’t have these qualified scholars who are
insisting on some sort of academic ethics, some sort of scholarly ethics. And
the students are not in a position to do it. Again, these are bright young people
who can—sometimes they’re not young—bright entrants who are deeply
committed and they give us their time. But are they in a position to push back
on a piece that doesn’t, has some of the problems we’ve discussed, especially
if faculty members in the building are pushing them on something. I see so
many problems here that relate back into the general themes we’ve been
discussing.
HORWITZ: A couple of points on these I think. First of all, on this is a point
of information. The South Carolina Law Review is experimenting with or has
launched a, I think they call it, “Prism.” What it is, is a group, double blind
peer review process, where law journals that sign up to be part of this kind of
consortium, people who participate, who submit within that network, the article
is then subjected to this kind of peer review generally. So, you know there’s a
pool and that solves some of the selection bias problems that are involved in
own-school review or a journal coming up with a list so you know you have a
pool of reviewers. That’s one thing, one resource we might look at and/or
encourage as an example of sound movement toward a better process. The
second, although again I appreciate that the students have their own interests
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and also, it’s harder for them to resist, but we could certainly recommend as a
best practice that review be of the article, not of either the resume, the cover
letter, or the abstract, all of which are subject to—I think it’s a sad, but true fact
that there are many journals where people will start with the resume and then
put something on the read-sooner and read-not-at all pile. And letters, cover
letters and abstracts are both subject, as we’ve talked about a little bit, to the
kinds of manipulations that, can again, be problematic. It’s a tough process but
to the extent that we have a law review process, making them read the article
would be a recommendation that I’d stand behind, if that’s not too radical.
HESSICK: So, a couple of quick words. I’m sort of with Eli on this. I
actually think that there are some virtues of the law review model. And one of
the virtues that I see is it allows us to have a format for work that should be of
interest to a more general audience. To the extent that we do want lawyers or
judges to pay attention to what we do, I think it is helpful to have that format.
And I understand that it’s contestable about whether we want lawyers and
judges to pay attention to what we do. I do know some people who, their
scholarship is they are engaging with three other people. Sometimes it’s three
and sometimes it’s fewer. And it’s a back and forth between them. And I don’t
think that it’s a bad thing for that discussion to happen in a specialty journal or
to happen on blogs. I don’t know that that has to go into a law review. That’s
my own personal feeling about that thing. If people are hashing out really minor
disagreements about a much broader topic, I don’t think that that’s the worst
thing in the world. But leaving aside the virtues of law reviews, maybe there’s
something about law reviews that we could then use to try to help these
pathologies. If people are making claims about novelty, why not have, or what
their contribution is, why not have that be something that we footnote, that we
explain where that claim about the impact of the paper comes from? Why is
that not the sort of thing that we would then expect the students to be able to
look and to check? Because I suspect if we turned that into a norm, into the
profession, people wouldn’t say, “This article is the first to whatever.” They
would instead say, “This article contributes to the following literature in the
following way.” And in the footnotes, could explain a little bit more about what
that literature says, as opposed to what the article is doing. I know the
footnoting of articles is something that we don’t like because of how ridiculous
some of the requests are about what ought to be footnoted, but it strikes me that
that’s not a crazy thing for us to have to footnote. If we’re making a claim
about the potential impact of our work, why is that not the sort of thing that we
wouldn’t have to back up. And then the last thing, I’m sympathetic to what
Neil said about how the students are looking for guidance. They’re coming to
us because they’re concerned about whether they’re publishing something
that’s valuable or not. They’re grateful if you say, “I know so and so has a
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piece and it hasn’t been picked up yet, and I read it at a workshop and it’s good.”
They’re not grateful with “so and so is my friend.” I think there they feel
pressure, I think that’s right. But why not have that then more formalized?
Why not, if you really feel as though this paper that you read at a workshop is
a great paper, peer review could be the sort of thing that journals ask people to
do or we could do it voluntarily. That could be part of the cover letter to the
journal. “These three people have said that they think that this article should
be published,” because, I bet if we had to write down “I endorse the publication
of this article,” we’d probably be really limited in the number of articles we’d
be willing to do that for. And I don’t know, anyways, these are kind of, you
don’t think so?
HORWITZ: I don’t.
HESSICK: Okay.
HORWITZ: Unless there were some reputational penalty, I think it probably
happens as a matter of course. I mean, not as a matter of course, but it happens
and I don’t think anybody suffers for recommending a piece.
FRANCIS: Just quickly, another problem.
Law reviews have no
institutional memory. It dies with the existing editor. With their graduation.
So, if so and so really did a horrible thing to your journal two years ago, there
may well not be any memory that you’ve gone through the editorial process and
then they pulled it because they got a better offer.
OLDFATHER: Let’s actually ask the question. Michael, Nick, and
Apallonia, do you guys have a list of problematic faculty members or authors?
Any sort of institutional memory from past years? No is the answer. I’ve
wondered about that sometimes because you do hear horror stories of authors
acting in particular ways. And I would think as a journal editor I might be
inclined to make a list and leave it for my successors.
FRANCIS: There’s also no obvious way to do retractions or to do, if there is
some sort of a discussion about whether there was a scientific problem with a
piece, how to make sure that gets appropriately investigated and then
considered.
OLDFATHER: Right. What I’ve seen in terms of corrections are stickers
placed on the published copies of articles because somebody missed a comma
in a footnote that really should have been there or something along those lines.
WALD: Two quick points. The first is about the notion of institutional
memory. Law reviews often lack it, but that’s as much a function of poor
faculty advising and mentorship as it is a critique of law reviews and their
editors. Oftentimes, the institutional memory of a law review is its faculty
advisors, but that ought not be necessarily the case.
Maybe one
recommendation we could make is about the institutionalization of faculty
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support for law reviews, including the creation of infrastructure for institutional
memory that does not depend on who on the faculty serves as the journal’s
advisor. So, that’s the first suggestion.
The second is less of a suggestion and more of a question to everybody. As
late as 15 years ago, when I started publishing, I seem to recall that it was the
habit of law review editors to offer substantive feedback to authors. Certainly
at the so-called top law reviews, but also throughout the system one would send
in an article and would get back, in addition to requests to fill in the 412 missing
footnotes, some substantive feedback. That was fantastic, both in terms of
faculty mentorship of law review editors who would benefit from the
substantive exchange with the authors, and in terms of the insights to the
authors and the resulting improved articles. Another pair of eyes, or more than
one pair of eyes, of editors who actually read the article start to finish, thought
about it, and then came up with some substantive suggestions, that was often
very helpful. It appears that substantive feedback is increasingly a thing of the
past. The vast majority of law reviews will say as a point of pride, “We give
you complete freedom of authorship and we don’t edit for substance anymore.”
Even at elite law reviews, substantive feedback appears to be less common. It’s
too bad, some kind of a race to the bottom in terms of law reviews fearing that
if they offer substantive constructive criticisms they might lose the article to
journals that offer fewer edits. Should faculty advisors at least suggest or
intercede or have a discussion with editorial boards about whether or not the
students should limit themselves to comments that sound in “are you
conforming to Bluebook or not?”
SELIGMAN: I just want to bring some perspective as somebody who works
in the field with lots of peer review. One of the things that I’ve done in recent
years is to become involved in digital history, although I do not go so far as to
call myself a digital historian. I blog as the Reluctant Digital Historian.17 One
of the things that digital history is doing is pointing to the ways in which the
notion of peer review can and should be expanded. So, what Leslie calls
masked peer review is really a very specific form of prepublication peer review.
Digital history suggests there’s lots of other things that can count and should
count as peer review. It might be worthwhile thinking about your culture as
law professors and how you have institutionalized peer review that doesn’t
happen at the law review itself. So, to the extent that you have faculty
workshops (I don’t know how normal that is), to the extent that you give
17. Amanda
Seligman,
THE
RELUCTANT
DIGITAL
HISTORIAN,
http://reluctantdigitalhistorian.blogspot.com/ (last visited May 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/282WDNQV].
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conference papers, to the extent that you shop around your articles and ask your
colleagues to read them ahead of time before you send it off to a journal for
review. In digital history, one thing that people are experimenting with is an
open writing process in which they draft on the web and then use Twitter to get
their colleagues to come and read and leave comments.18 There’s essentially a
process of peer review during the writing. There’s also a process by which you
can have a peer review period for a digital publication so that you try to round
up people to come and read stuff. And it’s not blind at all. I participated in a
very fun experiment.19 When you write a grant application, there’s peer review
involved in the grant application. And one more suggestion for the student law
journal editors is that you might think about either a peer review process that’s
before publication that’s online. People might be encouraged to come and leave
a comment or a post-publication peer review where people leave comments and
give meaning to what’s in an article, even though it’s fixed in print in some
sense.
FISH: Well, I’m working off the comment about peer review during the
writing process with the aid of technological developments. Not being blind at
all, in fact, of course that’s obviously true. Almost 40 years ago now, I wrote
an essay called No Bias, No Merit20 against blind submission. And I still stand
by the argument there, which is basically that the distinction between intrinsic
merit and extrinsic merit doesn’t hold up. And what you have when you switch
from non-blind to blind is a whole other set of political factors which are
unacknowledged operating, including the great game of guesswork, “Who
wrote this piece? To whom is this piece really addressed? Or, against whom?”
Is it [indiscernible], so I still stand by that argument at least as a theoretical
argument, which says, in effect, that blind submission cannot live up to its
claims, which is the claim to produce more objectivity, less bias, et cetera. So,
I’m in the uncomfortable position of, at the same time, being against the
politicization of scholarship, as I have said earlier today, but for the
acknowledgement and inclusion of political factors in assessing essays. And
the reasoning behind this is very simple and I’ll just use a literary example,

18. Michelle
Moravec,
Writing
in
Public,
MICHELLEMORAVEC.COM,
http://michellemoravec.com/michelle-moravec/ (last visited May 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T6MY9MF5].
19. WRITING HISTORY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Jack Dougherty & Kristen Nawrotzki eds., 2013),
https://writinghistory.trincoll.edu/ [https://perma.cc/XJ7N-MTX7]; WEB WRITING: WHY AND HOW
FOR LIBERAL ARTS TEACHING AND LEARNING (Jack Dougherty & Tennyson O’Donnell eds., 2015),
https://epress.trincoll.edu/webwriting/ [https://perma.cc/JW83-LARP].
20. STANLEY FISH, No Bias, No Merit: The Case Against Blind Submission, in DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES 163 (1989).
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which may not be familiar to you but it’s easily rehearsed. Under blind
submission, if you had in the 1980s a submission—I think this is a humanities
context—on myth theory and the author of the piece was Northrop Frye you
would then, in fact, have received a piece on this topic by the person who
invented the topic. So that, by definition, whatever he had to say about this
topic was of intrinsic interest because he said it, not because it seemed to be
intrinsically interesting, independent of any knowledge of what he said. Now,
I’m quite aware that my ability, or at least what I think of my ability, to totally
undermine the arguments for blind submission. That does not necessarily mean
that it’s a bad idea because, again, like democracy and some other things that
have been named, it may be a bad idea but better than the alternatives. So, those
are just some of my musings which go back, as I’ve said, many years.
OLDFATHER: I want to go back to one of the points Eli made, with respect
to substantive feedback in the editing process, and particularly since Robin is
here, maybe she knows something about what I’m about to discuss. I’ve
published twice with the Georgetown Law Journal. And the first time, they
sent my article, after it was accepted, to one of your faculty colleagues who
wrote a very lengthy, detailed, incredibly helpful letter of commentary on it,
that I was then able to incorporate into my changes to the piece. Second time,
there was none of that. And so, I’m wondering was that a regular practice?
Was it something that fell by the wayside? It certainly led to feedback that was
more substantive than what I often get.
WEST: I know at Georgetown this just comes and goes with the various
boards. There’s no law school policy over time. So, your first editor wanted
to get the outside read and then the faculty member happened to be very
engaged in it. But sometimes the faculty who are asked will just say, “Yeah,
you should take it,” or, “No you shouldn’t.” And then sometimes, they’ll be,
as you said, a detailed read. But I’m not aware of there having been an actual
change in policy.
OLDFATHER: I think it would be an interesting thing to do. One of the
difficulties here would be that we have a smaller faculty than we used to and
our expertise only goes certain places. Now, that’s not to suggest we couldn’t
say something useful about an article anyway, because we probably could. It’s
an interesting idea.
HORWITZ: So, I’ll try to keep it short. I have found that I’ve gotten some
very helpful memos and so on from law review editors. I have to say it has
varied with the school, for better or worse, but it’s varied with the school in
ways that tend to meet the standard credentials as rankings and so on. It seems
to be some of these best practices are good ethical practices. Others, I’m not
sure whether I’d consider them strictly ethical norms or just better or worse.
So, I’m trying to think about what absolutely belongs and what doesn’t.
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Another reason, I think, that there’s less substantive reading going on is in the
era of straight doctrinal or normative scholarship where it was case-crunching,
at least in theory, the students could kind of do some of that. The more
interdisciplinary the work gets, the more difficult it is to provide that. The third
thing I’d say is just try to focus shift a little bit, which is, maybe people disagree
that we can or should do any of it. But is there an ethics of, “What are the
obligations on the author side?” So assuming that people either agree that the
current student-side system is broken, or at least acknowledge that it could use
some fixes. What about authors? Either in terms of placement or in terms of,
I guess we’re talking about the mechanics, so the way we’re writing the articles
or the way we’re trying to place them or so on, I still think there’s probably
more to be said there.
OLDFATHER: And is that something that is distinct from the sincerity and
candor-type obligations? How do we isolate those things? I know Amanda had
something she wanted to get out.
SELIGMAN: Yeah, but just a small point that if you move to a model in
which peer review was used more often or it was a standard rather than a student
review, my question would be, “What is the obligation of faculty members to
participate in peer review?” So, what does that do to your workload if suddenly
all the journals are requiring you to review things for them and it adds to the
amount of labor that you have to do?
OLDFATHER: And could we, as one of the potential standards that we offer
up, state, at some level of generality, the idea that service to the law journals at
one’s home institution is a prioritized piece of service?
FRANCIS: One other thing I bring up that we haven’t talked about that’s
related to the question of obligations of authors, is that I did some Googling of
different law reviews to see whether they had an “instructions for authors” page
of the kind that journals in other fields have. It’s very uneven whether they do.
And actually, I could only find the South Carolina Prism thing. The last stuff I
could find on that went back to 2013, I think. So, it was difficult to find out
what the current situation was, with respect to that. But if you’re an author and
basically all you know is they take ExpressO. There’s nothing that tells you
this law review objects to the colleague carrying it down the hall. And it’s
going to be quite rational behavior, after all, if you’re desirous of moving ahead
in the profession and getting your work published. You’re going to do what
seems rational. I think a minimum expectation is that an author shouldn’t
violate the stated policies of law reviews. So, that could go back to saying,
maybe, another obligation of faculty would be to work with their law reviews
to publish instructions for authors that made it quite clear that certain kinds of
behavior was inappropriate.
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HESSICK: I just had a really quick thought about some of the other
obligations that authors might have to law reviews. And it reminded me of two
things. One, it reminded me of a woman who I know, who I respect a lot, and
she asked me to read an article that had already been accepted for publication.
And the last part of it was really unfinished. There were like some sentences
in a couple of paragraphs and some brackets saying, “Fill this in, whatever,
whatever.” When I asked her, I was like, “How did this get accepted by insert
fancy journal that we all get excited about?” And she said, “Oh, I had submitted
a paper that focused more on X, but after it was accepted, and I spent some
more time with it, I realized that I really wanted to sort of shift the paper and
change it and improve it.” And it struck me that there’s a tension there between
us trying to be thoughtful and careful and produce our best scholarship and,
possibly, giving law reviews not what they accepted to publish. And maybe
this happens in good faith and maybe it doesn’t.
But then, more recently, I was at a conference and had a fascinating dinner
with a very junior person at a top five school, who informed me that his
colleagues routinely submit papers that are incomplete and they’re noticeably
incomplete. And they are routinely accepted by top five law journals who think,
“So and so fancy person, this sounds like a good idea. I’m sure they’ll make it
sound good.” So, I’m not offering anything prescriptive, I’m just flagging these
two things. The first, I think, is a difficulty. Do we have to stop trying to
improve the piece after it’s been accepted? I think we’d all say “no” to that.
But how much can we improve it before we have to worry about the bait and
switch problem? And then the other thing, which is just, you know, part of this,
might just be that the law review submission process looks really different for
some of us than it does for the rest of us. And I would say I’m the rest of us.
FISH: Well, speaking to your second question, that was part of the point
that I made in that long-ago essay where I said I’ve been in this game for a
while. I’ve done X, Y, and Z. The result is that, when my name appears on
something and they submit it to someone, they’re going to pay more attention
to it. And I said, “Why shouldn’t I have the benefit of that? I did the work.”
WALD: Carissa raises interesting and troubling questions. Do law reviews
apply different standards for accepting articles to different authors based on
status, or for that matter, based on any consideration other than merit? And if
so, how? Is it that informally law review editors are somewhat susceptible to
advice about what articles to publish from their own faulty members who know
some authors but not others—I suspect this has long been the case, or is it that
partial submissions from elite professors get accepted based on their potential
whereas non-elite professors are required to submit complete polished articles
for consideration? It would be quite helpful to find out what the realities on the
ground are.
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HESSICK: No, no, I’m with you. I was like, “Are you punking me?”
OLDFATHER: I will say that it’s been a good quarter century plus, but I
distinctly recall, as an articles editor at Virginia getting a submission from
somebody at Harvard, looking at it, and we all said basically, “Well, this doesn’t
look so good to us and if somebody at Harvard is trying to publish with us, it
must be their worst work, so we’re not going to take it.”
FISH: You made three mistakes then.
OLDFATHER: It wasn’t just three.
HORWITZ: I mean, it’s not that I have any more than anecdotal experience.
Yes, it happens and there’s also, of course, the “this is so and so’s tenure piece”
thing, which I don’t know how much of that happens now, certainly, was once
common. And is talked about in Rising Star21 by David Garrow on Barack
Obama, that was roughly your period, right?
OLDFATHER: I’m in there twice.
HORWITZ: There you go. So, it seems to me, Stanley, I don’t know enough
about the community in which the reader reception was going on and so on, but
in 1977, the American legal faculty was smaller in number than it is today.
There were all kinds of problems involved in it being a small community. I’m
not glorifying it, but it was potentially easier to make substantive judgments
about Stanley Fish, we know he’s going to make good, or so on. The larger the
community gets, maybe the harder it is to make that judgment and the more that
it makes a difference that the editor who is saying, “It’s Stanley’s work and I
know he’s going to make good,” is a faculty member, as opposed to a grad
student in English, who probably would still be in better shape than some law
students. But the larger the community is, the more likely it is that the person
that says, “Well it is so and so is making a very shallow judgment of that sort
rather than a meaningful judgment.” And that the person who writes the
breakthrough article who is at school X. Sometimes it’ll happen for them but
it’s just more unlikely that it’s going to happen.
OLDFATHER: Do we want to try to move toward making this a little more
nuts and bolts? What might we actually find ourselves including in a model
code?
HESSICK: Can I actually just say one thing? I understand that we’re here
to talk about the ethics. But I’m a criminal law person, so I always think about
how people will react to things. And I actually wonder if ExpressO and
Scholastica aren’t something to be embraced here? Why is the pressure not on
ExpressO and Scholastica to say, “We will perform a scrubbing function so that
this is a blind submission process?” As opposed to what they’ve done instead
21. DAVID J. GARROW, RISING STAR: THE MAKING OF BARACK OBAMA (2017).
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which is to say, “Authors, law review editors have told us that a CV is the most
important piece of information that they have about you, please don’t forget to
include your CV.” So, I understand that we’re talking about the ethics here.
But I just wanted to point out, to the extent that we have a practice or we have
systems in place, the systems right now are pushing us in precisely the opposite
direction of blind review and so, if people like blind review, the fact that this
has become centralized into two platforms could facilitate that sort of blind
review. I think that that’s just at least worth noting.
OLDFATHER: Am I remembering correctly that there’s at least been a
proposal out there that AALS should undertake to create its own article
submission platform? Maybe I’m confusing it with SEALS and the hiring
market. But maybe that’s a legitimate question, too. Should this be something
that AALS could do?
WEST: I can just tell you that I’m on a panel at the next AALS meeting
about the role of AALS in scholarship and I don’t think, from what I’ve seen,
that there’s any set agenda on that or that there are any commitments that have
already been made. So, I think the answer is no, there is nothing on the table
right now, but there may well be recommendations that come out of this next
meeting. Oh, I just have one more anecdote and that is a top five journal, that
we’d all be excited to hear about, accepting an article—not one word of which
had been written—from a very junior person.
OLDFATHER: I’m going to try that.
HESSICK: Yeah, I mean, I don’t know that about a junior person, but I do
know the whole, “Oh, we’re full.” I mean that’s not to say, “We’re definitely
full.” So and so’s research assistant says he has a piece coming. If that doesn’t
happen, we may have one more slot but otherwise we’re full.” And I should
add I don’t think that that author knew what was happening, I don’t.
I don’t think that it’s someone that I think highly of. I think it might have
been like the research assistant talking to the journal. I don’t think it was. I
could be wrong.
OLDFATHER: Let’s throw out on the table, too, if we want to talk about it
from the journal side. And I am still skeptical of focusing too much on that.
The practice of internal submissions and the differential treatment of internal
submissions, that’s another topic that comes up quite a bit.
SELIGMAN: I just want someone to find me during the break and explain to
me why student journals have so much status.
HORWITZ: We are status oriented.
HESSICK: Yeah, that’s true. That’s what it is.
FRANCIS: So, one thing we could do empirically, it is an expected practice
of any professional journal to publish what your reviewing process looks like
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and to publish your instructions for authors. I mean, there is a very interesting
group called the Committee on Publication Ethics. And we could go to at least
a random sample of law reviews, some of them flagship, some of them not, and
we could see from their websites. I would actually be happy to get an RA to do
that. Whether they even have the appropriate documents on their website. And
if we made a list of some of the content things we think ought to be in there, to
see how many of them do or do not include that, if they do have such statements.
It wouldn’t be hard.
OLDFATHER: And if [the editors] want to get in and defend your honor at
any point, by all means. We’re more than happy to have your contributions.
SCOVILLE: Just to extend a little bit on something I said in the little piece
that I wrote for this conference, I think that you could conceivably do something
similarly useful with respect to the contracts that authors sign with law reviews.
They seem to be pretty bare-bones in most cases, although I must confess that
I don’t read them all that carefully, on the presumption that issues aren’t going
to arise. Conceivably, law reviews could add stricter requirements with respect
to author behavior in order to enforce some of these standards. Something to
consider.
OLDFATHER: And I think too there is some limitation on putting too much
of the burden on law reviews to enforce this. The boards are around for a year
and they spend a bunch of time trying to fill their slot full of articles. I suspect
that there are a lot of disincentives to playing hardball with an author. Yanking
an acceptance will just entail more work and, “Oh, by the way, I’ve got classes
and I’m a third year and somebody told me I could actually enjoy the second
semester of my third year and relax a little bit.” So, there are other sorts of
limitations in addition to all the power imbalances in the process. The
incentives, I don’t think, necessarily line up well for the editors to enforce a lot
of these things.
HESSICK: I just wanted to say about the ethics of home submissions. It
gives me the heebie jeebies to submit to my home journal. And it was
interesting because some of the folks who wrote about law review submissions
in the ‘80s and the ‘90s seemed concerned that faculty would use the home
submission to try to expedite to another journal. I’m actually less concerned
about that sort of dynamic than I am of law review editors potentially feeling
pressure to accept articles from the professors that they see every day, that they
might currently be taking a class from, that they might be trying to get a
recommendation from. Depending on the school, the law review, the identities
of the articles editors could be very well known. The process at some schools
is very well known. And, I don’t want to get into too much detail, but my
impression is that at least some of the editors that I have spoken to feel pressure
when they’re reviewing an article by someone who teaches at the school. And
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I think that that’s worth thinking about whether that’s an appropriate dynamic
to create.
HORWITZ: So, I guess it’s a bifurcated problem. Most schools that are not
Harvard or Yale or one or two others are not going to be impressed by a tenure
piece published in their own home journal, I think. When we’re looking at—
and I actually think it’s a problematic practice—but when we look at tenure,
we’re looking for our juniors to publish and what I think somewhere we can
call like schools, journals that are better ranked than ours. And it would be nice
if we just focused on the substance of the article. But if you’re a Harvard
professor seeking tenure, at least up until recently, then getting a tenure piece
in Harvard was counted. Post-tenure, it’s kind of maybe a different story. I
think the worry then is about pressure rather than about advancement. And this
can be true for elite or non-elite journals. I’m the faculty advisor for my journal.
There’s probably one particular faculty member who used to have a bad habit
of this and my introductory speech to the new editors every year was, “I’m here
to run interference for you so, if so and so is pushing you to publish a piece,
send them my way. That’s my job to tell them to leave you alone.” So, again,
what I want to say is everything said has had some merit. Where the push
should be targeted is a question. I think your point about Scholastica and
ExpressO was valuable, and I’d abstract it to say the question is, I guess, “What
internal ethical duties do we have as scholars?” And then, two, “Structurally
who’s the least cost avoider?” I mean, if we’re going to prescribe something,
the question is, “Where is the prescription most effectively and efficiently
aimed?”
FISH: I tend to agree with Paul that law schools that see themselves at a
certain level or at a certain rank are going to want their junior colleagues to
publish in law reviews that are at least deemed to emanate from a higher ranked
school. I’ve had two experiences over my lifetime with Yale University. And
they have been exactly the same in one important respect. When I was a
graduate student in the English department, the idea that anyone who was not a
member of the Yale English department had anything interesting to say was
never even entertained. So, all of the references in any of my classes to essays
or books written by someone other than my present instructor were to people
residing down the hall. Then, when a few years ago, I taught at the Yale Law
School, it was exactly the same thing. The idea at Yale that someone who is
not at Yale would have something very significant to say was simply not
entertained. So, I think we have to understand the cultural/political/hubristic
differences in these matters.
OLDFATHER: Things that we have missed. Are there things that we ought
to be saying in this session about non-law review means of scholarly output and
the mechanisms there?
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FRANCIS: This isn’t about non-law review, but we haven’t raised the
question of author behavior—trading up—and that practice, and the, “You need
to take the first offer,” or some version of that. I think we ought to think very
seriously about the whole expedite trade-up phenomenon and what it does to
scholarship.
OLDFATHER: Right, and I would broaden that to include the practice where
one submits in the first place with the idea that the goal is to provide a source
of an expedite and with no real intention to publish. And then the behavior that
follows after that.
WEST: Just two quick thoughts. I think you should worry about what
trading up does to the practice. You should also worry about what it does to
character. I find it just so offensive, but I also find it shocking that the law
review student editors themselves expect it. So, it’s become a widely accepted
practice, which I think is really a reflection of something that’s wrong with the
culture. But I’m not sure it’s fixable. We haven’t focused really on the virtues
of student-edited law reviews with the exception of the comments that you
raised. But I do think that there are an awful lot of student-edited law reviews.
There’s so many of them. A lot of what’s published isn’t very high quality.
But just the fact that there are so many does provide us a solution or sort of
safety valve for some of these problems. Yeah, there are these terrible stories
of people getting their friends’ work published and so on. But just because
there are so many law reviews, people do get their work out there. And now
with SSRN, if the work is out there, it’ll be read by the people who have an
interest in it. And so, I just don’t want us to lose track of the fact that there’s a
lot that’s fine about this culture, the publication culture in law schools.
FISH: Yeah, I would second that and say that one of the things that’s fun is
the symposium collections. If you’re working in an area and trying to figure
out what’s going on and you know that there’s been a symposium on the subject
recently published in a law review, it’s invaluable, not necessarily solely
because of the quality of the essays, but because of the volume of the footnotes.
And you can quickly educate yourself, at least to your obligations, what pieces
or books you should now read. That’s a genuine service.
HORWITZ: So, I’ll make a practical suggestion. It feels very “facultypolitics” or “politics in general.” The next step is the “blue-ribbon commission”
or the “more-study is needed” approach but it does strike me that, to the extent
that we can batten down on hard standards or recommendations here, all to the
good. But there are serious arguments about which path the legal publishing
process should take. The ethical duties and responsibilities are going to vary
depending on the environment and so the legal academy needs to “come to
Jesus” and amass information on the following and have a meaningful
institutional resolution, pan-institutional resolution of some of these issues. I
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know that’s weak sauce, but I feel bad, as a character matter, about some people
gaming aspects of the system. If the system is what it is, but not all of them
strike me as unethical and some do, and some just strike me as, kind of, sleazy
in a different way. So, maybe it’s just time to figure out how clearly the
problems can be identified and put to the academy as a matter of questions that
need to be dealt with.
SELIGMAN: I’m going to pretend that Chad asked this question that I’m
going to answer, which is, “What else should we be thinking about there?” I’ll
just say, again, as an outsider, that it’s striking to me that the question posed is
here, generally about the mechanisms of legal scholarship, but the focus has
been almost exclusively on law reviews, as opposed to some of the pieces that
you all wrote in preparation for today. There are other venues of publication or
for the output of the ideas of law professors that I think might be worth
discussing for a little while. I might be wrong about that. And it’s also quite
notable to me as an outsider influenced by social scientists that there’s been
zero discussion of the ethics of the research process, which is the foundation of
publishing and scholar publishing.
HORWITZ: I did say we should make data sets available. I think that was OLDFATHER: Yeah, but that’s right and be exhaustive. Or at least
thorough, reasonably. I would like us to speak to the other outlets mentioned
and we don’t have to limit ourselves to mechanisms. We are running close to
the end of this session as it’s formally designated, but next is thinking in terms
of nuts and bolts. So, we can start to orient ourselves in both of those ways.
BOOTHE-PERRY: My comment might actually be a little bit more nuts and
bolts, kind of piggybacking on what Paul was saying as we were thinking about
doing the restatement and having some ethical obligation specifically regarding
the law review process and not really discussing revamping the law review
process because I don’t know to what extent we could do that in quick form.
But, in discussing the law review process, and not to borrow from the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct because they don’t apply to us as legal scholars,
necessarily. I think we had that discussion a little bit earlier. But in the teaching
and when you write about legal ethics, and you write about professionalism,
legal ethics are a standard of rules that you have obligations and you have a
duty to abide by. And if you don’t, there are some ramifications.
Professionalism, on the other hand, is something a little bit not as concrete for
some people. And so, when Paul talks about those things when we’re talking
about law reviews that might feel kind of sleazy or they don’t feel right, it’s
kind of like, the judge once said, “Pornography, you know it when you see it.”
I think we might want to be thinking about that when we do the actual drafting
of this to know that there would be some ethical obligations we’re talking about
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and then these other “good standards, professionalism” sounding things that
are, the sleazy things.
WALD: I’d like to clarify and add to my earlier point about the Rules of
Professional Conduct. As a matter of law, some Rules, as codified in whatever
state those of us who are lawyers are licensed in, certainly apply to our conduct.
A law professor, who happens to be a lawyer, who commits an act of
dishonesty, say plagiarism, is subject to discipline per rule 8.4(c) under the rules
of the jurisdiction where she is licensed. As a lawyer, I’m mindful of the fact
that I must comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and that some rules
apply to my conduct as a law professor. But, importantly, I’ve always thought
of myself primarily as a professor who’s subject to some Rules, not as a lawyer
who happens to be teaching at a law school. And so, while as a technical matter,
yes, some of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply to my conduct, as a law
professor I do not think of the Rules as playing an important role in guiding and
shaping my conduct as an academic. I suspect most law professors who are
lawyers are in the same boat: they are mindful of complying with applicable
rules but the Rules do not meaningfully inform their conduct as law professors.
By the way, there are more and more—yet still a minority—but increasingly
more law professors who are not lawyers, and I don’t mean because they
haven’t kept up with the licensing. I mean professors who are not lawyers, such
as sociologists, economists, so on and so forth. These law professors, of course,
are not subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct at all.
FRANCIS: One other observation that I don’t know where to take, I’m sort
of making a whole bunch about the current landscape. The law reviews that
occupy the current landscape come in many different flavors. There are the socalled flagship law reviews of institutions. There are ones that come with
particular political perspectives. For example, the ones that are associated with
Federalist Society views. And there are ones that are special area ones. And I
don’t know that there’s anything to say or whether we want to have out on the
table, something about whether it’s appropriate to have ideologically driven law
reviews or, I mean, maybe there isn’t anything we can sensibly say about that.
That may not be a fair characterization in any event.
HORWITZ: There are a few [law reviews] that I think are explicit about it.
There are one or two, maybe more than one or two. There are a few that are
not just about a subject matter or not just environmental law but with a general
preference for saving rather than destroying the environment. There are a few
that are kind of explicitly political, but there are not a ton. Of course, it is true
that, you know in the JLPP or a few others you can generally guess where things
are going to come.

CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1152

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/12/18 9:24 AM

[101:1083

FRANCIS: My own view is that disclosure on the part of the review is the
right way to handle that. But again, I think it’s just a phenomenon that’s out
there in the territory that we shouldn’t entirely ignore.
FISH: There have been cases in which the law review at a law school had a
higher reputation within the law reviews than the law school might have had
and, in part, this has happened—at least in the ones I am thinking of—because
there was a deliberate decision to strike out in a path that might amount to
occupying a niche of some kind. So, it was a strategic decision. Not to be “just
a law review” but to be known as “the” law review, the “go-to” law review or
one of them at least. I have no normative conclusion to draw from that
observation but I just thought it should be put on the table.
E. Session Four: The Mechanisms of Legal Scholarship, Continued
OLDFATHER: So, to the nuts and bolts. We begin with modesty and
humility. As we move into this last phase, let’s bear in mind that we’ve got
Stanley for exactly one more hour, so let’s make the most of it. So, go get him.
Was that what it was? Have at him, something like that. An issue that came
up during the break that we want to put on the table is the question of author
behavior with respect to law review editors. I’ve had to involve myself in
situations where authors sent intemperate emails to editors.
FISH: Intemperate in what direction?
OLDFATHER: Intemperate in the sense of generally being difficult to deal
with and accusing the student editor of being unprofessional in various sorts of
ways. I don’t remember all of the details. I do remember my response where I
confronted this person with being intemperate and unprofessional and so forth,
and the matter was resolved.
FISH: Is this bullying or attempted bullying?
OLDFATHER: Bullying is a word that would work, yeah. It was, I’m
oversimplifying here, but “I don’t want to do your stupid footnotes. Don’t make
me do them. I’m coming from a different discipline. We don’t do it that way.
I think this is all ridiculous.” That sort of thing.
FISH: Not a law person.
OLDFATHER: This is somebody from outside the legal academia. So, I
think there is something to be said there for a norm of civility in dealings with
law review editors, recognizing once again that there is this power differential
there, among other sorts of differentials.
Having started with that, we’re now at the difficult part of our endeavor
here, which is to attempt to take these discussions and turn them into at least
the basis for a first draft of a set of ethical standards. I think I’m going to work
off of Paul’s draft here as we start our discussion. It takes us back to the
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beginning, right, which is what are we talking about? What is our subject?
What do we mean by scholarship? Do we approach it, I didn’t capture in my
notes the three-part definition that, I think, Stanley formed based on a reaction
to Robin’s piece, but that was mentioned a couple times as a, what was it,
scholarship in the tradition of the humanities?
FISH: Just [indiscernible] scholarship which has its compelling motive
getting something descriptively accurate truth and so forth. And then
scholarship second, the scholarship is responsive in a particular sphere of the
enterprise that is the law realizing the incurring of justice or making it a little
better. And then there was work that was, frankly partisan, precisely
endorsing—that is, it started with the answer.
OLDFATHER: Is that a useful division of the world?
FISH: I thought so.
HAMILTON: This approach made a lot of sense. I had it really defined into,
the frankly partisan form, which to me was in the advocacy ethics. “No
affirmative lies” was kind of my outer boundary on that. But you can certainly
leave out a lot of evidence that doesn’t support your position versus—this goes
to exhaustiveness actually—versus the other model which I thought was
signaling that it was a good faith effort to explore all the evidence, conflicting
as well as favorable to your position, and then coming out. It doesn’t have to
be exhaustive to everything but at least good faith. But this picks up a nuance
that I didn’t have.
FISH: Yeah, and I would prefer good faith to sincerity because good faith
obviously refers to patterns of behavior even though the word faith is there. It’s
not being used to refer to some inner-mysterious thing or, as sincerely always
seemed to me to be, some inner-mysterious thing. So, I like good-faith.
HORWITZ: So, if I’m thinking again about what a hard copy looks like and
I should say two things. Three of us here will do as much of the work as
possible, not to steal it from you but to take the burden off your shoulders and—
this session in part is about, “You give us the map, or the skeleton and we’ll try
to fill stuff in with what you said or vice versa.” We gave you the basic map,
you can argue with it and/or provide flesh on the bone. This seems to me a
place where I guess caveats or qualifications start coming in, so you have a
definition of legal scholarship and then one of the questions is, “What about
non-scholarship?” It seems to me, it would be a relevant comment if I’m
thinking in the restatement fashion. Or maybe to put it differently, the question
is not just, “What is good? What is the purpose of scholarship?” but, “What is
scholarship as an entity? Does it include an op-ed written by a law professor?
What does it include written by a law professor?” Maybe put it in a more openended way.
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OLDFATHER: Including potentially books—case books and other teaching
materials and so forth. Nicky.
BOOTHE-PERRY: When we were having the discussion, I was just jotting
down recurring themes or recurring words. So, what I have is when we were
defining what is legal scholarship. It’s a good faith, collaborative, engaging
process that contributes usefully to the law or the legal landscape. And then
underneath that would come, well, what types of that collaborative process
would qualify where we would go into those. I’m again just thinking of writing
the restatement.
OLDFATHER: Do we want to expand on the idea of collaborative?
BOOTHE-PERRY: By collaborative we were talking about, everybody kept
saying, “You’re engaging with other scholars,” or “You’re engaging in some
conversation.” But that word kept coming up with the collaboration.
OLDFATHER: Does the audience for scholarship consist primarily or
exclusively of other scholars? Does it necessarily extend to the bench and bar?
Does it possibly extend beyond that into the general public?
BOOTHE-PERRY: So, would that go to a comment under that when we’re
talking about what types of writings qualify for scholarship? Because every
type of writing will have a specific type of audience. But you’re still engaging
in some collaborative process for that audience, whether it’s to influence judges
in their opinions or whether it’s to influence the public in an op-ed or whatever
else. We were thinking of scholarship, but it’s still collaborative, right? Just
collaborative in a different scheme depending on what the scholarship is.
FRANCIS: I guess, I’m a little puzzled about, and I thought scholarship had
something to do with the production of knowledge, or maybe I’m not quite sure
how much the dissemination of knowledge here also matters. But I’m not sure
it’s scholarship to write a letter to the editor or an op-ed or blog or a Tweet. If
all I’m doing is expressing my opinion. It might be—suppose I’ve written
something that’s aimed to contribute to new knowledge and I, then, disseminate
it to a different audience by a different medium which involves some rethinking
about presentation. That might count. But I think we need to be really careful
about what the scope is. And just on collaboration, there is always going to be
collaboration with audience. But I think we have to be really careful not to
have it look like it always has to be co-authors or something like that.
SELIGMAN: Just to amplify a piece of that that I think got buried, was the
piece of “what makes it scholarship is the new knowledge.” And so, the focus,
I think, of your thinking needs to be on the production of what went into the
output, rather than the place that it is put out. So, what I could imagine putting
new knowledge out in an op-ed, although that would not be very wise. So, that
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would give research underneath that. The key isn’t the final place. The key is
the process behind it.
OLDFATHER: And does motivation matter?
HAMILTON: Well, I mean, I think it’s good to look back as to what others
have thought about this. So, going back to Ernie Boyer in Scholarship
Reconsidered22 in 1990 that coming out of Carnegie, remember, he argued for
the four categories that it’s scholarship of discovery, integration, application,
and teaching. Because they wanted to create a new field of the scholarship of
teaching, which I think was a wonderful new initiative and fits with some of the
teaching materials, ideas, and then they proposed in the ‘97 book, “Does the
scholar identify important questions? Does the scholar adequately consider
existing scholarship?
Does the scholar use appropriate methodology
recognized by the field? Does the scholarship add consequentially to a field?”
So that one you can see, if you go that route, then we’re not including the oped piece, that category doesn’t get included.
WALD: We fairly casually drew a distinction between codes of conduct and
restatement-style documents, and should spend a little bit more time talking
about it. The goal or objective of the Rules of Professional Conduct is twofold. One is to guide the conduct of practitioners, the other is to protect
clients—assuming that clients will often be vulnerable vis-à-vis their lawyers
and in need of protection. In contrast, restatement projects, in general, are
primarily meant to codify the existing law and guide practice. This distinction
suggests that we might gravitate toward a Rules-style document, at least to the
extent that what we have in mind is not just the guidance of the practice of
academics, but also the protection of others, such as readers of legal scholarship
and editors of law reviews. It doesn’t mean that at the end of the day our work
product must look more like a code as opposed to a restatement, but it does
mean that if we draft a restatement like document, we might want to keep in
mind the objective of protecting readers and others who interact with legal
scholarship.
Unrelatedly, it seems that we are making a background assumption here
that all law professors regularly engage in scholarship. But some of our
colleagues do not have strong scholarly work habits, and therefore we might
consider making a statement about the duty to regularly engage in scholarship
and what such a duty might entail. To be clear, by a duty to engage in
scholarship I do not mean to suggest some magical standard of productivity—
so many articles or book chapters a year—rather, I mean a statement about what

22. ERNEST L. BOYER, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED: PRIORITIES OF THE PROFESSORIATE
(1990).
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it means to consistently research, have strong work habits, read and comment
on the work of others, publish regularly, etc.
OLDFATHER: Two quick reactions to that before you pass it to Robin. One
is, I think that should be a non-controversial sort of idea in the sense that if one
looks at the university faculty handbook for Marquette University, for example,
there is a clear statement of an obligation of a faculty member to continue to
produce scholarship throughout his or her career. And I would expect that’s a
fairly common sort of provision. With respect to the counting, I went to an
associate dean’s conference this summer because that’s where I find myself
these days sometimes. And one of the panels there was some folks who were
or have been deans, and among the questions they were dealing with was how
do we assess scholarly productivity. And somebody remind me to bring up the
rubric that Don Weidner at Florida State used to assess faculty productivity
there because it was very much, “If you do this sort of thing, you get one point.
If you do this other sort of thing, you get a half point.” And it all factored into
a number at the bottom which worked quite well for Florida State, but I don’t
know what I think about the idea in general.
WEST: Okay, much of what I was going to say has been said, so I can be
very brief. I do think the question, “What is scholarship?” has to be couched
as, “What is scholarship for, what purpose? Why are we engaged in this
definitional project?” Because the content of the definition will depend
somewhat on why you’re doing it. The context in which this definitional
question is often posed is a tenure or a hiring decision and that’s not what we’re
engaged in here. So, “What is scholarship for purposes of generating a code of
scholarly ethics?” is a better question to start with than simply, “What is legal
scholarship?” I do also, though, just want to stress that I don’t think we should
be overly pluralistic. On the other hand, I don’t think we need to assume that
we can say something about all forms of legal scholarship. There are other
things. There are other kinds of scholarship which we haven’t discussed and
which we don’t need to, perhaps. But there is still a lot of straight descriptive
legal scholarship that just aims to elucidate what the content of the law is.
There’s analytic jurisprudence, you know, a bunch of people used to talk about
in the 19th century. There’s scholarship that’s quite self-consciously critical,
which is not normative but it is also not particularly inter-disciplinary. There’s
theoretical scholarship and then there is something called adversarial
pedagogical or “clinical written” work, which I don’t want to sign onto a
document that disclaims the value of that. Again, I don’t care that much what
things are called. But I don’t want to sign onto something that disclaims the
value of that. Okay, why it matters what type of scholarship we’re talking
about: I do think for ethical purposes, the virtue that you ascribe to scholarship
does determine some of the ethics. So, to say that the purpose of scholarship is
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knowledge is to imply a certain set of constraints, all of which make sense to
me. I do believe that the purpose of much normative scholarship is to improve
the justice of the legal system. That implies a different set of constraints—
overlapping, of course—but that’s why I wanted to keep insisting the
disinterestedness stay on the table because to my mind disinterestedness is right
at the core of it. And then my last comment is that I think it’s important for us
to say something on a preamble or otherwise about the obligation to do
scholarship because the question facing so many law schools right now is
whether to have any scholarly role at all for legal academics, given the expense
of a legal education, given the need of their students to find jobs, the question
that a lot of faculty and a lot of administrators are trying to answer is whether
we should ask faculty to do this at all or is it simply a luxury that we cannot
afford, we have to focus on training our students and the skills that they need
to be functioning lawyers. And so, I think it’s important to just—and in any
gathering like this that talks about the ins and outs of scholarship—to just
continue to insist on the importance societally, as well as professionally, of
having an academy that’s independent of the bench, independent of the bar, that
produces a body of work that is about law and all these various ways but
including critically as well.
HORWITZ: So, one thing, you haven’t quite weaned me from pluralism, but
you all have made me think carefully about what, I, in a more disinterested
fashion, think needs to be there and which things that I bring to the table are
kind of “hobby horses” that are important to me but don’t necessarily have to
be addressed. And it seems to me that one way to deal with this more generally
is by a careful statement or limitation on scope. There are questions that we
might not want to answer or be able to answer, without having to make a
statement. But to say, for instance, this is not a statement about, I’m thinking
of the classic joke—have any of you read Thomas Reed Powell’s mockery
statement of constitutional law where there’s the bit about the dormant
commerce clause and he’s kind of like, “Some amount of interference with
commerce is too much—note how much is too much is beyond the scope of
this restatement.” It’s a very clever bit. But it’s possible to say, for instance,
“What counts as clinical legal scholarship is beyond the scope.” And I don’t
consider that fudging. I’m actually more willing than I was to accept Stanley’s
answer that we might value it, but still not call it “scholarship.” But I am happy
to just put it aside and make a scope statement. And that might apply to a couple
of things. So, scope exclusions, these are valuable here. And the second thing
I’d say, the reason I asked about what I’ll call legal academic non-scholarship
is that partly because things like amicus briefs and professors’ letters are so
prevalent these days and partly because they specifically involve what I think
of trading on authority—they specifically involve not just, “Here’s a
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statement,” but, “Here’s a statement coming with ostensible authority” cloaked
in the, whatever it is, mystique or expertise of the legal academy and the
institution. I don’t know whether it, therefore, in my view, must be included in
dealing with the ethics of legal scholarship or whether one says we are not
addressing—except in so far as it’s immediately relevant—legal academic nonscholarship but there may be duties that appertain to it. And that is an important
issue but beyond the scope.
OLDFATHER: I think Neil and then we’ll go to Leslie.
HAMILTON: If we’re including Stanley’s frankly partisan as part of the
definition of scholarship, it would pick up—
FISH: I wouldn’t want to.
HAMILTON: Oh, you don’t want to. Oh, I see. The other point I was going
to make is if you want to start with, “Why is there a duty?” you’d go to social
contract which I think was in Nicky’s piece as the social contract argument.
FRANCIS: So, we’ve been talking about whether scholarship includes
dissemination or advocacy and whether there are lines there. One other line, I
don’t know if it’s a line, but I just want to bring it up is creative works. So,
would To Kill a Mockingbird be legal scholarship? Well, it might be, I don’t
know.
HESSICK: I know why you’re asking those questions.
FRANCIS: Well, we had an example like that in law school of somebody
who wrote plays. A colleague of mine in the philosophy department is a fiction
writer, and she wrote a lot about bioethics dilemmas and her fiction involved
bioethics dilemmas and there was a question about—now that goes back to
Robin’s point—would you account for tenure, but whether any of the kinds of
standards that we’re thinking about might also apply to certain sorts of creative
works that people might do—as calling on their legal expertise, and in an
interesting sense, contributing to how it is that people understand the law. I
mean, if you’re thinking about the justice project, that’s partly why I thought of
To Kill a Mockingbird. But I just wanted to mention that could potentially be
part of the landscape.
OLDFATHER: There certainly are plenty of law professor fiction writers
and not just at Yale.
WALD: Let’s talk a little bit about what may, or should be, distinctive about
law and legal scholarship–Justice. In an excellent book, Robin talks about
justice and its neglect in law schools and legal education.23 Assuming and
hoping that justice will one day play a more significant role in law, what role

23. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM (2014).
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should it play in legal scholarship? I don’t think that every piece of scholarship
necessarily has to directly engage in some way with conceptions and the
application of justice to count as legal scholarship. Of course not. But, should
legal scholars generally be committed to, think about, research and write about
aspects of justice, to correct for the suppression and irrelevance of justice at law
schools, legal education and legal scholarship?
FISH: What are examples?
WALD: My concern is that law teaching and the practice of law more
generally is completely, practically speaking, devoid from commitments to and
engagement with justice. Examples? I believe I’ve read recently a piece that
points out that although we have approximately two hundred accredited law
schools in the United States, all are called and referred to as schools of law, and
not a single one is known as a school of justice. Is that a coincidence? More
generally, most law schools do not have a required class called Justice, although
many teach Jurisprudence as an elective, a course that may or may not explores
conceptions of justice, and do not systematically explore justices pervasively
throughout the curriculum or outside of it.
WEST: I know. No, let me just clarify. I’m not saying that law has always
been about the suppression of justice. Legal discourse has neglected the topic
of justice. And so, in my essay I wanted to insist on two things. One was this
disinterestedness point and the second was that law scholars who do normative
legal scholarship, I think, have a sort of general, ethical obligation to say
something about their normative structure, if you want word less loaded than
justice. And so, some people do this, the people who feel very strongly about
efficiency, say lots about it. Many of us don’t share that commitment. And so,
if there’s another way to describe what you think it means to say that this is a
better legal solution to this problem than that. What’s the better and they’re
referring to. I think for a lot of people it’s not stated explicitly. But the implicit
premise there is justice. This is more just than that and so we should be doing
it this way rather than that way. And if that’s true, then I think we have an
obligation to think a little bit more clearly and explicitly about what that norm
means.
OLDFATHER: Thinking about it in terms of our code, then, is that
something that would be part of a disclosure-type norm? I mean it’s not the
same, but on the other hand it’s—or is it candor or transparency to use that word
again. How do we formulate the norm?
WEST: I meant it as an intellectual project, not that you’ve got to disclose
your hidden thoughts about this, but that one should be—partly it has to do with
candor—but one should be open to argument about what it is that you think the
point of this field of law or the point of the rule of law, generally.
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OLDFATHER: Could we state it as something like an obligation to articulate
one’s premises as best as one is able?
WEST: Yeah, I would say one’s moral premises. But yeah, I just resist, or
I recoil, at the sort of subjectivity of that because I think that what I would
envision would be an obligation to engage in an inquiry about the—sorry to use
the expression—objective truth of the matter. So, what does justice require?
And it’s not a question that’s been a familiar one in the legal academy. I think
we’ve neglected it, the neglect of it has had consequences and most of them
have not been good. So, at any rate, if so many law professors continue to
engage in normative legal scholarship that takes the form, “This is the way the
law ought to be,” and it’s not all bad writing and it does have scholarly virtues
of depth and breadth and so on. It seems incumbent to have an obligation to
say something about that moral structure. And we haven’t, as an academy, as
a group done much of that.
HESSICK: So, that’s why I’m glad that you’ve kept the value of
disinterestedness on the table. I think that that’s when we talk about candor and
when we talk about exhaustiveness, I think disinterestedness needs to be in
there and maybe we should flag it when we define scholarship. And I think that
the definition of scholarship should embrace normative scholarship with the
caveat that it’s especially important for normative scholarship to adhere to an
ethic of disinterestedness. And then that would be dealt with below and the
code. Maybe I’m wrong.
WEST: I’d be really happy with that.
HESSICK: As I’ve been listening to you, that’s where I thought we were
going with it and it made me quite happy that you pushed disinterestedness back
to the forefront because I think that when people hear the word normative
scholarship, they necessarily worry that it is interested or partisan or
adversarial. And so, I think it could be helpful to flag that in the definition of
scholarship and then to make reference to the value that will be explained more
later.
FISH: I agree completely with the desire to put disinterestedness in a
particularly favored position in whatever statement is produced. But we should
be aware of the, shall I say, political/rhetorical pitfalls of doing so. Because
some people will read disinterestedness as a neutrality, which brings with it a
whole other host of definitional problems.
Some people will read
disinterestedness as a hands-off ivory tower kind of thing. So, I don’t know
exactly how this could be accomplished, but one has to. One would hope it
would be possible to promote or celebrate disinterestedness as a genuinely thick
value, rather than the antiseptic character traits that some people will
immediately jump to.
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OLDFATHER: Note takers, are we satisfied on the definitional question?
All right, so then we should move into the topics from the second session. We
had sincerity, which I took to be an idea that there was some sympathy for
excluding from our project here. Candor, we talked about disclosures. Candor
about what, whether it was about methodology, whether it was about
information relevant to the evaluation of the scholarship, including, but not
limited to, ideological considerations. Maybe we should focus on that before
we move to exhaustiveness because I think there’s a lot on the table with respect
to the candor point.
FRANCIS: As I understood it, the predominant one wasn’t so much political
or ideological persuasion as it was methodology, conflict of interest in the more
classic sense.
WEST: On candor?
FRANCIS: Yeah, what sorts of things were needed to disclose.
OLDFATHER: Modifications to that.
WEST: No, I don’t want to lose track of Carissa’s point, that there’s a point
past which disclosure is not sufficient and you really want to discourage going
there. It’s not just a matter of disclosure. If you’re in the middle of litigating a
case, you can’t be writing about it at the same time in order to influence the
judge. I don’t think.
OLDFATHER: Disclosure is a partial remedy but for some situations
recusal, so to speak, is the real remedy. Not doing the project.
WEST: I don’t know. Does everyone agree with that?
HORWITZ: Yeah, so my assumption will be something like, whatever the
duty of candor describes, either in a comment there or elsewhere, one says, “It’s
not a necessary remedy for all evils,” and, “See conflict of interest below.”
Something of the sort. I guess that’s how I’d put it. In terms of how I’d define
candor, maybe this is overbroad or over-vague, but something like, “The
scholar has a duty to provide information,” or maybe, “Non-obvious
information,” takes care of the point that you don’t think it’s always necessary
to disclose every political viewpoint, for instance, necessary for a sound
evaluation of the work on a piece of scholarship.
WEST: Are you going to provide examples like in the restatement?
HORWITZ: I think so.
WEST: Okay, but what would an example be of something that should be
disclosed?
HORWITZ: That the project is funded by a particular group, to take an easy
one, I guess, that the person has filed an amicus brief in this case. Not that
they’re simultaneously gaming the system, but let’s say they’re analyzing a case
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where I filed an amicus brief in this case. Those are the kinds of standard
disclosures that might be relevant.
FRANCIS: The third disclosure was any data sources. So, the way social
science journals—if you collect the data, the raw data are available.
SCOVILLE: It might also be useful to reference the value of more
substantive forms of candor, not necessarily process candor like most of the
issues we’ve been talking about so far. In other words, candor about
uncertainties regarding the implications or the strengths or weaknesses of a
piece. Candor about counter-arguments obviously. That sort of thing.
WALD: Does that fall under candor?
OLDFATHER: It is kind of related to the humility point.
SCOVILLE: So, where would you put it?
WALD: Well, I’m reminded of Stanley’s point at the beginning of the day
that “you just do the work.” Not engaging with likely critiques of your own
work, not anticipating them, not responding to them to the best of your ability
would simply constitute weaker, poor scholarship. A good scholar would
anticipate and respond to reasonable challenges, as part of what we referred to
earlier as subject matter exhaustiveness and competence. The “geographical”
location of this argument, if you will, is not candor. It’s about doing the work
and doing it competently.
HORWITZ: It would be Rule 1.1, right?
WALD: Right. The issue is one of competent legal scholarship, unless by
candor you mean to revisit strategic exhaustiveness.
OLDFATHER: In some respects, are we not, here, defining what constitutes
competent scholarship? It is candid. It is exhaustive. And I think with respect
to the disclosures we might borrow from the securities laws and use the word
materiality, the concept of materiality.
FISH: Not only is acknowledging and anticipating objections an important
part of doing the work: It’s a wonderful teaching tool because, as you know,
I’m sure all of you had the experience of realizing that some of your students
don’t know what an argument is aside from thinking it’s a quarrel of some kind,
and have one way of talking about it, and therefore, have difficulty in knowing
how to organize the presentation. And one way is to teach them the “I-knowwhat-you’re-thinking” move, meaning at this—which, more formally, is “at
this point someone might object that,” you know, which is not only an
obligation under the heading of exhaustiveness and perhaps of candor, but it’s
a wonderful way to facilitate the unfolding of your argument.
SELIGMAN: Chad, I’m not sure that good scholarship is the same thing as
ethical scholarship. I think that there’s a Venn diagram in which they overlap
and we would probably all like to be in that overlap, but I’m not sure that as I
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have heard you define the project today that the project is to make
recommendations about how to have quality scholarship so much as to have
ethical scholarship.
OLDFATHER: The implications for our definition of candor being?
WALD: Stanley offered a compelling example earlier. Once you author
something, it’s out there and you no longer have control over it. You could
adhere to the best ethical standards, produce a piece of scholarship that you
stand behind ethically and then down the road it’s being used for very bad
purposes. As a scholar, you would not be accountable for the manipulative uses
of your own work.
OLDFATHER: It can certainly just be horrible scholarship and be
completely ignored. And I agree with that.
SELIGMAN: I think what I was responding to particularly was the piece
about figuring out what all the objections to your argument might be and
building them in. I don’t see that as a point of ethics, I see that as a point of
quality.
HESSICK: Well, I see that as a point of ethics. I think that it’s one of the
things that distinguishes, I think, legal scholarship from legal advocacy is that
you actually make the case on the other side and then, in light of the case, have
to argue why you nonetheless don’t think that that’s correct. And I should
qualify that by saying and sometimes you don’t do that. If you’re doing an
empirical project all you’re doing is acknowledging the shortcomings but it’s
really important that you do that. I do think that that’s ethics. And it’s true.
Sometimes we say, “Oh, this isn’t a good piece of scholarship because” but I’ve
heard other people describe it in terms of, “This person wrote this paper, they
know there is this other argument and they did not talk about that.” And that
wasn’t just a lapse in quality, I think we would say it was a moral lapse.
HORWITZ: There’s the distinction though: One can sloppily,
incompetently fail to spot. One can carelessly, incompetently omit a counter
argument. One can knowingly and deliberately omit a counter argument and it
seems to me the intent to conceal or avoid the fact that there is an authority or
an argument that you know exists is an ethical problem. The first is just
something to be judged as poor scholarship.
SELIGMAN: I think we may be at the point of disciplinary difference,
because I’m not sure that historians would feel quite as strongly as clearly the
legal scholars do. And we might hide it in our narrative anyway, glossing over
the problems. But it sounded to me in what you said like the legal scholar has
a responsibility for imagining all objections to that scholar’s points. And then
writing about it and including them. But what if they didn’t think of them?
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WEST: No. I think the objection is to the decision. I’ve seen this in
colleagues’ writing—and I hope not in my own—in consciously deciding not
to address a counter argument that you know full well is out there and you don’t
include it and address it because you don’t want a court to pick it up.
SELIGMAN: And I wouldn’t object, I wouldn’t argue with that point.
HESSICK: And I don’t care about why you don’t address it, I care that if
you don’t address it, that’s a problem.
SELIGMAN: So, you would say it’s okay for the scholar not to think of
everything and that there to be room for some other scholar to move in later on
and think of this?
WEST: Yeah, of course.
HESSICK: That’s right.
BOOTHE-PERRY: For purposes again, and a lot of what I’m saying at this
point aren’t really my views, but I used to serve as a rapporteur, so I’m trying
to formulate in my mind how a code or something would look. So, tell me what
you said again because I just got so caught up in making sure you knew these
aren’t all my views. When you were just talking about—
SELIGMAN: That a person can think of something and you wouldn’t call it
unethical if they didn’t think of everything.
BOOTHE-PERRY: I was saying, maybe we can put this under the
thoroughness or the exhaustiveness section because if you do exhaustive
research you know what the counter arguments are, just thinking, “Oh, I wonder
what there could be,” but it’s actually that you’re aware of counter arguments,
not just imagining.
SELIGMAN: I think you might need the word sort of consciously in there.
HESSICK: I agree.
OLDFATHER: Should we move to exhaustiveness then? Having exhausted
candor. And I think there we have on the table the notion of having explored
all of the criteria, inputs, whatever, within the subject matter. We had a
proposal that there was then non-law exhaustiveness and strategic
exhaustiveness and a suggestion of a good faith related standard here. Also, a
proposal that thoroughness be a better word or in any case the word reasonable
be appended to either of them.
FRANCIS: I don’t know that this is quite on exhaustiveness, but you brought
up the example of the article in the lesser law review not cited. And I said,
probably too quickly, “plagiarism,” but I think there’s strategic choices people
make about what not to cite to make their stuff look more original. It’s not just
they don’t want the court to think of it. It’s that they’re downplaying other
work or they’re just, maybe it’s conscious suppression of other work in the field
and that’s problematic. Another problematic practice in some other fields that
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I think happens in law is this so-called salami slicing. You publish five articles
when it should really just be one.
HORWITZ: We usually have the opposite problem, don’t we? Publish with
a couple hundred-page article which should be in a book or five articles.
FRANCIS: Yeah, that’s another, well, we have both problems. But the
salami slicing one is that you make a whole lot of articles out of, essentially,
one idea. And I’ve seen people do that in law.
WALD: Can you say a little bit more? What are some possible ethical
failings in what we refer to as salami slicing? Is it that you repeat yourself or
self-plagiarize?
FRANCIS: Self-plagiarism is something that’s considered unethical in other
disciplines. So, copying something you have had somewhere else. I keep
having a lot of trouble about how to write this without some reference at the
front to we’re working in the context of the current landscape, which we regard
as problematic in many ways. One of the reasons salami slicing is regarded as
problematic in the sciences is the way it consumes scarce resources. And the
scarce resources consumed include journal space, the expense of publication,
the genuine involvement of peer review. Now, in law somebody made the
comment a bunch of times and it was so wonderful to get to meet you.
FISH: Well, I’m very pleased to have been here. Thank you.
[Stanley Fish leaves]
FRANCIS: But those resources were sort of infinite. “There’s always
another law review.” Well, I’m not so sure that we should think about it that
way because a lot of resources go into the publication of the law review.
There’s the editing, maybe student labor is infinite, but we ought to be
husbanding our students’ time and not having them work on stupid stuff.
There’s also the question that it costs law schools time and money to produce
journals and we kill some trees. So, I don’t think resources are infinite. And
so, I think that’s a problem with salami slicing in law reviews too.
WALD: Other than self-plagiarizing, which is a significant ethical failing if
done without proper citation and attribution, what are other examples of salami
slicing?
FRANCIS: Well, so here might be an example. You have a clever tool or
you know the clever distinction and it can help make sense of three different
problems. Well, one way to do it is to publish the little methodology, the
distinction and problem A and then you do it for problem B and then you do it
for problem C. So, that could be one kind of example, when you could write
an article that is actually a richer article in a way because it shows the
comparative of how the tool works and another way would be you have a data
set and you publish this little result from the data set and then you publish this
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little result, when you could be publishing a more comprehensive account from
the data set.
SELIGMAN: Yes, I agree entirely with what Leslie is saying. When I was
a junior faculty member, somebody came around on some occasion, was giving
advice, and this was sort of negative advice, but advice nonetheless to think
about. What was the least publishable unit of your scholarship? The example
that he gave was of somebody who had written an article in which his research
had discovered that the favorite color of people with schizophrenia was orange.
And that was published separately. And I agree with all of the arguments that
Leslie made and I would like to just point back toward Ryan’s piece on puffery
that basically what you’re engaging in when you go with the LPU is résumé
inflation.
OLDFATHER: Right, and I specifically recall as a junior scholar having
people say to me, “It’s always two articles, always make it two articles. Always
split it up as much as you can.” So, I have certainly received similar advice. I
want to go back to the example that I had raised of the situation of the scholar
not citing or, I think probably not even noticing the existence of the prior piece
that had taken up the same question and analyzed it roughly the same way. I
think there are some scholars out there and I’ll mention a name and use an
example because I think incredibly highly of this person’s work. If you read a
piece by Fred Schauer, for example, there are not going to be a lot of citations
there. It’s certainly not because he’s plagiarizing, but he knows exactly where
in the puzzle this particular piece fits. And I guess kind of expects the
readership to know it as well. And there’s really no effort at all to place it in
any sort of context. I find as a reader, I’d really like a lot of the time to have
had it placed in context because it would help me in undertaking the research
project that I’m involved in to be able to know what’s he drawing on here,
where does this fit, what are the other things I should be reading. I don’t think
that there’s any sort of intentional violation of any kind of ethical norm going
on there. And so, I think one of the things to account for in an exhaustiveness
norm is whether there are circumstances in which it can be waived.
HESSICK: I want to say that the example that you gave initially about the
law review article—not mentioning the first law review article. I think that
there are two pieces to that. The first is, “Did the person actually bother to read
in the area before writing?” Because, and I guess this gets at subject matter
exhaustiveness. Do we have an obligation to be well-read in our field and to
continue to be well-read in our field? I think that the answer to that is “yes”
and I think it’s relatively uncontroversial and I think that that’s a pretty easy
one. What I think would be a new norm would be that there’s an obligation to
signal in the paper how our contribution fits into the existing field. And this
pushes back directly on claims of novelty and those sorts of things. I’m just
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mindful of the extent to which we’re stating things that people probably agree
with and things that might be controversial. So, I think it’s not controversial to
say we have an obligation to know where the field is and what’s being written,
especially in an area where we’re going to be spending enough time to write
something new. But I think that it would be useful if we came to a norm of
instead of spending the beginning of our articles saying how different what
we’re saying is from everything that’s been said before, instead trying to talk
about the ways in which it’s the same or borrowing. I don’t see that as
plagiarism. I see it, instead, as—it could be a signal of expertise. I don’t know
what the other signal would be. I do think that the number one is
uncontroversial. The idea that being an expert in the field includes continuing
to read, because I think that there are plenty of people who stop reading at some
point.
FRANCIS: You know, plagiarism can be straight out copying, obviously.
But if the scholar had actually read that piece and it played a role in how he
structured it, or she structured it and it wasn’t cited, that’s a wrong to the scholar
whose work was used. And I think we ought to say that. I also, maybe you
said it might have been a research assistant. And another point we haven’t
made, if I’m a lab supervisor in science and the post-doc in my lab does
something that involves what’s potentially an unethical practice and I haven’t
appropriately supervised that post-doc, that’s on me. So, suppose your RA—if
you haven’t given your RA instructions about what they’re supposed to do in
terms of making sure that you appropriately credit other peoples’ ideas, I think
that’s on you, not on the RA.
WEST: I don’t know if we should keep walking around like that. Anyway,
I just want to agree strongly with the first half of what you said. I don’t have
views on the second half, but on the first half, I think that’s completely right.
And I do think that it’s worth saying because my sense—and it’s completely
speculative—is that people may be aware of the existence of an article, may not
have read it carefully, but they look at it, “It’s in this rinky-dink law review by
somebody teaching at rinky-dink law school, I don’t need to bother, and more
credit to me if I can present myself as the first person to say this.” But I do
think it’s very hierarchy driven. I also think it’s got a gender and a race
component, not that we need to go down that road. What gets cited and what
doesn’t is a problem and it’s an ethical problem.
OLDFATHER: Should we, in our 30 seconds remaining here, talk about the
last piece, which is our obligations with respect to the mechanisms of
scholarship, the law review process. Or have we fulfilled the exhaustiveness
norm for the day? I guess, we will then pick up again in the morning with that.
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DAY TWO
A. Session Five: What Have We Missed? Additions and Modifications
HORWITZ: All right. So, first of all, let me—I guess on behalf of
everybody, express our thanks for a lovely dinner last night and your
hospitality.
And again, we’re delighted to have our friends from the Law Review here.
So, the title of this session is “What Have We Missed? Additions and
Modifications,” and prior to that, off-transcript as it were, there were
discussions about the nature of—and I think unsurprising question—but the
nature of the enterprise, specifically what the lead document that we foresaw
would look like. And I think that’s a valid question. It’s certainly something I
know that Chad and Carissa and I worried about along the way. And so, a
couple of people have specific comments about that and before I kind of give
the floor to them, I’ll say a couple of things. Yesterday, there was some talk
about restatement versus code versus aspirational principles versus something
else. In other words, the format—having a document, agreeing that it starts
with a document—but what the format should be, so that is very much I think
on the table. Our assumption, I think, had been that it would be valuable to
have some kind of document, not because we expect that it would perfectly
capture the exact sentiments of everybody in the room, or because we think it
would be taken as a document that people would then use, but because it would
be good, and also unusual for conferences, to come up with a discussion, to a
document that could be used to provoke further discussion. So, we do our best
to come up with something, we comment on it, eventually a journal like the
Journal of Legal Education, for instance says, “Look, here’s this document,
we’re going to reprint it, solicit views.” So, it is a starting point for
conversation. In that sense, we expect it to be imperfect, but I think there are
valid questions about doing it or how to do it. And the second thing I’ll say is
that I think—although everybody has done admission tickets, done papers,
certainly—at least in my view and depending on space and so on, at least it’s
always been my view that dissents, partial concurrences, commentaries on
reactions to are also valid ways to respond to the imperfections of a document.
And so, I ask you to keep that in mind, as we think about how it might be done,
not done, restructured, and so on.
FRANCIS: I agree with you that it’s really important to have a document.
My question has to do with what kind of document and at least as a start, I
wanted to suggest we think about drafting something that could look like best
practices or guidelines or something like that, rather than either a model code
or a restatement. And I’ll just flesh that out a little bit. It’s much more in
keeping with what you would see in other fields. So, if you get on the website,
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for example, of the Committee on Publication Ethics, you will see documents
like that. You’ll see them for authors, you’ll see them for journal editors, you’ll
see them for publishers, you won’t see them in the form of a model code or
model rules, or restatements. So, it would put us more in the family of
publication and how this kind of thing is done. Second, I have some specific
concerns about a model code, which is, first of all, the question about obligation
and aspiration, that’s one piece of it, but secondly, when you promulgate a code,
you assume somebody’s going to adopt it, that there will be an entity that enacts
it like a legislature. So, I’m curious about what enacting entity we have in mind,
for a model code. Is it going to be law schools? Is it going to be law journals?
And if so, what kind of enforcement authority will any of them have? With
respect to a restatement, it’s super controversial what the role of restatements
are. Are they recommendations? Or are they what they initially purported to
be, restatements of law? So, as for a restatement, I have a question about what
we’re restating. So, those are my more specific—if we were to produce a best
practices document, or, if I lose on my little contrarian rant, I think if we do
anything, the best thing we could do, that could go along with any of these, is a
model document of instructions for authors, that law reviews could put up on
their website, and it could be a template, it could say something about how you
submit and then there could be some suggested alternatives for law reviews,
like directly to the law review or to some Scholastica or whatever. There could
be instructions for authors about what you may or may not do after you get an
offer. You know, there are all the kinds of topics [such as], “What information
you can send us? Do you send us your CV?” for example. And law reviews
could make choices. And actually, another piece of my slightly contrarian
suggestion is that I think the three of you [speaking to Marquette Law Review
editorial board members] should be up at the table, helping us to think about
what would help you, if you’re going to be either the enforcers, if it were a code
of some kind, or if you’re going to want a document of instructions for authors
to have up on your website.
HORWITZ: Let me say, first of all, I don’t want to impose on you at either
a distance from the table or coerce you to the table, so to speak. [Speaking to
Marquette Law Review editorial board members] You are very welcome to sit
in and participate in the session. If you prefer, kind of to be there, because
you’ve got work to do and you’re thinking about how this all looks, I
understand, but you’re welcome to participate and to interject.
WEST: Okay. Maybe we could all have a contrarian rant. I won’t just
repeat what you said that I agree with, but my main reservation about the way
we proceeded yesterday is that we didn’t seem to pick up what strikes me as the
two major problems facing legal scholars and facing legal scholarship,
particularly as I hear them voiced by new entrants to the legal academy and by
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candidates and by my own fellows. And the first—we don’t have to go on and
on about this, because there’s a huge body of literature on this now, but there’s
skepticism and outright disbelief, both in law schools and outside of law
schools, about the value of legal scholarship. As I said, it’s coming from both
inside the legal academy and outside the legal academy. Schools that are in
precarious financial straits are seriously considering cutting way back on
scholarship, meaning cutting way back on what they expect or demand or even
allow of their law professors in scholarship. Others are talking quite explicitly
about eliminating all together the mission of legal scholarship or eliminating
legal scholarship as a part of the mission of the law school. Rather, the mission
is to train lawyers and to do so in a way that prepares them for law jobs—legal
scholarship doesn’t contribute to that—and therefore, we shouldn’t be paying
for it. It’s a luxury, if people want to do it at home in their spare time, they’re
free to do so, but it’s not part of their job. So, even if it’s brief, I would think
some code or some aspirational statement should say something that amounts
to an argument, it could be no more than a paragraph, about why legal
scholarship should be part of the legal academy’s mission and say something
about the mission of legal scholarship. So, that’s the first thing, that if we’re
really writing a code about legal scholarship and I think it would be the best to
defend the value of the enterprise, because it is under attack. That’s a little
different from other parts of the academy, where the academy’s also, of course,
under attack, and in a defensive posture, very broadly speaking, but legal
scholarship in particular, I think, is under attack because it’s not obvious what
the point of the whole thing is. And then the second problem that I still feel we
haven’t satisfactorily addressed is the distinctiveness of legal scholarship
definition. Much of the conversation yesterday, that worked toward a definition
of scholarship, would work as a general definition of scholarship. If we looked
at what is distinctively legal about legal scholarship, my own attempt to do so
is to say something like, “Except for the interdisciplinary work, legal method is
at the heart of legal scholarship,” and I explained that in terms of an orientation
toward justice rather than simply the truth in knowledge. Maybe there’s a better
way to explain it, but my idea, just having read this stuff and written some of it
for three decades is that normative legal scholarship is still most of what legal
scholars do, it’s not all that different, in method, from what lawyers or judges
do, except to the degree of it borrows from disciplines. But what the legal
method of legal scholarship is not only different, but for two dimensions,
disinterestedness—it’s not done on behalf of a client or an interest—and depth.
And so, depth and breadth I guess. But anyway, when I talk to fellows, new
entrants, junior faculty and even J.D. students with an academic orientation
toward law, that’s what’s expressed sometimes with a real sense of panic—
people coming into the academy who don’t have Ph.D.s in other disciplines—
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coming in as J.D.s, plus a clerkship or plus a fellowship. This is what they
worry, worry, worry about, “What is my method?” What do I say to
appointments committee when the person says “Well, what’s your method?”
“Do I have one? I don’t know, but what is it?” And again, I think we should
address that. The other thing about the code, what’s the response to well, “Who
are you?” addressed to all of us. And so, I wonder what the claim of authority
of this group is and should we address that? Should we just say at the outset,
“This is intended to begin a conversation about what our aspirations should
be?” If we wind up with an aspirational statement, or what the code should be
if we wind up with a code, inviting not just comments but inviting the beginning
of a conversation toward this thing. And then lastly, I’ll say, I think the Journal
of Legal Education would be quite interested in participating in this.
HORWITZ: So, roughly speaking, I want to give everybody a chance to
weigh in on this general question, and either it will emerge organically or I’ll
kind of make sure it’s there, the second part to the question will be, “What to
do about it?” That’s to say—assuming we come up with either a consensus
about what some document should look like or not quite agree to disagree—but
we do our best to reflect these things in a document imperfectly, what are good
ways to respond to that? And to acknowledge these broader questions. And I
will note that I’ve been trying to think as we go—and one thing is I assume
there will be an “editor’s introduction to the symposium” and I think one of the
things that the introduction will do is contextualize the document. That is to
say, “Here is why we thought it was worth doing, here is our lack of authority.
We hope to start a conversation, we think it’s valuable to have a document to
do it with, and receive it in that spirit, why it’s different from or not a code,” or
what have you. So, some of this can be addressed there, not all of it, and I just
want you to keep that in mind. But I hope that the three of us are extremely
responsive to these concerns and that whatever happens again, given our
discussion yesterday, we try to be open about them in print, so that people can
understand and make reasonable judgments about it.
WALD: The type of statement or document we end up producing should
take into consideration who we are trying to reach and how we expect our work
product to be used. Is our audience individual law professors? Deans of law
schools? Roof organizations like the Association of American Law Schools?
Yesterday we talked about the tradeoff between drafting rules of conduct
and a restatement, and I suggested we keep in mind that the former are designed
to guide practice and protect vulnerable constituents whereas the latter usually
focuses on codification of existing law. Another aspect of the tradeoff is
promulgation and enforcement. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct start
as a model drafted by the American Bar Association. Then every jurisdiction
contemplates and adopts a version of the model, usually in a process involving
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its state supreme court. The process is important because by the time the rules
are adopted in each state they have been vetted and have considerable buy in
from the regulated. After the rules are adopted they become state law and
enforced by a disciplinary agency. In contrast, restatements are published by
the American Law Institute. With that in mind, if our desire is to one day simply
publish a statement that informs the conduct of individual law professors, then
a restatement format might be appropriate. If in contrast we’d like to
promulgate rules that may be adopted by the AALS and by law schools, we
might want to circulate our work product widely and get buy in from affected
constituents akin to the process entailed in the Rules’ promulgation and
adoption.
I also want to completely second and join Robin’s other two points, in terms
of the importance of acknowledging in our text the value of scholarship and
exploring what might be distinctive about legal scholarship. As we do that, we
should be mindful of the charge of lawyer exceptionalism. On the one hand,
when we talk about the distinctiveness of legal scholarship we need to do that
without being perceived as engaging in a form of legal exceptionalism, that is,
saying that there is something unique about law professors as opposed to other
professors and something special about legal scholarship as opposed to other
forms of scholarship, unless we mean it and can explain the uniqueness. On
the other hand, if we are going to say something about the distinctiveness of
legal scholarship, for example, its inherent commitment to justice, I’d like us to
say something substantive and meaningful and avoid platitudes. One thing I
dislike about the Rules of Professional Conduct is that they lead off in the
Preamble with high rhetoric about justice stating that “A lawyer is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen with
a special responsibility to the quality of justice,”24 only to then essentially
abandon justice infusing it with little substantive content in the body of the
Rules. I’d like us to explore legal scholars’ commitment to justice meaningfully
and avoid such empty rhetoric.
HORWITZ: So, two quick points. One is why—the initial restatement
idea—the way it came up, and some of it is, so to speak, “marketing value,”
that it’s a clever way to frame it, that might draw attention in a different way
than another code or best practices. What it turns out to be, in fact, is kind of a
different story, but I think that’s one reason we thought about it in those terms.
And the second is, again, I just want to—not that it is unimportant to focus on
what the document contains, you’re all here, you all have a stake in it—but I do
want to also say introductions, and commentaries are also places that can
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’ N 2018).
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contextualize, and to say, “We have a paragraph about justice in here, it is
important that it be in there, here’s why it’s important.” So, there are ways to
address some of these that might be outside the document, although again, I
think this discussion about the doc so, have an intervention? I want to make
sure everybody gets a chance, editors included, if you would like it.
FRANCIS: I want to make sure that if we say something about justice, we
do it in a way that’s not perceived as having a certain political slant, that’s the
risk of it. An alternative would be to say it is in some way or another,
scholarship without law. If you’re writing about the circulation of the planets,
you’re not doing legal scholarship, if you’re doing something about how we
ought to think about the law for outer space, you are doing legal scholarship.
So, it’s more a topic area than a direction of a point of view.
WEST: Yeah. I’m just trying to characterize what other people call internal
legal scholarship as opposed to external. External legal scholarship is
scholarship about law; internally, the scholarship participates in the legal realm
of this and that is doable, and that’s what I think is distinctive about legal
scholarship is well, a lot of people call it not scholarship at all, I don’t think we
should do that.
FRANCIS: I guess I’ll just push back on that because I think we want to
cover both internal and external legal scholarship.
WEST: Right. And so, sure, we can say, “It’s all scholarship about law in
some sense.” It just doesn’t seem to me to capture the kernel of it, that internal
scholarship is scholarship that adopts a legal method for one thing. That is not,
I think, all that different in kind from lawyerly writing except for
disinterestedness and depth and what is it that all of that legal writing does? It
aims toward justice. I don’t want to use a loaded term, I certainly don’t want
to use an overly politicized term, and you always have to drop a footnote saying,
“I’m not talking about social justice here,” and so it could be aiming toward
legal justice. I don’t know, I completely acknowledge the problem, but I would
like the document to be written in such a way as to not take a stand on this, I
think, quite divisive and damaging issue about this legal scholarship, isn’t really
legal scholarship. I think we should embrace both, there is so much of both and
so, I’m just looking for a way to do that.
HORWITZ: Can I just ask, as a question of interest—I think I know the
answer. Let’s say appearing in the Journal of Empirical Legal Scholarship that
there is a piece on settlement rates by jurisdiction, just pure data, no
conclusions. I take it that it would called legal scholarship?
WEST: Yeah, that’s true.
HORWITZ: Yeah, as opposed to some other statistics or some other
discipline about law?
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WEST: Correct. Sure.
HORWITZ: Yeah. No, I’m not surprised to hear that but wanted to ask.
WEST: No, I don’t know where the question was coming from because
again, what I want to do is be inclusive of those two very basic types of
scholarship that appear as legal scholarship in journals—to referee to not
referee, to peer or not to peer. The bulk of articles that appear in law reviews
are not of that type you just described, that you just gave an example of. It’s
more like, “This circuit is right and that circuit is wrong and here’s why and
here’s a bunch of legal reasons for it.”
SCOVILLE: Two points. One is that I agree with Leslie that the
“restatement” term in particular seems problematic; it just seems inaccurate
because there’s really too much of a blank slate on the matter of scholarly ethics
for that term to describe what we’re doing. It’s also inaccurate in the sense that
the apparent plan seems like it will be too prescriptive to constitute a
“restatement.” The second point is that it’s a little unclear to me how we’ll be
adding to or improving upon draft codes that already exist.
WEST: I have just a quick one. I know I’ve talked too much already.
Another way to get at my point would be just to use Dworkin’s phrase, that
much of legal writing in law reviews, as well as judicial opinions, is aimed at
making the law the best it can be, and so your empirical piece of it suggests jury
deliberations, et cetera, would redeem them, but this piece about, sort of,
[indiscernible] that’s problematic.
HORWITZ: Thank you for the comments. Particularly the question, again,
whether the restatement term is inept. Let me ask, plus comment. I think the
Dodson, et al, point is a valuable one and I hope the journal doesn’t mind adding
depth, numericity, and volume to a discussion even where it’s been broached
before, but certainly if it is mere recapitulation, that is a separate question, so
that is food for thought. And let me ask do you have—you don’t have to—but
do you have a proposal or a suggestion about what you think the right kind of
title would be? I understand that it depends on what the document is, but do
you have views on that?
SCOVILLE: Well, just by process of elimination, taking off “restatement,”
taking off “code,” it seems that something like “draft principles of scholarly
ethics” might be best.
BOOTHE-PERRY: I actually echo a lot of Leslie and Robin’s thoughts, so
I won’t repeat a lot of those. My concern with having a model code is the
enforcement and the consequences, the ramifications, if you don’t abide by the
code who is going to police that. And thinking of a different way to frame it, I
know that there are best practices, but there aren’t specifically best practices for
legal scholars, with specificity. I was thinking about MacCrate, when
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MacCrate came out with lawyering skills and values and it started a huge
conversation. I don’t know if that was the intent when MacCrate got together
and drafted that, but maybe if we could have something similar to that. So,
using maybe Ryan’s terms about maybe “principles and scholarly values” with
“best practices,” combine a lot of it, because I agree with Robin particularly
with younger scholars, they don’t know what to do, where they’re going, where
to start, and there needs to be some guideline and certainly there’s literature out
there, but how many of them are going to look up a law review or articles that
specifically discuss how I’m supposed to go about with these scholarly values.
So, I think there is great value in having a document, a source of reference, at
this space, particularly with, as Robin has pointed out, people are questioning
what’s even the value of legal scholarship. Well, it’s valuable and we know
that it’s valuable because the values we have that make it valuable, so—
HORWITZ: And let me add to that if you’re thinking about audience. One
obvious possibility, if you’re thinking about who do you mail the
complimentary issues of the symposium to, who do we follow up with via email
and personal contact, the AALS New Law Professor Conference is an obvious
thing to think about. Let Dean Kearney secure yet more sources of great wealth
and then every new law professor will get a copy. On the principle that the
most important are first, do you all want to add anything? Not obliged, but
welcome to.
MICHAEL ANSPACH: Along the lines of what Professors Francis and
Scoville brought up, a “restatement” to me doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense,
because the question is, “What are we restating?” I really like the idea of the
guidelines, especially for me, as Editor in Chief. I came in here, I had to make
my own guidelines, which is to say I made my own rule to live by, which is, as
I mentioned yesterday, to do what’s in the best interest of the law review. No
one told me that, it was just, “I’m going to take lawyering principles, and that’s
going to direct my conduct.” However, for a predecessor of mine a few years
ago, this individual’s idea of best interest was to have the most pages in our law
review history. And this person may have done that, but if that is what one
considers to be the standard to live by, then what standard is it, for what
qualities in the paper and that sort of thing. So, like I said, it is a standard that
I’ve kind of put upon myself, but it would be nice if I had that off the bat,
someone said to me, “Your job as Editor in Chief is to do what’s in the best
interest of the law review,” and every time I have to ask a question of what do
I need to do, that’s the first question I ask myself. But it’s something like that,
that I don’t know that every Editor in Chief or every editor asks that question.
And just having guidelines that set that up, on the editorial side, I think would
be very helpful for me and law reviews everywhere, in terms of what the quality
of the work is, and what their goals are in putting out the best possible volume.
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HORWITZ: So, I thank you. Hesitate to remind you that at the end of the
day, you wield a red pen, maybe not the only one, but a red pen, do not get
drunk with power. So, let me kind of feed it to the organizers or just—and
briefly what should we do about it and then again, what have we missed.
HESSICK: I think a lot of people have said a lot of really important things
here and I don’t want to wait until what is a code versus what is a restatement
and I want to ask what maybe is just a super obvious question, which is, when
we say something like “best practices,” are we saying, “We would hope that
people would do this, it would make for a better scholarship if people did this?”
Or are we trying to set norms? Are we trying to say, “We should all be doing
this and to the extent that we’re not doing it, it’s a shortcoming?” It’s not just
that it wasn’t as good of scholarship as it could have been, but that we perceive
there to be a flaw in the scholarships, that we don’t just judge as a matter of
quality? An ethical floor. Although, I think, implicit in this discussion about
whether it’s a restatement or whether it’s something else, is that we’re not just
articulating norms here, we’re also trying to shape them, so maybe the phrase,
“draft principles” is appropriate. I’m not sure, because I don’t know what
people usually say, what they’re trying to say is to both articulate and to shape
norms, and I think that that’s where the value comes, because I think a lot of
the principles that we’re talking about tie into problems that people are
complaining about now: the puffery, the claims of novelty, methodological
questions, whether there has to be methodological rigor and doctrinal
scholarship. It’s important for me, for us to keep in mind that if this is about
articulating and shaping norms, that I think that we want those norms to extend
to everyone, so I like Robin’s intervention about talking about scholarship in
terms of both what it’s about, but also in terms of—it’s about rigor, it’s about
depth, it’s about legal method. We’re not leaving people out then. And then
we just have to make sure that when we’re saying what we think the norms
ought to be, that it sweeps as broadly as possible. I’m comfortable saying that
pedagogical scholarship should be disinterested, and I like having a really broad
definition of scholarship, to try to say that these norms should apply across all
of the various points.
HORWITZ: I’ll say given that I’m at least self-identified or card-carrying
pluralist, I obviously agree with a lot of what’s said. The goal is not to read
people out of the legal academic profession in the first instance, and so I’d
rather be broad as well. And this, I think, goes to the first part of your statement.
There are kind of three things we can say, again, whether they’re said in the
document or elsewhere, and one is there is a large amount of perhaps
unacknowledged or un-explicit consensus that something—that people have
concerns, and that this is not limited to people on a particular methodological
or ideological or prescriptive path, it’s a wide-spread concern among law
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professors. And second, that maybe more than one would acknowledge, there
are a lot of things that everybody can agree on. Not everything, but there are
probably a number of things where the reaction would be similar across, again,
internal and external and so on, and that is important. And the third, I think
is—although again, one can acknowledge, to the extent that there are deeper
disputes, it is a good thing to argue about it, and I think that really leads to the
third point—the value of a document and a symposium on this subject is to have
a document and a discussion, physical or I guess, electronic corpus, that says
law professors are worried about this, need to be explicit about it, need to bring
that discussion out into the open and try to figure out where the agreements are
and where their intentional differences lie. And in other words, the usual large
statement, that this is not a perfect document, but we need to have a discussion.
OLDFATHER: Just to sign onto a lot of what’s been said, and really to pick
up—in particular, I think what Carissa, was saying—I’m persuaded to the
position that something less concrete, less prescriptive than restatement or
model code is an appropriate approach, to the “draft principles” sort of idea, the
idea of being much more explicit about it tending to start rather than conclude
any sort of conversation. I think, in part, that has to be the large part because
this is really a norm driven activity, a norm driven profession. Certainly, as an
associate dean, one sees that a substantial number of law professors are not into
rule following in any sort of precise way.
I think as well, and this—this is a point—I’m going to give Ryan a lot of
credit for, we talked about it at dinner last night, that we could at least think
about acknowledging what might be a root cause of some of the behavior that
we are here talking about, which is that it is also a profession that is almost
ridiculously status conscious. So, that you can take Stanley Fish’s—you know,
Yale talks only to Yale—I mean, it really is sort of one of those “Lowells speak
only to Cabots, and Cabots speak only to God” type situations, to a large degree.
And that drives, I think, a great deal of the pathological behavior that we see.
I think that the context in which it is taking place has also shifted
dramatically since when I entered this profession to now, largely as a result of
the advent of electronic submissions to law reviews.
WEST: Wait, what do you mean?
OLDFATHER: Maybe I overstated the point, but it has certainly changed the
game of legal scholarship in substantial ways, I think, to have gone from a world
in which the almost physical limitations placed on the submission process made
it much more difficult. You couldn’t easily send a piece to 100 journals,
because that meant somebody had to make 100 copies and stuff 100 envelopes
and there had to be 100 separate cover letters printed and signed. And on the
journal side, it was physical manuscripts coming in. There were fewer of them
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and so the process was easier to manage, there was a greater likelihood that
things were getting read, there was less of a felt need to rely on proxies.
HORWITZ: Were there abstracts when you were reviewing?
OLDFATHER: I don’t recall abstracts when we were looking at the physical
pile of paper, and we had a process by which every single piece was read by at
least two people, and I just don’t think that happens anymore because I don’t
think it can happen, realistically.
HORWITZ: All right. And I definitely will suggest, by way of, structure—
I think everybody’s had at least one shot in, and let me say, in addition to that,
I will try to take a quick round. I guess a combination, because of time
constraints, of what to do about it but also because some of these, I think, have
already been that, what have we missed. And I know that Francis might want
to weigh in, for instance, on SSRN and the point that Chad just brought up,
possibly, possibly not, but yeah, go ahead.
SELIGMAN: Just weighing in with a point of process, since I didn’t know
until yesterday what a restatement was, I’m actually pretty neutral on what you
call the document. But it might be worthwhile to think of it as writing
something that’s draft or preliminary, and to think about what a follow-up might
be, so you might plan that there would be a larger conference of people who
respond to the symposium and the statement, and get something a little bit more
permanent at that point.
FRANCIS: First of all, I really love what Ryan said as a way framing it, and
I think we can link that to what Carissa said. Because when you draft principles,
some of them can be obligatory and some of them can be recommendatory. So,
I would suggest linking those two together and going along those lines.
Secondly, I brought up the role of SSRN and it might be worth our just thinking
about it a little bit because I think it does several things: One is people can post
stuff on SSRN and try to preempt, in a way, so before you actually had
something, go through any kind of review process, you can stick something up
on SSRN and expect other people to cite it, which might or might not be
pernicious. So, it’s essentially a self-publishing vehicle and it can undermine a
bunch of what else goes on. Second, I think SSRN can undermine journals in
a funny way. You know, a lot of journals in other fields, you’re not permitted
to publish until the journal publishes. That’s the policy of Science. So, if you
give a paper at a professional meeting then Science will no longer publish it.
Now, that’s good and it’s bad. I mean, it’s good because it gives a special pride
of place to the fact of journal publication, but it may hinder the sharing of ideas.
So, SSRN has the advantage of the sharing of ideas, but some of those
disadvantages. I also worry that any time the journal holds the copyright, it’s
very hard to put something up on SSRN except the abstract. So, if I publish
something in a peer reviewed publication, where the journal holds the
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copyright, I—before it went through the editorial process, but still it’s not the
official copy in a way, and I think that skews, in some ways, what people cite
and potentially devalues peer-review publications over stuff that’s coming out
in law reviews. I also worry for you law review editors whether—my personal
policy is I never put anything up on SSRN until it’s out in the journal, because
that way people can cite to the actual journal page numbers and so on. But, if
somebody puts it up on SSRN before you have gone through it, it’s just as likely
to get cited to the SSRN as it is to the journal, depending on when something
comes out and the result of that is that you guys get less in the way of credit.
So, I think in law, SSRN has kind of had a pernicious effect, but I don’t know
whether people use SSRN in the same way I use PubMed and I use Glosser’s
Index and I use other sources when I’m looking for work in other fields, and I
use SSRN when I’m looking for work in law, and I think that skews what I see
and is problematic.
HORWITZ: So, if I can, comment and then pass it along. I’m always a big
fan of means of production analysis and in the legal academic profession,
combination of means of production, technology, norms, which are largely,
kind of, ungoverned. These two working together, and then the “go-ahead” or
“get-ahead to go ahead” kind of spirit that sometimes prevails in a credentialist
and/or ambitious academic profession can have bad combined effects or underexamined effects. So, for instance, Chad and I were speaking about the
lamentable absence of book reviews in many of today’s law journals. Book
reviews are not cited as often and that’s one reason they don’t appear as much,
even if once upon a time, if you were thinking about what a book looks like, an
issue of a journal, it would make sense to have different kinds of content.
Moreover, SSRN generally does not treat book reviews as part of the main
body, so if you want your downloads to count, then don’t write a book review
or call it something else and hope that it squeezes by the SSRN review process.
These are unobserved influences and incentives to act in a particular way, right?
Also, again, questions about workshopping for instance, whether you present
the half-baked paper because that’s when you can actually learn and therefore,
the peer review is real, or whether you present the polished, “already-throughthe-editorial-process” paper for purposes of looking fancier when you’re in a
room full of strangers, or if you’re thinking about lateral hiring and so on and
so forth. Lots of determinants of behavior—to my mind, all the more reason
therefore, even if we want some structural remedies, all the more important to
have law professors educated and steeped in thinking about the ethics of
conduct, so that they can negotiate these things with something more than
advice about what it takes to get ahead, right?
SCOVILLE: I agree with part of what you said, Leslie, but I’m a little more
comfortable with the posting to SSRN before publication, in part because,
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insofar as the draft that you post is, as far as you’re concerned, complete, and
insofar as law review editing is largely stylistic, there will often be no material
difference between the version that goes up on SSRN and the version that
comes out in press. In those cases, pre-posting to SSRN doesn’t seem all that
bad. In addition, my impression is that authors typically submit to law reviews
soon after posting to SSRN. I think that also reduces the significance of the
practice.
HORWITZ: Unless you’re Larry Solum, in which case, the law review
article is an ongoing iterative process on SSRN, and I mean that with affection.
He’s done this great work on originalism that keeps on being a work in progress,
where we get different versions.
So, again, everything on this board will graphically, I think, be either
recorded or included. Other considerations, other values, things that need to be
considered or haven’t been or what have you, and this, of course, goes to
anything, the document or broader discussion issues.
SCOVILLE: I think we might have dismissed the sincerity issue a little too
quickly by overlooking some sub-issues. One is withdrawal obligations: if you
no longer believe that a piece is accurate, or no longer agree with one of your
prior conclusions, do you have an obligation to try to remove the piece from
online sources? It seems like the answer could be “yes,” if sincerity matters.
And then also, I think I disagree with my comment yesterday on the importance
of consistency.
[LAUGHTER]
HORWITZ: Well-played, sir.
SCOVILLE: I think my earlier concern was just that an obligation of
consistency might be interpreted too broadly. If you are taking a position at
point A and then at point B, you take a logically contradictory position without
any attempt to justify or reconcile the two, that’s a problem. But I don’t see
any problems with, for example, publishing an article saying that under an
originalist interpretation of the Constitution, the conclusion is X, and then later
publishing another article arguing that the conclusion is the opposite of X under
a different modality. As long as the obligation of consistency is not too broad,
that’s fine.
HORWITZ: Well, I wouldn’t say more than fine and I would probably
add— and I can think of one article where I criticize this—if you have changed
your mind, you should not do so sub rosa. I mean, if you have a major work
out there that says X and then you come along and write Y, and possibly the
only thing that has changed is the topic under dispute, one would expect you to
have an obligation to say either, “I changed my mind,” or, “But see my earlier
work,” or something.
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SCOVILLE: Right. And this also goes back to the issue of, “What are we
adding to the existing draft codes?” One of them already talks about
consistency, so do we have problems with the way that the principle has been
articulated or are we just copying and pasting on some issues—maybe that’s
okay, I don’t know.
HORWITZ: Others? Again, this can cover a pretty wide variety of what
have we missed initially, and it’s also what else would you want to say before
time’s up?
OLDFATHER: So, one point, as I was going through things yesterday, that
we might not have talked about. We did discuss some ideas about the form of
discourse, I guess treating one another respectfully in our interactions. But I
think there’s another point to consider, and this is one that Dan Farber makes,
encouraging a greater willingness to engage critically with one another, right.
So, I think there are problems in two respects there, and we spoke about the
first, but not necessarily the second, which is that there may not be enough
critical interaction with other people’s work, and that that sort of interaction is
actually a significant part of advancing the scholarly enterprise.
SCOVILLE: I mean, that’s sort of a product of an over-emphasis on novelty,
isn’t it? At least in part. You’re not viewed as doing sufficiently novel work if
you’re simply responding to the work of others.
HORWITZ: Other additions?
HESSICK: So, I’ll just say, I think that Ryan’s probably right, that part of it
is because we want to come across as novel, but I also think that might be
because the respectfulness norm isn’t well entrenched enough that—I will
definitely admit that I have worried about engaging with particular people
because they don’t have a reputation for—I’m going to go with politeness—I
would rather use the colloquial word there than anything else. But, I think that
Chad’s right, that those are two sides of the same coin and maybe if we could
increase the sort of “respectfulness of tone,” it might encourage people to
engage more critically or more substantively. I like the word substantively
better because I think critically has a connotation of maybe being less polite.
But I also want to say, and this is just circling back to something we talked
about briefly yesterday, I think it’s worth saying the things that are not
scholarship, but then to also make clear that we can nonetheless have certain
obligations for our non-scholarship behavior, in which we identify ourselves as
law professors, and I think that we can do that briefly; it doesn’t have to be a
big part of the code, but I think it’s worth saying that these particular norms
exist, in part, because we’re professors and not just because of the enterprise
that we’re engaged in. I mean, I think that they apply maybe with less force or
that there are other countervailing considerations, for example, when we teach,
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but we nonetheless care about a lot of these things, in all of the roles that we
perform.
HORWITZ: And as I said yesterday, that is certainly a huge hobby horse for
me in part because of what I see as the general increased phenomenon of trading
on authority, of using one’s status as a legal academic and the authority or cache
that that gives one—to push ideas—ideas that are not always entirely related to
or in the best practice of one’s legal academic status. So, whether it’s done in
a document or noted in a document as an important issue, and then I know a
couple, at least, of our pieces that expand on it is an open question. I’m glad it
will be dealt with; I think it is important, how it’s dealt with. I’m more catholic
on.
BOOTHE-PERRY: Just a quick comment. We touched on this a little bit
yesterday, but when you’re sitting in the choir, you don’t think about the people
who just came to the church because somebody dragged them here, and they
don’t really know why they’re here. And when I teach or I write or even when
I present on professionalism, a lot of times I’m preaching to the choir. It’s those
individuals who understand why there is a need for professionalism in the legal
profession, but there is a whole percentage of individuals who think, “Why do
we need it?” like, “Why should I care? why should this matter?” And so I think
we need to address in our document, whatever it is, “Why should you care about
having some ethical standards or ethical principles for your scholarship? Why
does it matter? Is it just because of the status of being a law professor or is it
because we have some social contract with society?” But I think we definitely
need to include in there, for the non-choir members, why this should be
something that they should be talking about too.
HORWITZ: And let me say, one of the responses I’ve gotten, particularly
privately, and I know I mentioned this in my contribution, when I raise these
kinds of concerns on the blog or in-person or elsewhere is, “You don’t need to
worry about this or that or make a disclosure about this because everybody
understands what’s going on,” let’s say talk about the professor’s letter, or the
amicus brief, where people have signed on, where they may not actually agree
with propositions or whole pages in an amicus brief and so on and so forth. The
answer, I get it, “Look, everybody kind of understands this,” or the op-ed thing,
“Everybody knows that you’re just trying to be persuasive and doing it in 800
words,” and so on. And I get this, especially, I think, this is just annex data, but
I get this especially from people higher up in the hierarchy. So, I worry about
that. I certainly worry about it if it’s the whole explanation, and there’s no best
practices, agreed upon practices, et cetera, as a background. I also think that
people who are in a small and select discussion either are thinking about only
the people in that discussion or are making too many assumptions about what
everybody outside knows and whether everybody’s in on the game and so on.
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Especially where the audience is law clerks, some of whom have been mentored
and tutored by these people in the so-called realities of the game and some of
whom haven’t, and so on and so forth, or if the audience is the public or the
media. Also, even if they’re right that everybody knows, I’m not sure why
living with, accepting—encouraging the cynicism is the right way to proceed.
But this relates to, I think, something that Nicola said, which is a word that I
want to at least throw out, not least because of the location where we’re holding
this conference, is the idea of vocation. It’s not quite antiquated but not a word
used with frequency these days. I would like to think that one ought to have a
vocation to be a law professor or at least treat that work in vocational terms;
“calling” may be putting it strongly, and I don’t think it is for everybody. I
would like to think that one thinks it is a necessary and sufficient reason for
thinking about the ethical obligations of being a law professor or a legal scholar,
that this is your profession, but also your vocation and so you ought to want it
to be undertaken with a sense of the larger goal in mind or the larger ethic in
mind, and it’s not easily codified, but it’s a word that I would like to at least
have kind of on the record.
FRANCIS: When you were talking, I thought of something that I’m not quite
sure how to formulate, because I think what you said is super important and we
talked a little—part of the vocation of a law professor is that we’re teaching law
students and we’ve talked a little bit about how some of the obligations of the
professoriate are to mentor folks as journal editors and not to be mean to them
and not to be rude. Here’s what’s sort of an inchoate thought and I don’t know
quite what to do with it, but are there ever circumstances in which authors could
do things that put journal editors in a context that could actually harm them,
and what might those look like and what are our obligations to protect them?
And by harm, I mean not just that their dealing with somebody who’s being an
asshole, but that they’re dealing with somebody who might put them in a
position of having to sign on to something that could harm them professionally
or make them feel deeply uncomfortable morally. There’s a concept of moral
harm. I’m trying to think of some of them but it could be a situation in which
it’s not just that the author is being rude to you, but you think that the author is
cheating in some way, and you might be implicated in that cheating, and the
journal has accepted it, but then the author might come back and bite the journal
in some way or another or, well, I’ll leave it at that. It’s speculative because I
don’t have great examples, but I worry that there might be situations like that
and we need to be very clear that law schools should step in.
HORWITZ: And if one digs through Westlaw—two things. If one digs
through Westlaw, one can find some histories of retractions and things of that
sort, so if you’re failing in your obligation of thoroughness, of course, you’re
also putting the editor at risk. And one last thing I’ll note about novelty or
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originality means of production, the fact that many of the law reviews only exist
in easily searchable form on Westlaw elected from 1980 is a further structural
aspect, at least where people don’t go and do thorough print research. That
affects the novelty question. Mark Tushnet has a great piece in the Supreme
Court Review—a few years ago, reviewing a couple of articles from the first
issue, I want to say, of the Supreme Court Review—I could be wrong about
that—but from an early volume, and he talks about how many times he’s seen
these points come up since then in subsequent articles without those earlier
articles being cited. Some of that is a function of, again, the way electronic
resources work. Let me give it to the Carissa for the last word on this session,
and then a break.
WEST: I was just going to say that there’s a role for the advisors to refuse
to intervene and perhaps the student should be more cognizant of their right—
not just an obligation—but their right to rely on the law review advisors to add
this media and mediaries and as advisors in those instances.
HORWITZ: All right. So, let’s take a break, refuel, recharge and then have
the last session. And thanks to everybody for a very productive discussion.
B. Session Six: Final Session
HESSICK: Should we go ahead and get started? So, this is our last session
and, in a fit of practicality, I’m wondering how much progress we can make
towards securing this sort of document; so I’ve outlined, I think, not necessarily
the structure of the document itself, but a few issues that I think it would be
worth seeing if we have consensus on, or a few issues where we need to make
a decision or at least make some progress on a decision. And wow, did that
sound like an academic-sane thing to say—if we can’t make a decision, can we
make some progress on a decision? I’ll use that at my next faculty meeting.
So, I’m not sure if it’s the first thing that we want to deal with, but something
that obviously came up in the last session is the idea of what the document
would be titled. I think that Ryan’s suggestion of a draft statement of principles
seemed to resonate with a number of people, even if it’s not their first choice.
I like the word “norms” in addition to “principles,” but I wonder if anyone
would prefer to call this a restatement or do we want to call it something like
“a draft statement of principles” or “a draft statement of norms.” Do people
have strong feelings about this? Or do we put a pin in this and come back later?
Does that sound good to everyone, should we call it draft principles and
revisit? Does anyone want to voice doubt about draft principles? Draft
principles, it is, woohoo! I guess the good thing about putting this last is
everyone’s like, “I’m tired.” Okay. Then, I think, we have a question of
introductory paragraphs or paragraphs that sort of set the stage. I agree with
Paul that there should probably be some sort of editor statement, so I guess the

CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

6/12/18 9:24 AM

CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

1185

question is which ideas do we think are important enough that they need to be
in the statement itself and which could be a sort of editor’s type statement? The
two that I wrote down as possible candidates for the document itself are the
importance of scholarship and then why we need scholarship ethics.
FRANCIS: This is just a research ethics question. You were using the word
“editors.” I think we need to have a brief conversation about who are the
authors and to be entirely honest, I am happy with either the three of you being
the co-authors with the rest of us being footnoted as participants. I’m also
happy with the possibility that we’re all co-authors and the recognition that that
means that we all bear equal responsibility for everything from drafting to
editing.
SELIGMAN: I just wanted to say that I don’t think I should be an author,
though I’m happy to be listed as a participant since it’s so far outside my field,
I don’t think that I can authoritatively sign on to anything. It’s humility.
HESSICK: Anything else on this question?
WEST: Well, I think you’ve reached—you should get a pride of authorship
and I’m happy to be signed on as a participant, and that’s assuming that you
actually do write it.
OLDFATHER: Come up with something?
WEST: Good.
HESSICK: Okay. I’ll have to say honestly when it came to the statement
itself, I didn’t imagine there being authors for the statement, that the editors’
preface or whatever it is, mentions that this was a conference and that these are
the people who participated, we organized the conference, here is a document
that grew out of the conference, but not that every participant in the conference
necessarily signed onto it in toto, but maybe that’s a crazy thing to think.
SCOVILLE: The only argument for including more authors is that it may
help with notoriety. For better or worse, a publication with the names of people
like Stanley, Robin, and others at the byline will attract more eyes than one that
doesn’t have those names. We may not like that, but I think it’s the reality. So
if the point is for this to be influential, it might be worth adding more authors.
HESSICK: We’re doing this in part to counteract sort of the role of hierarchy
and prestige.
[LAUGHTER]
HESSICK: People with better places in the hierarchy and more prestige.
[LAUGHTER]
WEST: Well, you might want to wait on this until you see what the work
entails.
HESSICK: Good idea. I’m happy to put a pin in it.
FRANCIS: Yeah. And I don’t have an answer.
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WEST: No, I don’t either.
FRANCIS: I mean, what I was going to say is I don’t have an answer—I’m
happy with whatever you all and all the participants feel comfortable with, but
I think you all, because you’ve done so much work to convene it, have some
kind of special role in that.
HESSICK: Okay. So, we’ll go ahead and—
SCOVILLE: I agree with that, by the way.
HESSICK: Pardon?
SCOVILLE: Yeah, I’m not trying to upset anyone.
HESSICK: We’re not and I love that you said it. It was [indiscernible] and
some truth. Okay. So, let’s leave it for now, but I think Leslie’s right, it’s
something that we need to think about. In addition to the importance of
scholarship and why we need to have a conversation about scholarship ethics,
is there anything else that we think belongs in this sort of introductory statement
to the statement itself?
SCOVILLE: Yes. Chad made a comment in the last session about some of
the underlying causes of the pathologies we’ve been talking about. It might be
good to mention some of those in the preamble.
HESSICK: Anything else? I was once told by a trusted colleague, you have
to count to seven in your mind before you move on. Ryan?
SCOVILLE: Purposes, broad goals, including what we hope to achieve with
this.
FRANCIS: Who’s our audience?
WEST: Now, I’m counting with you.
HESSICK: I know, right. You’re like, “Think I’m already at eight.” You
got to go Mississippi. Okay. So, then I think from there, we move onto the
definition of scholarship. And I want to hear from people about the—did you
have something to add?
BOOTHE-PERRY: I’m actually—I know you counted and you waited and I
shouldn’t go back. Just the document title—it’s not just going to be “draft
principles,” right?
HESSICK: “Of Scholarly Ethics” or “Scholarly Norms,” that’s right. Okay.
Thank you. So, in terms of the definition of scholarship, I think this is
something that we talked about a bit this morning, I’ll weigh in pre-emptively
to say that I really like the idea that came out in some of the admissions tickets
about—that there has to be sort of substantial analysis, there has to have been
substantial labor that goes into scholarship. I also really liked Robin’s points
from earlier today, that would both include interdisciplinary scholarship, but
would also make clear that legal method is not just a legitimate, it might also
be the predominant methodology of legal scholarship. And you made one more
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point about—that it would include clinical scholarship, I think that that’s right,
yeah. Do we all have additional things to add beyond that? I’ll write down
really quickly what I—and please, feel free to disagree with me. Analysis and
labor, inter-disciplinary and legal method, and then I think an explicit nod to
inclusiveness.
FRANCIS: I think that it needs to include what Robin was calling both
internal and external legal scholarship and it needs to do so in such a way that
it embraces work of all political walks and points of view, so it’s not—we need
to be very careful to be non-ideological—how do we frame it.
HESSICK: I guess, I should also add, we did say about specifically
excluding—I’m so sorry I was not paying attention—explicitly excluding
amicus briefs, op-eds, those sorts of things, so—
SELIGMAN: So, actually, I was going to address that. I wanted to just
remind you that yesterday I suggested a typology of things that could count as
scholarship, that might be worth listing explicitly. And then throughout this
conversation, I’ve been bothered by the term “non-scholarship.” It seems to
me like there should be some sort of positive expression of what that other stuff
is. Even if it doesn’t count as scholarship, it might be useful to have a list of
whatever the positive name of “non-scholarship” is and say, “These are all
legitimate activities but we’re not counting them as scholarship for purposes of
this conversation.”
WEST: Such as blogs. This is a big issue. Right.
HESSICK: It is an issue.
OLDFATHER: Just as a point of departure, here’s what AALS, somewhere
in its standards, defines as within the scope of scholarship “covered activities
include any published work, oral or written presentation to conferences,
drafting committees, legislatures, law reform bodies and the like, and any
expert testimony submitted in legal proceedings.” It seems to me we’re doing
something broader than that, the—
WEST: Wait, that’s not scholarship or that is scholarship?
OLDFATHER: That is scholarship.
WEST: Oh, I think the scope is going to be narrower.
OLDFATHER: Well, it’s both broader and narrower, right, if we’re willing
to include things like blog posts. I think there are two dimensions to this. There
are—there’s the field of the forms it might take and then there’s the component
of it that starts to lead us into candor and neutrality and originality and so forth,
such that one could, I think, write a blog post that advances a new idea and does
it in a relatively exhaustive way, and so forth, that could count as scholarship,
even though that’s not going to be the meat and potatoes of what scholarship
means.
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WEST: Okay. Again, I would just raise a red flag here. I think it’s
important for us to define scholarship for purposes of these ethical norms or
some other way to put it, and remain neutral on whether these different kinds
of forms are in some absolute sense scholarship because it’s a hot button issue
at a lot of schools what to count, what not to count, for purposes of tenure and
promotion and they just can’t weigh in on that. I don’t think we want to.
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think that—just to second that. I think it’s very important
that we make it absolutely clear we’re not weighing in on that and we could
even drop a line to the effect that the AALS may list different things and maybe
doing that precisely for different purposes.
HESSICK: Okay. I want to flag that there’s disagreement here and I think
that we might be able to craft something that both says that there’s legitimate,
I think, disagreement about whether blog posts, op-eds, comments submitted to
administrative agencies, expert testimony, whether these things count as
scholarship or whether they are ways of furthering scholarship. And I think
that we can simply say either, “We’re not going to take a position on this,” or
“We ourselves don’t necessarily agree on a particular position.” Either way.
FRANCIS: So, I think the critical thing to do is to say that we don’t think
the same ethical norms necessarily apply to them, because if you’re doing an
amicus brief, or if you’re trying to persuade a legislator, to go back to what
Chad said yesterday, you start with the outcome and how you frame it and the
ethical norms that go along with that might or might not—I just don’t want to
take a position on the norms of advocacy—be quite different from the ethical
norms that apply to what we’re really focusing on, which is what you publish
in more standard sources, like law reviews.
HESSICK: I’ll say, quite frankly, this is something that I struggle with
because I think that something could both not be scholarship and yet we could
have professional norms that people could violate when they engage in it, under
the auspices of their expertise as a law professor, but I’m not sure that this is
the document to get into it. Maybe the answer is—in light of circumstances, it
may be fluid—the amount to which they apply.
OLDFATHER: And I should say, I’m okay with bracketing these other
things. I think maybe this is something for the introductory paragraph, to
explicitly note that we are speaking about only a certain variety of scholarly
activity or scholarship or—it would be phrased better than that—that we believe
that some of the same sorts of ethical norms that we are articulating here apply
to other things that academics do in their capacity as academics, but that there
may be differences that we’re not specifically addressing.
HESSICK: Did you want to add something, Ryan?
SCOVILLE: No, I was just agreeing.
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HESSICK: Okay. Do we think we’re good with the definition of
scholarship, both trying to capture, I think, variation in methodology and types,
but then also not try to take position on the blog post/amicus debate without?
Okay. I don’t know that this will be the structure at the end of the day, but I
thought it made sense to try to separate out the individual principles or the
individual norms that we wanted to talk about and then have article placement
as a separate issue to comment on, but I understand that people might not agree
with that approach. In some ways, I think that that might help to answer Ryan’s
concern about whether we are simply repeating Dodson & Hirsch, because I
read what they were doing as very explicitly about article placement process,
and I think, from my perspective, our project is much broader—and it may bear
on behavior during the article placement process, but that might also be
something else to think of. I’m curious about your thoughts on that, Ryan.
SCOVILLE: Well, I think my comment was inspired not just by the Dodson
& Hirsch piece, but by the others as well. There’s a collection of pre-existing
draft codes, so I think we need to account for that in deciding what we put to
paper.
HESSICK: Does it make sense to start talking about individual principles,
Leslie?
FRANCIS: Okay, if you’re going to go for that.
HESSICK: Are you sure?
FRANCIS: Yeah.
HESSICK: Okay. Again, not that we’re agreeing on format and structure at
this moment, but in my mind, at least, the idea that there could be conflicts of
interest, sort of “un-consentable” conflicts of interest if you wanted to think
about it in Model Rules of Professional Conduct terms. And then also sort of
conflicts that ought to be dealt with in disclosures, so sort of hint at the fact that
there might be some situations where writing an article would be unethical and
then other situations where there would be an obligation to make particular
disclosures. I mean, what that conflict would be—I don’t know if people would
agree, but there are some times where an article would not be appropriate.
Maybe it’s something as simple as when writing an article would require
compromise with other duties that someone has, such as if someone is
representing someone and then writes an article in that area, where the article
would necessarily be limited by those duties, or if there’s a confidentiality duty,
say because someone clerked on a case or something like that.
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think those are important. A thought—this is another
sort of inchoate thought that I don’t know how to deal with. We’re talking
about law professors as authors here. Law journals often get submissions from
practicing lawyers as well and whether the same norms apply. I think one of
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the things that’s really problematic is if you know you’re going to be involved
in litigating the case and you write an article, or maybe you’ve even been
looking to litigate a case, and you write an article that you specifically are
writing to give your client a litigational advantage. I think that sometimes
happens when law firm folks are authors and I wonder whether we ought to at
least raise that question. You know, “Are the ethical obligations the same?
What’s the story for law reviews when we get these?” et cetera.
WEST: I think we should raise this. I think it’s a really complicated
question because there are instances in which people will write an article and
will say, “I’m writing this as an outline to guide future litigants on my side of
this issue,” particularly in public interest and I’m not sure that disqualifies it
from being a scholarship. I do think that the other extreme, that’s a clear case,
is when somebody’s being actually paid at the moment as a lawyer and writes
as a scholar, they’re compromising the roles [indiscernible] as well. So, I think
it should be raised, but I don’t think there’s a cut and dry answer to it.
HESSICK: Let me just clarify. When I was talking about a conflict of
interest, which would suggest the person couldn’t write the article, I was too
trying to limit myself. I don’t even mean necessarily to paid representation, but
when someone had ethical obligations that could impede them from these
ethical obligations such as—
WEST: Zealousness.
HESSICK: Right, if they have confidentiality or zealous or zeal-type
obligations to a client, but I don’t know if people agree with that.
OLDFATHER: Would it be too broad or too controversial to say that a
scholar should—a law professor, and I think maybe one way to address that
issue is just to get our scope provision, say we’re dealing only here with
scholarship written by legal academics, understanding that other forms of legal
scholarship present other issues. But with respect to the specific disclosure
question, say that a law professor should disclose any information material to
the evaluation of a piece of scholarship, which sort of inherently incorporates
neutrality, disinterestedness—any factor that a reader might want to know in
order to assess the value of this piece as scholarship, whether there is some
potential motivation or other factor that could be affecting this person’s analysis
or perspectives, consciously or unconsciously. I’ve killed the conflicts.
[LAUGHTER]
HESSICK: I’m thinking about what Chad said, so I agree with that, and the
only thing that I would want to add is to the extent that they think that that is
necessary, in order for people to evaluate whether they’ve complied with our
obligations, I would just want to make clear the disclosure itself does not
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somehow lessen their other obligations, but I assume you don’t care if I add
that.
OLDFATHER: No, I agree with that.
SELIGMAN: I just want to say that I think this question seems to go to the
point that Robin’s made several times about defining the purposes of ethical
principles, for what purpose, so that people who are litigators wouldn’t need to
worry about this in the same way.
HESSICK: Are we good with disclosures? Is there anything else that
someone wanted to add on the issue of disclosures or conflicts?
FRANCIS: I think we want to make clear that getting money is over the line
in every case. So, if you’re being paid to represent a client or if you have a
grant or a contract with the foundation, whatever, you need to reveal your
funding sources.
HESSICK: So, just so that we’re all on the same page, we’re not going to
say that they can’t write the article, because otherwise there are people who
couldn’t write their articles, even though I may someday write about how
ridiculous it is, but it has to be disclosed, I agree. Financial funded research
funding has to be disclosed. Should we move onto candor? Okay. So, I know
we’ve spoken a lot about candor up until now. Do people—and one could
arguably think about disclosure as sort of part of candor. One of the things that
we’ve spoken about is that people would need to be explicit about the
methodology that they’re using and explicit about the substantive assumptions
that they’re making, and I think we also talked about—and that that sort of
explicitness would probably be worth sort of drawing in the work by Baude and
his co-authors, whose names I don’t remember. And that we think that there
should be disclosure of data sets. Is that true? Would empiricists agree with
that or would they freak out if we were like, “And you need to disclose your
data set?”
SCOVILLE: No, I think that’s smart.
WEST: Well, I know of one instance, that’s become a hot problem. The
ALI is putting together a set of proposals about this grand bargain such that—
I’m sorry, give up on the idea of consumers actually reading their shrink wrap
contracts in exchange for the courts being urged to apply unconscionability
doctrine more rigorously. This is on the basis of a large, data-driven study they
did, which they’re not sharing. So, I’m just passing these on—a colleague of
mine is writing a piece about his attempt to say the people who did the study
have an ethical obligation to share the data because it was based on a study that
analyzed case results and the suspicion is that the people analyzing the case
results are getting some of their cases wrong because they think they’re actually
accommodating a bunch people who coded the cases are not lawyers, and they

CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1192

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/12/18 9:24 AM

[101:1083

refuse to put it in. So, I’m not sure that there would be no push-back if we make
obvious that people should share their data.
HESSICK: Yeah. And that’s worth talking about. Does that then mean that
this is not sort of “moral failing,” but instead something that although it’s
controversial, like we should obviously flag the fact that it’s controversial.
SELIGMAN: I think if you’re going to make a pronouncement about data
sets, you need to have an asterisk, because I can think of a bunch of social
science circumstances in which the data set shouldn’t be public, because people
have gone through IRB process in which they say, for example, we’re going to
hold your results confidential.
OLDFATHER: And on that specific point, we can, I think, track what the
American Political Science Association says, the provision on data access,
“researchers making evidence-based knowledge claims should reference the
data they use to make those claims. If these are data, they themselves generated
or collected, researchers should provide access to those data or explain why
they cannot.”
WEST: And so, they lose the [indiscernible]?
OLDFATHER: APSA.
FRANCIS: Yeah, I think that’s good. The most relevant ones are either Law
and Society or the APSA. We might want to look at Law and Society as well.
Law and society review whatever they say.
HESSICK: Let’s see. I think that when we talked about candor, we also
talked about two other issues. We talked about the value or the need to
acknowledge uncertainty, to the extent that people project more certainty than
actually exists. And then we also talked about counter-arguments, but in
knowing omission of an important kind of argument would be unethical and
that we all have a duty to carefully try to identify the counter-arguments and
response to them, so one being a positive obligation and one being a failing, if
you then have certain mens rea. Do you folks have thoughts either on the ideas
of certainty or counter-arguments?
OLDFATHER: I agree with both. I think just for purposes of creating a
record and a solid source to draw on, Dick Fallon articulated a similar sort of
norm and called it confrontation, that seems to capture these ideas pretty well.
HESSICK: Agreed. I agree with you and I felt that way as well, about what
he said.
FRANCIS: Yeah, I’m a little concerned with the “you have to reply to it”
and I think it might be fair to say there are possibilities—there are
circumstances in which what you would do is you would flag it, but either for
reasons of space or maybe you just haven’t figured out how to reply to it, you
would flag the counter-argument without actually developing a reply.
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HESSICK: I see what you’re saying. I think that’s been a question—I think
that in some ways that leads into certainty, and, “Here’s this counter argument
and I really can’t figure out what to do with it.” I think that that would satisfy
it, because the response would be, “I don’t know.”
WEST: Or, “It’s my next article.”
HESSICK: Right. Or, “It’s beyond the scope for the following reason.” Are
we good on candor? Do you think we’re missing anything on candor? You
have a look on your face, Ryan?
SCOVILLE: Well, was this where we had the discussion about candor
regarding research assistance?
HESSICK: Oh, it is. Oh, you know what? I think I might have that down
here with attribution, but that’s a really good point. I mean, attribution in some
ways is sort of a sub-set of candor.
FRANCIS: And that’s not just acknowledging your RA, it may be coauthorship or first authorship.
SCOVILLE: Can I just say, as someone who’s relatively junior in all this,
the point at which that sort of attribution or co-authorship is ethically required
is a little unclear to me. So, to the extent that you try to verbalize some sort of
formula on the issue, what would it be?
HESSICK: I don’t know. The norms about this have changed over time, but
it’s unclear—let’s put it this way. The statistics on co-authorship with students
have changed over time, but it’s unclear if that’s because there was a change in
norms or if there was a change in how much work the RAs were doing, or if
there was a change in the idea that you would help out your RA by giving them
authorship, so they could go on the market. I think it’s a little unclear. I would
say, I personally—I’d feel comfortable with something flagging the issue to say
that—and sometimes the work of an RA may rise to the level where coauthorship is appropriate, if not necessary.
FRANCIS: I think we could also say some of the kinds of considerations that
go into that. So, responsibility for the intellectual content, responsibility for
drafting, those would be two things that would count in favor of co-authorship.
Something that we’d count against, saying it rises to the level is pulling all the
cases, finding sources, but a major contribution to the analysis, that’s the kind
of thing that in other fields you’d consider co-authorship.
SCOVILLE: I think there’s some value in being detailed on these types of
issues in the sense that a lot of the problems seem to arise from the fact that,
with junior faculty in particular, it’s not that people know the norm and are
simply disregarding it. It’s that people don’t know the norm. They might
accept that, yes, at some point an RA’s contribution will be enough to warrant
co-authorship, but I would imagine that few have a firm sense for what the
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threshold is. So, it’s an educational document in addition to a normreinforcement document.
HESSICK: I’d be interested in what Amanda has to say, but I’ll tell you that
my entirely unscientific impression here is that there is no real norm and that at
some schools, professors routinely have RAs that write pieces of their articles
for them. And if you doubt that, look up the plagiarism scandals that occurred
in the 1990s and 2000s at Harvard.
SELIGMAN: I just wanted to observe that this is a problem that seems to be
extremely muddled for your field, in a way that is not for other fields, because
you’re so promiscuously inter-disciplinary. So, imagine a J.D.-Ph.D. whose
Ph.D. is the sciences, where the norm is you do a little bit of research on the
project and you get to be on the nineteen-page list of co-authors for a physics
article or whatever. That would be very different from a J.D.-Ph.D. in history,
where a student RA help is almost never rising to the level of co-authorship.
WEST: I was going to make a similar point that on plenty of pieces in the
social sciences someone does much less than what Leslie just described and is
listed as a co-author and the person who is responsible for the number crunching
and who may not have conceptualized the idea continues to get authorship. So,
I think it’s worth stating what some of the norms are in introducing their work
and that there isn’t any concrete norm, for paralegal cases that I’m aware of,
and I know people have very disparate practices on that, and it differs from
school to school. I don’t know what maybe more could be said.
HESSICK: Maybe note the lack of agreement and then flag other areas, and
maybe even flag this as an issue that we, as a discipline, need to spend more
time talking about and grappling with, so that we can have clearer norms for
the fields.
FRANCIS: In some fields, what has emerged as a norm is disclosure, what
the relevant contributions were. And I think it’s Anne Hudson-Jones that has a
particularly interesting discussion of that in the scientific integrity area and
basically, it’s a discussion of—it’s you describe what you’ve contributed and
so in some fields, you’ll actually see a footnote at the beginning of what
everybody did.
HESSICK: Do we want to leave attribution and go to neutrality and
disinterestedness? Or does anyone have anything else to add on attribution?
Oh, I guess, I should say, questions have arisen, on whether there’s attribution
that has to occur beyond for RAs. Like if you speak to someone and they talk
to you and they really help with a particular section, or they come up with a
counter-argument that you hadn’t, do you need to have particular attribution or
is it enough to thank them in your star footnote? I have to say, I’ve never
encountered this being particularly controversial, but what do I know?

CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPT 101 MARQ L REV (4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

6/12/18 9:24 AM

CONFERENCE ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

1195

SELIGMAN: This is a question about what’s norm in your field. Do you
need to disclose or attribute that you’ve presented previous iterations of the
project at a workshop or a conference?
HESSICK: I think people often do, but more to show off because there’s a
sense that it’s you’re indebted to them and it needs to—but maybe I’m wrong.
SELIGMAN: Well, that can also be a way of thanking or not (or
condemning) colleagues for their contributions to your project.
HESSICK: Okay. Well, if folks don’t have strong feelings on this issue,
then maybe we should turn to neutrality and disinterestedness. I know we
talked about this a lot yesterday. I think Chad had a comment that resonated
with me initially about, “Do you start with the question or do you start with the
answer?” But I was actually speaking with Robin at dinner last night and she
flagged, I think, something that I knew, but wasn’t thinking of, which is,
sometimes we work on a project because we have very strong feelings about
something that happened, so we don’t necessarily start—it depends on how you
might frame the whole starting with the question versus starting with an
answer—but sometimes we go and we think to ourselves, “That case can’t be
rightly decided, that’s got to be wrong. Now, let me try to figure out why.” So
it’s almost like you’re starting with the answer and seeking the question. That’s
not to say that I don’t think that there’s such a thing as disinterestedness,
because I do think that there’s a difference. Me personally here, I’m just
speaking, between saying “I can feel that this is wrong, I need to try to figure
out why,” and maybe, “I might change my mind and actually come to the
opposite conclusion,” and maybe it’s that last bit that matters. I’m getting some
positive reinforcement here from Chad. And maybe it’s that idea that we’re
trying to capture.
WEST: So, last night, I was remembering this piece that I’m sure most of
you have read in which [the author] said judges always start with the answer
and then they look through the precedent to see if there’s any case that actually
prevents them from writing the opinion, Posner says something similar in his
most recent book. Nevertheless, I think the formulation is fine because of that
qualification. I just want to say, disinterestedness, my idea was not so much
neutrality as it was that there’s a shared legal method between lawyers, judges
and academics, but the difference, again, is the scholar has the luxury of time
and depth and breadth, and also that the scholar’s just plain not representing
their client. That’s pretty much all I meant, it’s a kind of bare thing. That’s
what makes me queasy, frankly, about an ecumenical definition of scholarship
that includes amicus briefs. There’s no client, per se, but there’s an interest.
And my gut instinct, institutionally, is to think of that work as service and not
as scholarship. I know that plenty of other people disagree, but that’s where
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it’s coming from. I do think of scholarship as something that just can’t have a
background client, that that’s the difference between the lawyer and the scholar.
HESSICK: So, I want to hear from other people, but I wonder if openmindedness might be part of it though, maybe open-mindedness?
HORWITZ: Yeah. So, I think Stanley in particular would have a conniption
not only—but if we kind of treated disinterestedness as neutrality—while I
don’t mind terms like “neutrality” or “objectivity” in other areas and I don’t
treat them as anathema, yeah, I agree. That the goal is not neutrality as such
and for me, a lot of it is covered by disclosure, but there are different ways to—
I’m not pushing for that, so I agree on that point, and maybe a different
conversation—it seems to me that somewhere in-between—I mean, insofar as
you’re a friend of the court, and insofar, more importantly, as you’re using your
affiliation with your institution, there may be particular obligations. But I don’t
feel it necessary to call them scholarship just to think that the scholar has some
ethical obligations about how he or she does kind of work.
OLDFATHER: Just to riff on the judicial intuition point a little bit, because
I firmly believe in that, as a thing. I think it’s a valid thing. I think coupled
with it though is the phrase you sometimes hear from judges, which is, “It just
won’t write.” And so, there’s this habit of mind or a frame of mind that is
perhaps best described as disinterestedness—is it, “This case is wrong?” or is
it, “Can this case possibly be right?” And I think you’re talking more about
that latter idea. So really, I’m willing to call that, starting with a question rather
than an answer, because you approached it with the right attitude of, “I think
my reaction here is going to prove to be the correct reaction, but I’m going to
test it.”
HESSICK: Oh, and I really like that you said test.
SELIGMAN: So, from my privileged status as outsider here, I’m hearing two
entirely different things at work that are intermixed, one of which is about the
process of scholarship and where does the idea come from? Therefore, where
does it head to and whether open-mindedness is salient? The other thing I’m
hearing is, is there some real-world consequence at stake, which would be more
about neutrality, less about open-mindedness?
HORWITZ: Can you expand on that? Just the last part.
SELIGMAN: I don’t know.
HORWITZ: Fair enough.
SELIGMAN: So, the first part was clear?
HORWITZ: Yeah.
SELIGMAN: So, the disinterestedness—I think this is the disinterestedness
that Robin was speaking of, but I’m not positive since I’m not enmeshed in this.
But it has to do with the person who wants a particular outcome for cases that
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are currently under discussion and wants to influence the outcome. I think
that’s something different from the process by which one gets from point A to
point B intellectually.
HESSICK: Yeah. And, I’ll add the more time I spend thinking about it, the
queasier I got about the idea that we had to have sort of like a purity of motive
sort of test. For one thing, I don’t think it would just accurately describe the
norms of the profession, but also because when trying to think more about this
last night, I think where I was, was the idea, as long as people are open to the
thought, that they are drawing the wrong conclusions, and they are in the
process, trying to test those conclusions and to test those arguments, and here,
I actually thought there’s a law review article by Eugene Volokh and he makes
this point that, as a former computer programmer, he runs test sweeps with his
theses, like his legal thesis. My understanding from his explanation of a law
review article is you try out your code in lots of different ways, to see if it
actually functions, and so that was sort of what he was proposing people to do,
to make sure that it’s not the circumstances that are driving the legal argument
or the legal conclusion that you’re drawing, that that legal conclusion or the
legal argument would stand on its own in a number of different contexts, and if
not, why not, and to think that that’s part of what we have to do.
WEST: Let me just give the hackneyed example. One might imagine a law
review article that argues that there should be recovery for tort victims of
emotional distress even if there’s no touching, and this is against the weight of
considerable authority saying, “No, there should not be such recovery for
emotional distress injuries.” One can imagine a law review article that argues
that and comes to the conclusion, strongly stated, nothing neutral about it,
“Yeah, there should be recovery.” One can also imagine, of course, a brief
doing the same thing, on behalf of a client. What I mean by disinterested is just
that the author of the law review article should not be, also, in the business of
representing clients in those circumstances, and so then that frees that author to
treat this subject in more depth, to take on the counter-arguments and more
depth, and so on. And the lawyer, who’s got the same basic argument in mind
and is using basically the same method, is just engaged in a different enterprise
of representing an interest.
HESSICK: So, I guess maybe the question then to you, Robin, is do you
think that unlike the lawyer, the law professor has the obligation to be open to
the fact that that actually isn’t the right rule to arrive at?
WEST: Yes. Absolutely.
HESSICK: Unlike the lawyer?
WEST: Correct.
HESSICK: Okay.
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BOOTHE-PERRY: An incomplete form thought at this point. Are we then
back to defining what this legal scholarship, that these principles apply to?
Because if you are writing, even though it applies to the law, but it is for
advocacy purposes or you’re bound by some other ethical constraints because
of the capacity in which you as the law professor are writing, this doesn’t apply
to you.
HESSICK: So, I could be wrong, and Robin should correct me if I am. I do
think that we are excluding people who have a client and are writing for a client,
from the realm of scholarship. I don’t think that we are excluding people who
say, “I am writing this article because I think that there are tort plaintiffs out
there, who could be making these arguments and here’s an argument that we
could use to change the law in this area.” I don’t think that this excludes that,
because we’re nonetheless imposing an obligation on the person who is writing
that scholarship, that he or she may come to the conclusion that the law actually
does not support this, right?
WEST: Absolutely right, yeah.
BOOTHE-PERRY: Right.
HESSICK: Okay.
SELIGMAN: So, I’m almost thinking, in response to what I’m hearing about
this dual role, that law professors sometimes have advocacy as part of their
work. That should be addressed in a major point, parallel to intro, definition of
scholarship, and individual norms and principles. It should say, “Here’s the
conflicted role and these are some of the consequences: conflict of interest or
disclosures are different, candor is different, disinterestedness is a problem.”
To say that explicitly and to say tenure and promotion committees need to
realize that you’re going to have to parse what somebody does.
HORWITZ: So, I guess a subject of scholarly interest for me these days is
the concept of office. Not in a sense of how to interpret office or trust under
the United States, although it’s relevant to that, but kind of the idea that
particular jobs, like judge, like scholar, are an office, and the kind of oldfashioned sense of the word. You enter into a particular realm where you have
particular duties and so on. And that, I think, is part of how I respond to this
thinking. Are you acting in the office of a law professor or acting in the office
of a lawyer representing a client? And I’ll say for me, one of the ways this
plays out is—to add a third, are you acting as a citizen or, in my case, permanent
resident, but as a civic resident? And there are ways in which, as I said, I think,
for democratic purposes, it is valuable sometimes to offer your opinion without
offering your letterhead because it’s egalitarian and so on. But, for me, it plays
out in part in terms of, “How is the person representing him or herself?” Is the
letterhead there because it’s the mailing address where you need to send replies
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to the lawyer or is it there to give weight and authority and say “I am invoking
the office of the scholar in this work?” What it’s not always doing, but that’s
how it plays out for me, how it plays out in the document is a somewhat separate
question.
HESSICK: I hear what you’re saying, and I actually just wanted to highlight
one more thing. I think that in saying that people can write an article in which
they’re saying, “I want to make this argument because I think advocates might
be able to make it,” maybe they even have an obligation to do that, as a matter
of candor. I don’t know, but, from my perspective, they would not be relieved
of the obligation of confrontation or of any other obligations of candor as well.
And I think in some ways, this illustrates the inter-dependency of these values
and that—it-just-won’t-write idea is one that, by having to go through the
exercise of confrontation, that’s how we help to ensure open-mindedness as
well.
WEST: Just one more quick point. I like the way Amanda put it very much,
but I do think we need to drop an asterisk or a footnote or something that we
are not dictating to schools or tenure committees, what they will count as
fellowship purposes of tenure. And Georgetown has a very broad definition of
scholarship, that seemingly includes letters you write home from summer camp.
And so, that’s a whole different conversation, right, what should be included
for purposes of tenure.
HESSICK: I think that’s right, and I think we should be quite explicit about
that, I agree with you, Robin. Is there more on open-mindedness? Do we want
to call it open-mindedness? Maybe even, does it go a little bit beyond
disinterestedness, that we want to link them together? I don’t know.
WEST: I say just try to write it and—
HESSICK: Okay. That’s fair. Does it write? Is it time to move on to
exhaustiveness or thoroughness, do we think? I’ll count to seven really quickly
as I look at my notes. Okay. So, I think that when we talked about
exhaustiveness and thoroughness, we spoke both in sort of general obligations
that a scholar has, that could arguably, tie into ideas of expertise, in terms of
their general ongoing obligation to remain engaged and well-read in their fields.
But I also think that we also said something more specific for a specific project,
that not only do we have an obligation to treat our topic however we may have
defined it in an exhaustive manner, but that also, too, we have an obligation to
canvas what has come before, so that we can try to situate what we’re doing.
And then, yeah, where that then ties into, do we have an ethical obligation to
situate what we’re doing and what has happened before, and how that ties into
concerns that we have about over-claims about originality and novelty. So,
again, these things are sort of all inter—
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WALD: Yesterday I jotted down competence, reasonableness, and good
faith.
HESSICK: No, I think that that is helpful. Competence, reasonable—can
you talk just a little bit more about—since you wrote those down, what you’re
attaching to those ideas.
WALD: An example of incompetence would be failing to identify a
previously published source directly on point in terms of one’s subject matter.
Reasonableness entails questions such as how many hours of research must you
commit to your work, how many cases and articles must you review and in what
fashion before you say can reasonably say enough is enough? Must one cite
and discuss every source ever published on or relevant to the subject matter?
Can one make a professional judgment call and if so, applying what standards
as to what to engage with substantively and what to omit? Finally, there’s the
issue of good faith. If you find something in terms of competence and you
decide to engage with it in terms of reasonableness, how do you do so and what
do you do with it? Yesterday, we talked about how intentional exclusion or not
giving credit when it is due is an ethical fault and an instance of bad faith.
HESSICK: No, I think that that’s really helpful. Do people have more on
exhaustiveness or thoroughness?
SELIGMAN: Almost. Something about obligation not to suppress relevant
sources.
HESSICK: Right. So, we have both an obligation to learn about what they
are, but also an obligation to make sure that we include them or nod to them. I
will say, I do have a little bit of a concern about this for people who write on
issues that come up all the time. I think Chad’s example from yesterday really
resonated, because it didn’t look as though the person tried to find out whether
there was anything that had been written, but I do think that sometimes there
will be a topic that’s been so well-canvased and the question is how many of
the 3,000 hits from the JLR database do you read? How far back in time do
you have to go with what you’re doing? Do you have an obligation to look for
law review articles that aren’t captured on those electronic databases? I’ll say
I don’t think that that’s the norm of the profession.
HORWITZ: No.
BOOTHE-PERRY: Just to address that point really quickly then. That would
go to Eli’s point about reasonableness and, somebody said it yesterday,
reasonable exhaustiveness. I don’t remember, maybe it was you that said it, so
I really liked that. On the thoroughness, the politeness norm that we’re talking
about and the willingness to accept and to give criticism of other scholarship,
would we put that under thoroughness or would we put it under candor? The
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principles are so inter-related, but I think—I didn’t see it on the board yet, so
wanted to make sure we didn’t forget about that.
HESSICK: No, I think that’s a really good point. And if we’re talking about
engagement, and that we need to have substantive engagement and we also have
to worry about tone, it’s a fair question about where to put that on that list, we
don’t have it up there on that list at all, it’s not—I agree, we need to remember
that.
FRANCIS: Carissa, I really like the way you pose those as questions and I
think, to the extent we’re doing this as informative, there’s room in this
document for some things that don’t take a position one way or another, but say
in considering reasonableness, these are some of the things you might want to
think about, because that really gives guidance to your fellows and folks like
that. I also don’t know where we want to bring up and I’m still a great
proponent of peer review, and I think we sort of gave up on peer review, in the
sense that we thought law reviews aren’t going to do it, but we also talked about
the way authors can do it. So, maybe it’s remembering that scholarship is not
a lonely process and that while peer review has a great deal of—we recognize
the problems with our field, we also recognize the problems that peer review
has, but some of the advantages are that the potential for getting neutral, if it’s
done in the way in which you mask your identities mask, getting neutral eyes
that are expert eyes, and I think we need to talk about—somewhere, that needs
to be on the table. Engagement of other scholars—attempting so far as possible
to help—to move the quality of your scholarship in the direction of the kind of
quality you get from peer review. I’m not quite sure how to phrase it but I don’t
want it to be forgotten.
HESSICK: No, I think it’s a good idea and I just—in light of what Nicky
just said and what you just said, I’ve added to the board that maybe what we
have here is an independent norm of engagement that includes solicitation of
feedback or review of one’s own work. So, did I see a hand up here?
SELIGMAN: So, much as I agree with you about the value of peer review,
Leslie, the way you described it sounded to me more like an argument that about
quality rather than ethics, so I would sort of put a pause there. But I’ve also
noticed that there was a series of issues that have come up over the course of
the past couple days. I think we’ll get to article placement, but also about the
world of law reviews, that suggest a whole separate document, a separate
statement of some sort is needed, which is not identical with this project, but is
tied up to it.
HESSICK: Yeah. And I’ll add—maybe we can disagree about whether the
solicitation of feedback or engagement is in itself the norm. I think it might be.
I’ve certainly had conversations with people where they say, “Look, you have
a draft that’s criticizing someone else’s work, it is appropriate to send it to that
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person, to ask them for their views.” And Cass Sunstein is not going to write
back, and that’s fine, but for other people, you have an obligation to send it to
them, so at the very least, they can push back on how you’re characterizing
what they’ve said and that it is considered poor form to publish something
without having engaged with the person first. I don’t know if other people have
had that experience or share that view, but I have to say the idea that you have
to give somebody an opportunity to at least respond to how you’re
characterizing their work, I thought that that was a fair criticism and I now try
to observe it.
FRANCIS: That’s actually something you wouldn’t be expected to do in
many other disciplines. The peer review process would take care of that
because presumably the peer reviewers would have read the views of the person
you’re criticizing and would say, “You’ve mischaracterized Jones,” or, “You
left out something really critical for the Jones’ line of argument,” and because
Jones is going to come back and give you potential garbage, Jones isn’t neutral
either.
SELIGMAN: Carissa, I just want to push back at you a little bit because this
conversation makes clear to me that norms and ethics are different, right. You
can have an unethical norm.
FRANCIS: Yep.
HESSICK: Maybe. I agree, I think puffery might be a norm at this point.
WALD: There’s a way to share your work with people you criticize and
with those you agree with. A scholar needs to but also should want to share
work with both to improve the quality of the work.
HESSICK: That it’s a failing if you don’t do it, that it’s instead something
that can help further some of these other values or these other principles.
WEST: Okay. That’s all well and good, but it doesn’t really get to Leslie’s
point, which is that the peer review process is a gatekeeping role and that there’s
nothing comparable in the law review process in terms of peers doing this. And
you send it to your friends, you send it to people you’ve discussed, you send it
to people you’ve criticized who might get back to you, none of that is blinded
and none of it is just genuine peer review, so I don’t know if we want to take
the bull by the horns and say something about that, or if we don’t. It seems to
me the threshold question is, “Do we want to address this or do we not?” And
then we can talk about what we have to say about it.
HESSICK: How do people feel about me putting that here with article
placement—article placement/peer review, and we take it up in just a minute
after we—I don’t think that we have much left to go through, for the individual
principles, does that sound good? Okay, great. So, sincerity made a bit of a
comeback this morning, I just wanted to flag that. I remember Ryan said a
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couple of things. Ryan mentioned the idea of a duty to withdraw and—oh, there
was one more thing that he said that I’m—oh, and consistency—a duty to
withdraw and consistency. I have to say, I thought that the duty to withdraw,
that it not happen sort of sub rosa, I don’t know whether we would be
identifying a norm that exists or identifying the fact that sometimes people do
it and when they don’t, they ought to. But I thought that one in particular was
certainly worthy of consideration.
OLDFATHER: This is another one of those instances where I was going
back through the notes I had taken and found that Dick Fallon characterized it
in a little bit different way that I think it’s helpful and I think I agree with it. He
identified a principle of trustworthiness and here I’m quoting, “Which demands
that she sincerely believe all of her claims or arguments and that she state them
in ways not intended to mislead her readers about their relation to other
arguments or evidence.”25 Which isn’t quite sincerity, although it’s a piece of
it.
HORWITZ: I don’t know what it means in this context to sincerely believe
in one’s arguments. First of all, the second point that Ryan made, which he did
under the rubric of sincerity, I see as potentially falling within kind of integrity
or candor and so on.
HESSICK: Which was the second one, again?
HORWITZ: The second one with consistency. The first one, the duty to
withdraw under certain circumstances. I guess I’d also view as it doesn’t have
to be made as a consistency argument. The point is valid, but I’m not sure we
need a new slot, so to speak, to put it there and I would think more in terms of
good faith, thoroughness, some of the values that we’ve talked about, even
again, candor rather than sincerity—at least I don’t think we need to—can’t
speak for Stanley in his absence by relabeling it as sincerity, but I’m happy to
hear everyone.
HESSICK: Amanda?
SELIGMAN: So, I’m actually troubled by the notion of a duty to withdraw.
It strikes me as unrealistic and maybe even undesirable. If you want to have
something like that, I might call it like a duty to reconsider. I can imagine the
scholar who wrote something that twenty years later, they don’t particularly
agree with anymore, but they also have moved on intellectually and they’re
exhausted by that and putting on them a duty to withdraw or even to write an
article rebutting what they wrote twenty years ago strikes me as something
that’s simply is not going to happen. What if they change their mind after they
retire?

25. Fallon, supra note 1, at 240.
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HESSICK: Robin?
WEST: I completely agree. I’m not sure there’s a duty to retract or
withdraw a piece if you come to change your mind, you might change your
mind again, and you may think there’s value in the article, even if you no longer
agree with it, and that there’s something to be said for letting it be. You thought
it at one time, so I would soften that anyway. I do think it’s worth saying
something about this because sincerity so clearly contrasts with our lawyer
sense of consistency or lack of obligation to consistency or even to believe
everything you say. I mean, there’s that famous Daniel Webster line about
argue in the morning for one side and the afternoon for the other side, and that’s
a clichéd observation, but it’s one that’s routinely fed to students, anyway,
about lawyers. And so, I just think there may be something worth saying along
these lines. Again, not a consistency over time, but a sincerity with respect to
arguments made before [indiscernible].
HESSICK: So, in sort of Fallon’s trustworthiness vein?
WEST: Yeah, I like that.
HESSICK: Okay.
FRANCIS: In another field, if I discover that I miscalculated my statistics, I
have an obligation to let the journal know.
WEST: That’s different.
FRANCIS: And if I discover that I inadvertently omitted 20% of my dataset
and when I recalculate it, it comes out differently, there’s an obligation to let
the journal know. I’m stewing about whether there’s an exact equivalent of that
in law, but, certainly, if I’m doing empirical legal research, it would seem I
have an obligation to meet some of those standards. It would also seem to me
that, suppose I make a claim like there are no cases on point. Now, of course,
there might be later cases, but suppose I realize that my Westlaw search, I got
bored and I omitted twenty cases or my RA reported to me that searching
everything in the Westlaw database up to a particular point in time, and then I
later learned that the RA had been in a fight with a significant other and lied to
me. I think I have got an obligation to let journals know those kinds of things.
WEST: I think that’s right. I just don’t think it’s—I think when we overstate
it.
FRANCIS: Oh yeah, I want to be really careful not to overstate.
WALD: Not to add to our can of worms, but when I asked Ryan yesterday
about scholarly consistency, I had something totally different in mind. Not
whether scholars can over time change their minds in published work, but rather
the phenomenon of legal scholars testifying as expert witnesses and
contradicting in court their own published work, or at least testifying in a way
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that is useful to a particular client but not entirely consistent with their published
work.
HESSICK: So, I know Amanda raised her hand. I do want to flag—maybe
the duty to withdraw, at least it appeared to me to be the most important, if
people are, sort of, sub silentio contradicting something that they had said
before, that maybe part of the duty of candor that’s also related to this idea of
sincerity, but maybe it’s not related to sincerity, is to then explain why. To both
flag that you’ve changed your mind in whatever it is that you’re now saying is
contradicting something that you said previously, and why it is that you’ve
chosen to contradict yourself previously, but I don’t know how people would
feel about that.
SELIGMAN: So, it seemed to me what Leslie was describing was discovery
of errors in research or flaws in the research method, and that’s something that
definitely I would think would be an ethical obligation to report for correction,
which is different from the notion of withdrawing or requiring somebody to
write a new article explaining why they think something differently, which is
also different from what you were saying.
WEST: You know, Richard Posner famously said that he no longer believes
what he used to argue passionately, which is the pursuit of justice is fulfilled by
the duty to maximize wealth. It’s a pretty important claim he made there about
maximization of wealth being the sole goal of law, and it’s important that he
changed his mind. But I think it would be quite regrettable if he felt the need
to withdraw the 200 pieces in which he argued that, in the ten books. Those are
still important resources. He doesn’t believe it anymore, plenty of other people
do.
HESSICK: No, I think that that’s actually a perfect example, Robin, and so
maybe that’s, then, what he would need to do, is if he’s writing something else
that disagrees with it, explain why, that that is also valuable. More on sincerity?
I think we’re still on track to finish on time, which I am very excited about. I
did have a question for you guys about originality and novelty, because I think
when it comes to claims about originality and novelty, my concern is largely
one of candor that’s related a little bit to thoroughness, but I wonder whether
it’s worth breaking out, individually, here, to talk about originality or novelty
because there was some of the reading that we did, talked about how
scholarship needs to break new ground. Maybe it’s enough to mention this
issue when speaking about candor and when speaking about exhaustiveness or
thoroughness. I actually have to say, I think it might be useful to say
scholarship need not be original, it need not be novel in order to be good
scholarship and perhaps we’ve overvalued the norm—or we’ve overvalued the
worth of originality and novelty such that we’ve led people down this path, or
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maybe it’s enough to just deal with it when we talk about candor and
exhaustiveness, but I’d be curious what you guys think about it.
WALD: It might depend on what we mean by originality and novelty. I
don’t know that we always need to either aspire to or actually attempt to
reinvent the wheel in our scholarship. But presumably, everything we write has
a component of originality and novelty, moving beyond the mere summary and
synthesizing of existing work. In any event, whatever we do write, we must
avoid puffery and describe the originality of our contributions accurately.
HESSICK: Thoughts on maybe drafting the question about how to deal with
originality or novelty or other thoughts on it and its place and legal scholarship?
Okay. So, expertise—it had gotten broken out at some point, but I wonder how
much we think that expertise is something other than—or in addition to
competence. Do we think that there is anything about expertise that’s beyond
trying to become competent in an area? I mean, I will add, expertise sounds
like a different concept to me than competence, and I would personally hope
that law professors are striving for expertise and not merely competence, and I
guess that this goes to Robin’s point from before, about how one of the things
that differentiates legal scholarship from brief writing is the time and the
thoroughness that sort of goes into it, but I’d be curious what others have to say.
SELIGMAN: So, when I heard this discussion yesterday, what I thought it
was about was not overstating the depth of one’s expertise in the non-scholarly
context. So, if you were going to comment in a blog or in some other format
on some matter that was really a civic opinion rather than something that came
out of your scholarship, to not trade on that with your letterhead or whatever
else one might use. So, this was less about the content of the scholarship itself
and more about what to do with it in other contexts.
HESSICK: Yeah. Other thoughts on expertise?
OLDFATHER: This, I think, too, might be better characterized as relating to
competence, but I recall seeing an—and I don’t remember which of the
standards I saw it in, but—maybe it’s history, maybe it’s political science,
perhaps it’s even AALS, at least one of them makes reference to an obligation
on the part of scholars to continue to develop or refine their methodologies,
their expertise, their scholarly apparatus—you know, to continue to grow,
which isn’t merely keeping up with the latest developments in the field, but, I
think, continuing to be mindful about the approaches one takes. Maybe that’s
just competence.
FRANCIS: If what we’re looking at is publication ethics, it might be a little
different than what are our ethical obligations as scholars, which I think are
broader than our ethical obligations as authors, but it’s important.
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HESSICK: And I’ll add that, although I think that we have an obligation to
become experts in our field, I certainly think that people who are just entering
the field can publish scholarship, I just think that there needs to be a certain
amount of modesty and humility involved in that, and maybe even special care
associated with it.
HORWITZ: Well, I’ll again, briefly—and acknowledging there are
problematic applications—say the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have
something to add here, I mean that you can develop an area of expertise, but
you have to work up to it—and certainly, and it’s a problem, given that our
structure requires fellows to write ground-breaking huge claim articles, not your
fellows—the job process seems to encourage them to make huge claim articles
right from the get-go rather than modest ones, at exactly the time when we
should be saying, “Write on the narrow field.”
HESSICK: And I’ll add, maybe this is something for the editor statement
beforehand, to say, “Look, we have all of these pathologies and the idea that
we expect ground-breaking work from entry-level people is one of those
pathologies.” Is there more on expertise? Did you want to add something,
Ryan?
SCOVILLE: On audience, I think law schools are an important part of the
audience in the sense that people engage in unethical behavior for a reason—
they have incentives to do it. In our case, some of those incentives come from
our institutions—from promotion and tenure policies and the like. To that
extent, it’s important for law schools to consider their own roles and whether
they might reform their personnel policies to make it easier for law professors
to abide by principles of scholarly ethics.
HESSICK: Yeah, I think that that’s right. You know, Paul said this in our
last session, but I don’t think that there’s any denying the fact that some of these
pathologies are because ours is sort of a “hierarchical system” and we’ve
created incentives for people to act in a particular way, that then there’s a race
to the bottom, to the extent that those behaviors are effective.
WEST: Do we also get to list our own egregious breaches of all of these
norms?
HESSICK: Oh, I plan on just atoning for mine later.
HORWITZ: You know, the editor’s introduction can have the sin-eater—
HESSICK: There we go. Sin-eater section. I like that. And yes, I actually
was thinking about—as we’re talking about these things, how often, I, myself,
have violated these norms and why you even feel better confessing that
publicly. Unless people had more on the idea of engagement or solicitation and
feedback, which I’m actually not sure is going to make it into this, in any sort
of broken out way, it was just something that I added at the end, sort of this idea
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about, “Do we have an obligation of engagement or an obligation to solicit
feedback?” Maybe it’s a good time to turn to article placement, peer review,
those sorts of things. Did you have something to add, Leslie?
FRANCIS: Another way to do it would be to note in the editor’s note at the
beginning, some of what this group regards as pathologies of legal publishing
and that we don’t think that these can be changed by this document but this
document is written within those constraints and we would hope that those
constraints continue to be re-evaluated.
HESSICK: I like that idea. Are we ready to turn to article placement and
peer review? So, let me just say a couple of things at the outset that we’ve
already talked about, that are relatively uncontroversial. The first is the idea
that so much of legal scholarship appears in law reviews that are edited by
students, and because of that, it may lead to sub-pathologies or it may create
additional incentives for people to behave in a strategic manner. Maybe it’s
also worth noting the hierarchy concerns here or not, but I do think that a couple
of the things that we want to highlight here are the idea that importantly, candor
should extend to a submission process, that it ought not be accepted that people
make affirmative misstatements, for example, in the materials that they submit,
that accompany, their article placement, and that’s sort of directly misleading
the law review staff. And there’s going to be sort of shades of this. I think
Ryan’s right. A lot of people engage in puffery, I’ve engaged in puffery. I was
actually advised to engage in puffery, it seems like a fabulous idea, and I
benefited from it, I will say. But I do think that it’s worth pointing out, that
these norms don’t just apply to things when they are published, but that they
ought to apply during the submission process as well. But I’m happy to hear
more what we’d like to talk about in addition to that.
FRANCIS: So, does it make any sense for us to recommend that that
submission process be anonymous?
HESSICK: I think that it is worth discussing the fact that—I think it’s with
the exception of Stanford—I think Stanford is the only one where you actually
have to certify that you’ve removed your identifying information. I think
Harvard and Yale may say that they prefer it, I don’t remember.
HORWITZ: Some of them say they do it and may or may not do it. Some
of them do it, but also the authors are not—I mean—not without reason.
Sometimes, obviously you’re going to discuss your own work or cite to, but the
authors know ways to signal. Whether it’s totally prescriptive or, again,
guidance and so on, I think it is a valid concern to raise. Whether it comes in
the form—I think it’s both actually, obligations to authors but also,
recommendations to law review editors that they review articles as the title
“article review editor” suggests, and not review extraneous material.
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FRANCIS: So, another little thing that we might tuck in here, and I’m
interested in what the students think about it, is that law reviews must disclose
fully and honestly the nature of their submission and review process, including
whether review is anonymous, whether they consider pieces or give preference
to pieces from their own law schools, et cetera.
HESSICK: Yeah, and I’m going to hand this to Paul in just a second, but I
actually think that if what we’re trying to state is an ethic or a rule of ethics or
a norm, I think that it would be uncontroversial to say that the article submission
process, that when articles are reviewed, the primary—if not the sole criteria
should be the quality of the manuscript itself, and I understand that sometimes
things are used as a proxy for that, but I think it’s worth stating of the reason
for acceptance or rejection should be the quality of the manuscript itself.
HORWITZ: So, I’ll avoid a rant about disciplinarity and how that plays out
in the use or overuse of proxies in our field, but the only edit or add-on I’d make
to that is obviously we want to make recommendations to law reviews and law
review editors without treating them as the primary culprit so we’re burdening
them. I mean, this is about what the profession, what the legal academic
profession, ought to be doing and so part of the answer is the profession,
through its bodies or otherwise, ought to encourage and compile accurate
statements of the law review process or the journal in order to be published.
SCOVILLE: It seems like this part of the discussion—everything about the
article placement process—doesn’t really belong in the broader discussion on
principles of scholarly ethics. I think it’s an important topic, but we might
consider putting it in a separate document, which we’d also publish.
HESSICK: That’s a fair question.
OLDFATHER: And I think the point that it’s covered well in the Dodson &
Hirsch article already makes it less important for us to spend the time on it. I
agree with the approach that they articulate. And the only thing that they really
don’t touch is the bit that we just did talk about, which is the process of review
and what criteria should be—which I think ought to be non-controversial.
HESSICK: Yeah, and let me add, if what we’re identifying in part are the
pathologies that have created incentives for law professors to act other than
ethically, we do have other places in the document where we can say—one of
the pathologies is that the quality of an article—one thing that would have to
change in order for these incentives to change, is that the quality of an article
needs to be its primary, if not sole criteria for article submission and that law
professors and law schools should work towards that goal or that end, but I
don’t know how people feel about that. Leslie?
FRANCIS: We might want to consult Neil because he just wrote the piece
about peer review as well.
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HESSICK: Good point. More on article placement or peer review? We’re
at 12:31. I am so proud of us. No? All right. I’m sure that Chad and Paul want
to say things to you and here I don’t have to hold this up anymore. I feel a little
bit too much like a talk show host. I really appreciate all of you coming and
doing this. Although I feel passionately about these things, I’m not sure that I
had been very thoughtful about them and I actually feel very differently after
having talked to everyone for a couple of days, and I do think that it’s perfectly
legitimate for us to come up with a document and have a bunch of back and
forth on what that document looks like and not even agree on the document. I,
in fact, am always shocked whenever a faculty group of more than two people
agrees on anything. So, I really hope that this will lead us to talk—maybe even
decide that, in addition to what we’d originally spoken about here, I may
personally addend like a little statement that talks about the things that I think
are particularly important and the things that I have reservations about, and I
don’t know if that’s something that Paul and Chad think are good or bad. Or,
I’ll call it “Hessick, P., concurring in judgement” or something.
HORWITZ: So, let me say, I agree with Carissa first that—and I mean this
as a good thing, not as an expert or anything—that I think people ought to feel
free to respond and react to the document, not because I want to encourage
people to do more work than they’ve already done, which is considerable, but
they should feel the freedom to do so. I appreciate that we’ve talked so much
about how much we value the law review editors and the mechanics of their
process. You don’t have X number of pages plus an extra two hundred and
what’s more it’s not your personal goal to make this the most number of pages
ever and I’ll say my contribution, as—which is typical of hastily written case,
was too long and I intend to shorten it as much as I can, but I certainly encourage
people to have their addenda as they wish and I just want you to understand that
that’s something that people might want to do. To the extent that I am at all a
co-organizer, I really want to thank you two and especially Chad and
Marquette, the system, the resources, the helpfulness and the hospitality. I’ve
never seen law professors not be decent about acknowledging this, so it’s not a
problem, but I think we all know that the staff who don’t always get named are
nevertheless lynch pins who make our lives much, much better and I just want
to convey our thanks to them. And I would say, it’s probably typical for any of
us who organize round tables or conferences, feedback is always welcome and
appreciated. This is not a format like an annual round table that we’ve been
doing every year, but one can always improve and if there are things we can do
better, by all means, we’re happy to hear it. Or, if there are things that you
thought were novel and good, so that we ought to—
HESSICK: Or even not that novel—
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HORWITZ: Fair enough. We’re totally not original, but a good idea that we
ought to do the next time—you know, any of us individually are planning, we’re
happy to do it.
OLDFATHER: That we can recharacterize as completely novel.
HESSICK: That’s right.
HORWITZ: Fair enough. It’s something the three of us have been talking
about doing for a long time and since you’ve urged for me to be on social media,
the happiness is a two-day conference on this subject, at least some of which is
a discussion of overclaims and novelty and it’s something I’ve ranted on my
blog for so long that it’s nice to do it in a better format. Anyway, it’s been a
real treat and much appreciated.
OLDFATHER: Yeah, so just briefly, thank you all. Please take a coaster
with Marquette Law School on it as a token of our appreciation for your
coming. I really want to thank our law review editors who have been wonderful
to work with, patient, as they have come to me and asked well, how many pages
are we talking about here and saying, I have no idea because this is a new thing,
and I think they were relieved to see the quality and even the length of the five
pagers plus that came in, and so thanks to them, both of what you’ve done so
far and your work going forward, thanks to you all. This was a lot of fun and I
look forward to continuing to move it forward, and I hope that we get a
transcript that we can work with. I hope that the mic that was out wasn’t out
too much. I suspect that there’d be some gaps in the transcript, but
unfortunately—which we can try to fill in, but we’ll get it transcribed as quickly
as we can and get it out to everybody and we’ll see what we have to work with.
So, thank you all.

